City of Seattle v. Lange

• Decision Date: 06 July 2021
• Docket Number: No. 78071-9-I consolidated with No. 81430-3-I,78071-9-I consolidated with No. 81430-3-I
• Citation: City of Seattle v. Lange, 491 P.3d 156 (Wash. App. 2021)
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: CITY OF SEATTLE, Appellant, v. William LANGE, Respondent.

491 P.3d 156

CITY OF SEATTLE, Appellant,

v.William LANGE, Respondent.

No. 78071-9-I consolidated with No. 81430-3-I

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

FILED July 6, 2021

Danielle Malcolm, Seattle City Attorney's Office Criminal, 701 5th Ave. Ste. 2050, Seattle, WA, 98104-7095, for Appellant.

John Marlow, King County Department of Public Defense, 710 2nd Ave. Ste. 700, Seattle, WA, 98104-1724, for Respondent.

PUBLISHED OPINION

Verellen, J.

¶ 1 A defendant may request discovery of impeachment information under CrRLJ4.7(a).When the information is discoverable, CrRLJ4.7(d) can require prosecutors to seek and disclose such information even if they lack actual possession of it.And if a prosecutor violates their discovery obligations under CrRLJ 4.7, then the trial court has discretion under CrRLJ4.7(g)(7)(i) to impose a sanction, such as suppression.The rule does not require a showing of materiality or prejudice to support the imposition of a sanction less severe than dismissal.Because the City of Seattle(City) violated its discovery obligations under CrRLJ 4.7 and the municipal court did not act illegally by suppressing evidence related to the discovery violation, the superior court did not err by denying the City's request for a writ of review of the suppression decision.

¶ 2 When a trial court abuses its discretion by threatening to admit a highly prejudicial and largely irrelevant exhibit to leverage the defendant into agreeing to stipulations that all but compel findings of guilt on charges against him, the resulting predicament precludes a fair trial.Because the municipal court engaged in such an abuse of its discretion, depriving William Lange of a fair trial, the superior court did not err by reversing Lange's convictions on RALJ appeal.

¶ 3 Therefore, we affirm both the superior court's denial of the City's request for a writ of review and reversal of Lange's convictions on RALJ appeal.

FACTS

¶ 4William Lange went to a drug store in Seattle to drop off a prescription and asked an employee for help finding the pharmacy.The employee noticed Lange smelled of alcohol, could not walk in a straight line, was slurring his words, and was hanging onto shelves for support.He concluded Lange was intoxicated.When Lange left, the employee followed him to make sure he exited the store.Lange got into the driver's seat of a car.Believing that Lange should not drive, the employee called 911.

¶ 5 Seattle police Officers Brian Grozav and David Warnock responded.Both concluded Lange was intoxicated and arrested him for driving under the influence (DUI).Officer Warnock noticed that Lange's car did not have an interlock ignition device (IID).Lange refused a sobriety test, so the officers obtained a warrant and took a blood draw.Forensic scientist David Nguyen of the Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory(WSP) analyzed Lange's blood and authored a report of the results.The City of Seattle initially charged Lange with DUI and later added charges for driving with a suspended license (DWLS) in the third degree and operating a motor vehicle without an IID.

¶ 6 The morning of jury selection, the municipal court excluded the blood test report because the City had failed to disclose impeachment evidence about Nguyen.The court also allowed a limited admission of exhibit 13, an abstract from the Department of Licensing summarizing Lange's lengthy driving record, provided that the City was to redact all information not pertinent to the IID and DWLS charges.Exhibit 13 included multiple, unrelated DUIs.The parties conducted voir dire and empaneled a jury.

¶ 7 The next morning, as the jury waited outside the courtroom, the court changed course.It announced it would admit exhibit 13 without redaction unless Lange agreed to two stipulations: that his driving record included an IID notation and that his license had been suspended and was eligible for reinstatement at the time of arrest.The court recognized that the stipulations "would lead" to Lange being found guilty on two of the three charges against him.¹Lange initially refused, instead seeking to sever the DUI charge from the IID and DWLS charges.After the court denied his motion as untimely, he agreed to the stipulations.The jury found him guilty of all three charges.

¶ 8 The City sought a writ of review regarding the municipal court's decision to suppress the blood test report.Lange filed a RALJ appeal with the superior court, contending the municipal court abused its discretion by excluding the unredacted exhibit only if he agreed to the stipulations.The superior court denied the City's request for a writ of review.On RALJ appeal, it reversed Lange's convictions.The City sought discretionary review of denial of the writ and reversal of Lange's convictions.A commissioner of this court granted review under RAP 2.3(d)(3).

ANALYSIS

I.Writ of Review

¶ 9We review a decision to deny a writ of review de novo.²A writ of review is " ‘an extraordinary remedy’ " that " ‘should be granted sparingly.’ "³Under RCW 7.16.040, a superior court should not issue a writ of review for a lower court unless it "(1) exceeded its authority or acted illegally, and (2) no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law exists."⁴The writ cannot issue unless both elements are present.⁵

A lower court acts illegally when it " ‘has committed probable error and the decision substantially alters the status quo or substantially limits the freedom of a party to act.’ "⁶Because the parties do not dispute whether the municipal court's ruling substantially altered the status quo, the issue is whether it committed probable error.

¶ 10 The City argues the municipal court erred when it suppressed the blood test results as a sanction for violating CrRLJ 4.7, CrRLJ8.3(b), and the constitutional discovery requirements of Brady v. Maryland.⁷However, if the trial court's basis for denying the writ was correct, then our review ends.⁸Because the superior court limited its analysis to whether the municipal court violated CrRLJ 4.7, we begin by reviewing whether the municipal court committed probable error by relying on CrRLJ 4.7 to suppress the blood test report.

¶ 11 Lange's trial was set for September 19, 2017.That morning, the City received the results of WSP forensic scientist Nguyen's analysis on Lange's blood and provided the report to Lange.Lange requested a continuance for time to investigate Nguyen, and trial was rescheduled to October 31.

¶ 12 Days before trial, Lange obtained an April 2017 corrective action report about Nguyen.The report documented mistakes by Nguyen in another case that caused a false positive.Neither WSP nor the City ever provided the report, despite disclosing more than 3,500 pages of records in response to Lange's discovery requests.

¶ 13 The City makes several arguments about why the trial court lacked the authority under CrRLJ 4.7 to suppress the blood test report.None are persuasive.The City conflates the requirements for imposing sanctions for discovery violations under CrRLJ 4.7 with CrRLJ8.3(b) or with Brady when each rule serves a different, although sometimes overlapping, purpose.

¶ 14 It is long-established that a primary purpose of Washington's criminal discovery rules, including CrRLJ 4.7, is to ensure a fair trial by safeguarding the defendant's ability to prepare a defense and to safeguard the prosecution from surprise.⁹CrRLJ 8.3 "exists ‘to see that one charged with [a] crime is fairly treated’ " throughout the entire prosecution.¹⁰And the constitutional standards articulated in Brady establish the minimum due process protections a defendant enjoys around discovery.¹¹Because each has a different purpose, each has a distinct analysis.Here, our focus is CrRLJ 4.7.

¶ 15 The City contends CrRLJ 4.7 did not authorize suppression because the plain language of the rule limits its discovery obligations to evidence within its "actual knowledge, possession, or control," and only WSP possessed the corrective action report on Nguyen.¹²Lange contends CrRLJ4.7(d) required that the City provide the report because it was discoverable under CrRLJ4.7(a).

¶ 16 CrRLJ 4.7 defines discovery obligations for both the prosecution and defense.¹³The philosophy behind the rule favors openness and ready disclosure: " ‘The adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself; it is not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their cards until played.’ "¹⁴The criminal discovery rules were intended " ‘to provide adequate information for informed pleas, expedite trials, minimize surprise, afford opportunity for effective cross-examination, and meet the requirements of due process.’ "¹⁵

¶ 17For example, CrRLJ4.7(a)(1)(i) mandates disclosure of the contact information and written statements of any person the prosecutor intends to call as a witness, and CrRLJ4.7(a)(1)(vii) mandates disclosure of any expert witnesses who will be called to testify along with the subjects of their testimony and any related reports.Most pertinent here, CrRLJ4.7(a)(3) imposes a broad mandate upon the prosecutor to "disclose to defendant's lawyer any material or information within his or her knowledge which tends to negate defendant's guilt as to the offense charged."The rules exist "to ensure a fair trial, among other things, so that rebuttal testimony may be obtained and more particularly so that impeachment evidence may be ascertained."¹⁶

¶ 18 The City argues the scope of "discoverable information" under CrRLJ4.7(a)(3) is limited to information considered "material" under the federal constitution, as defined in Brady.¹⁷

¶ 19 Before concluding a Brady violation occurred, a court must conclude the undisclosed information was " ‘material either to guilt or punishment.’ "¹⁸But the plain terms of CrRLJ4.7(a)(3) do not require proof of materiality before mandating disclosure, and our Supreme Court has noted that the absence of...