City of Seattle v. Huff

• Decision Date: 04 April 1988
• Docket Number: No. 19302-3-I,19302-3-I
• Citation: 751 P.2d 879,51 Wn.App. 12
• Parties: CITY OF SEATTLE, Respondent, v. Dale B. HUFF, Appellant.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 12

51 Wn.App. 12

751 P.2d 879

CITY OF SEATTLE, Respondent, v. Dale B. HUFF, Appellant.

No. 19302-3-I.

Court of Appeals of Washington,

Division 1.

April 4, 1988.

Seattle-King County Public Defender Ass'n, Robert Adelman, Seattle, for Dale B. Huff.

Douglas Jewett, Seattle City Atty., Douglas G. Whalley, Asst. City Atty., Seattle, for City of Seattle.

PEKELIS, Judge.

Dale Huff appeals the superior court's decision reversing the municipal court's order to dismiss the criminal charges against him. Huff contends that the charges should be dismissed because Seattle's telephone harassment ordinance (SMC 12A.06.100(3)) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We affirm the superior court's decision, but on other grounds.

FACTS ¹

On December 18, 1985, Seattle police arrested Huff for "Investigation of Fraud." While in jail, Huff allegedly made SMC 12A.06.100(3) prohibits:

                two telephone calls:  one to the victim and one to his mother in which he allegedly said he was "going to get even" with them.   Huff's mother reported that she did not fear him, but that she would not be able to [751 P.2d 880] sleep the rest of the night and that she thought Huff would "tear up her house if he [were] released."   As a result of these telephone calls, Huff was charged with telephone harassment in violation of SMC 12A.06.100(3)
                

Telephone calls to harass, intimidate, torment or embarrass.

A. A person is guilty of making telephone calls to harass, intimidate, torment or embarrass any other person if, with intent to harass, intimidate, torment or embarrass any other person, he makes a telephone call to such other person:

* * *

3. Threatening to inflict injury on the person or property of the person called or any member of his family ...

Prior to trial, Huff moved to dismiss the charges, challenging the constitutionality of Seattle's ordinance as both overbroad and vague. Although the municipal court upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance, the court limited its reach to "fighting words." Since Seattle's prosecution of Huff was effectively terminated, the case was dismissed. Seattle appealed to the King County Superior Court. That court upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance as written, reversing the municipal court's dismissal of the case. Huff's motion for discretionary review by this court was granted on January 13, 1987.

ANALYSIS

Any legislative restraint imposed upon First Amendment rights " 'comes into court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutionality.' " (Emphasis omitted.) State v. Conifer Enterprises, Inc., 82 Wash.2d 94, 99, 508 P.2d 149 (1973), (quoting Fine Arts Guild, Inc. v. Seattle, 74 Wash.2d 503 Huff contends that SMC 12A.06.100(3) is unconstitutionally overbroad because it sweeps within its proscription speech protected by the Washington State Constitution and the first amendment to the United States Constitution. He asserts, inter alia, that Seattle's ordinance is unconstitutional because (1) it includes calls intended to "embarrass" the listener; (2) fails to limit its reach to calls directed to the home; (3) fails to require that the call actually harm the listener; and (4) fails to require that the caller have the capacity to carry out the threat.

                506, 445 P.2d 602 (1968)).   However, this court must, wherever possible, construe a statute so as to uphold its constitutionality.   State v. Reyes, 104 Wash.2d 35, 41, 700 P.2d 1155 (1985).   If the invalid reach of a law can be cured by a limiting construction, then "there is no reason to proscribe the statute's application to unprotected speech."   Reyes, 104 Wash.2d at 41, 700 P.2d 1155
                

We note at the outset that Huff challenges Seattle's ordinance as facially overbroad. Thus, we test the constitutionality of the ordinance as it is written without reference to whether Huff's particular conduct may or may not be constitutionally protected. See Reyes, 104 Wash.2d at 43, 700 P.2d 1155. A law is unconstitutionally overbroad if it may prohibit constitutionally protected activity. Everett v. Moore, 37 Wash.App. 862, 864, 683 P.2d 617 (1984) (citing Blondheim v. State, 84 Wash.2d 874, 878, 529 P.2d 1096 (1975)). However, a law that makes certain conduct illegal is not automatically unconstitutional merely because "the right of free speech may be intermingled with the condemned conduct." State v. Oyen, 78 Wash.2d 909, 918, 480 P.2d 766 (1971), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 933, 92 S.Ct. 2846, 33 L.Ed.2d 745 (1972). The reviewing court must first balance the impairment of speech against the importance of the societal interest furthered by the enactment. State v. Northwest Passage Inc., 90 Wash.2d 741, 743, 585 P.2d 794 (1978) (citing Oyen, 78 Wash.2d at 919, 480 P.2d 766; United States v Huff first contends that Seattle can demonstrate no compelling interest in criminalizing telephone calls that are merely intended to "embarrass" the listener. We agree. Webster's defines "embarrass" as:

                O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968);   Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976)).   The court must then consider whether the State may achieve its ends in a less restrictive manner or whether the speaker can exercise his First Amendment rights "in a way less detrimental to the societal interest."   Oyen, 78 Wash.2d at 919, 480 P.2d 766
                

to hamper or impede the movement or freedom of movement of (as a person) ... to place in doubt, perplexity, or difficulties ... to involve (as a person or his affairs) in difficulties concerning money matters ... to cause to experience a state of self-conscious distress: ABASH ... to impair the activity of (a bodily function) ... to make intricate: COMPLICATE ...

Webster's Third New Internat'l Dictionary 739 (1969).

By criminalizing threatening telephone calls intended to "embarrass", the ordinance proscribes constitutionally protected speech in a myriad of political, social and familial settings. For example, a person who calls her congressional representative intending to embarrass him by threatening to break down his door if he does not improve his voting record violates the ordinance. Similarly, a person who telephones his son intending to embarrass him by threatening to flatten his tires if he does not stop drinking and driving would violate the ordinance. Seattle cannot demonstrate a compelling need to protect its residents from embarrassment that would justify such an invasion of the First Amendment. Embarrassing telephone calls might be unpleasant, but whatever discomfort the listener may suffer pales in comparison to the speaker's right to express his thoughts freely. The City's interest in protecting its residents from embarrassment must simply give way to an individual's right to freedom of expression. Accordingly, we strike "embarrass" from SMC 12A.06.100(3).

We next consider whether threatening telephone calls intended to harass, intimidate or torment may be proscribed without unreasonably interfering with the First Amendment. Seattle unquestionably has a legitimate and substantial interest in protecting its residents from "fear and abuse at the hands of persons who employ the telephone" to harass, torment and intimidate others. Everett, 37 Wash.App. at 865, 683 P.2d 617. However, Huff's right of free expression is a preferred right under the Washington Constitution. Reyes, 104 Wash.2d at 43, 700 P.2d 1155. Thus, Seattle's ordinance must strike an acceptable balance between the legitimate...