CITY of SEATTLE v. The Honorable George W. HOLIFIELD

• Decision Date: 14 October 2010
• Docket Number: No. 83277-3.,83277-3.
• Citation: 240 P.3d 1162
• Parties: CITY OF SEATTLE, Respondent, v. The Honorable George W. HOLIFIELD, Seattle Municipal Court, Defendant, Matthew Jacob, Petitioner, John Wright, Jacob Culley, Defendants.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

240 P.3d 1162

CITY OF SEATTLE, Respondent,

v.The Honorable George W. HOLIFIELD, Seattle Municipal Court, Defendant,Matthew Jacob, Petitioner,John Wright, Jacob Culley, Defendants.

No. 83277-3.

Supreme Court of Washington,En Banc.

Argued June 10, 2010.

Decided Oct. 14, 2010.

Andrew R. Elliott, Attorney at Law, Oregon City, OR, Joshua Saul Schaer, Routh Crabtree Olsen, P.S., Bellevue, WA, for Petitioner.

Richard Edward Greene, Seattle City Attorney's Office, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

Charles Franklin Blackman, Snohomish County Prosecutor's Office, amicus counsel for WAPA.

Michael E. Harbeson, Attorney at Law, Lakewood, WA, amicus counsel for Jacob Culley-Defendant.

SANDERS, J.

¶ 1 The city of Seattle (City) charged petitioner Matthew Jacob with driving under the influence (DUI). The Seattle Municipal Court suppressed breath test evidence against Jacob pursuant to Criminal Rule for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (CrRLJ) 8.3(b). ¹ The City moved for a writ of review in superior court, claiming suppression was impermissible under CrRLJ 8.3(b). The superior court denied the motion in a three-sentence order. The Court of Appeals, on discretionary review, held suppression was improper and the writ of review could lie. We granted review to determine (1) whether suppression was permissible under CrRLJ 8.3(b) and (2) whether a writ of review was an appropriate vehicle for the City to challenge potential errors of law from a court of limited jurisdiction.

¶ 2 We reverse the Court of Appeals on both issues.

FACTS

¶ 3 The City charged Jacob with DUI based, in part, on the results of a breath test. The machine used to determine Jacob's blood alcohol content had been calibrated using a control alcohol solution certified by Ann Marie Gordon. Law enforcement officials use alcohol solutions to determine if the breath test machines measure accurate alcohol levels. Gordon was the former manager of the Washington State Toxicology Laboratory. Gordon resigned from her position after it came to light she certified solutions that she did not independently test and, later, other lab workers falsified records to cover up the misconduct.

¶ 4 Jacob and the City stipulated that an evidentiary ruling in an unrelated yet nearly identical case- City of Seattle v. Kennedy, No. 496912 (Seattle Mun. Ct.2008) (Holifield, J.)-would apply to Jacob. ² Clerk's Papers (CP) at 1,4, 7, 24; Answer to Mot. for Discretionary Review at 2. The Kennedy matter concerned Gordon's misconduct. The Kennedy court found Gordon signed alcohol solution certifications “even though she did not test each of those solutions.” CP at 18, ¶ 36. The court also found widespread “governmental misconduct and an attempt to cover up this governmental misconduct.” Id. at 21, ¶ 81. The court held the misconduct “egregious” and “the worst kind of governmental misconduct imaginable.” Id. at 23, ¶ 5. It found Kennedy suffered “actual prejudice” as a result of the misconduct. Id. at 23, ¶ 8.

¶ 5 Instead of dismissing the prosecution pursuant to CrRLJ 8.3(b), ³ the court suppressed the breath test evidence. Id. at 23-24, ¶¶ 10-15. It stated, “CrRLJ 8.3(b) allows the court to dismiss under these circumstances.... However, the court may, in the alternative, suppress evidence if doing so would eliminate the prejudice and allow the defendants' [sic] to have a fair trial.” Id. at 23, ¶¶ 10-11. The court cited several cases, including State v. Busig, 119 Wash.App. 381, 81 P.3d 143 (2003), and City of Seattle v. Orwick, 113 Wash.2d 823, 784 P.2d 161 (1989), to support this proposition. Pursuant to the agreement between Jacob and the City regarding the outcome of Kennedy, and based on the blanket suppression, the breath test evidence in Jacob's case was also suppressed. See CP at 24, ¶ 15.

¶ 6 The City sought a writ of review ⁴ in superior court. It argued only dismissal-not suppression-was available under CrRLJ 8.3(b). The superior court denied the City's motion. CP at 61. The superior court's ruling stated, “Motion For Writ of Review is Denied. The Court finds that Trial Court's Ruling is a clear legal error. The City has failed to meet its burden.” Id.

¶ 7 The City sought discretionary review in the Court of Appeals, which granted review. The Court of Appeals reversed the superior court and held that the City was entitled to a writ of review for the municipal court's legal error. City of Seattle v. Holifield, 150 Wash.App. 213, 228, 208 P.3d 24 (2009). It also construed CrRLJ 8.3(b) to permit only dismissal for governmental misconduct. Id. at 222-23, 208 P.3d 24. Jacob sought discretionary review here, which we granted. City of Seattle v. Holifield, 167 Wash.2d 1001, 220 P.3d 207 (2009).

ANALYSIS

I. Suppression pursuant to CrRLJ 8.3(b)

¶ 8 Pursuant to CrRLJ 8.3(b), a court of limited jurisdiction has discretion to dismiss a criminal prosecution that is tarnished by governmental misconduct if the misconduct prejudiced the defendant's rights and materially affected the defendant's right to a fair trial. The rule reads:

The court, in the furtherance of justice after notice and hearing, may dismiss any criminal prosecution due to arbitrary action or governmental misconduct when there has been prejudice to the rights of the accused which materially affect the accused's right to a fair trial. The court shall set forth its reasons in a written order.

CrRLJ 8.3(b).

¶ 9 We review a lower court's interpretation of a court rule de novo. Spokane County v. Specialty Auto & Truck Painting, Inc., 153 Wash.2d 238, 244, 103 P.3d 792 (2004) (citing City of Seattle v. Guay, 150 Wash.2d 288, 76 P.3d 231 (2003)). Our interpretation of a court rule relies upon principles of statutory construction. Id. at 249, 103 P.3d 792. To interpret a statute, we first look to its plain language. State v. Gonzalez, 168 Wash.2d 256, 271, 226 P.3d 131 (2010) (citing State v. Armendariz, 160 Wash.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007)). If the plain language is subject to one interpretation only, our inquiry ends because plain language does not require construction. Id. ¶ 10 Dismissal “is an extraordinary remedy, one to which a trial court should turn only as a last resort.” State v. Wilson, 149 Wash.2d 1, 12, 65 P.3d 657 (2003) (emphasis added). Trial courts should consider “ ‘intermediate remedial steps' ” before ordering the extraordinary remedy of dismissal. Id. (quoting State v. Koerber, 85 Wash.App. 1, 4, 931 P.2d 904 (1996)). We have stated unequivocally that “[d]ismissal is unwarranted in cases where suppression of evidence may eliminate whatever prejudice is caused by governmental misconduct.” State v. Marks, 114 Wash.2d 724, 730, 790 P.2d 138 (1990) (citing City of Seattle v. Orwick, 113 Wash.2d 823, 784 P.2d 161 (1989)); accord United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 366, 101 S.Ct. 665, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981)(“[W]e have not suggested that searches and seizures contrary to the Fourth Amendment warrant dismissal of the indictment. The remedy in the criminal proceeding is limited to denying the prosecution the fruits of its transgression.”).

¶ 11 The City contends the trial court erred when it suppressed the breath test results, rather than dismiss the prosecution outright. It asserts dismissal is the sole remedy pursuant to CrRLJ 8.3(b). ⁵ Answer to Mot. for Discretionary Review at 9-10. Our precedent suggests otherwise.

¶ 12 In Wilson, we held dismissal of a criminal prosecution pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule (CrR) 8.3(b) ⁶ should be used “only as a last resort.” 149 Wash.2d at 12, 65 P.3d 657. The language of CrR 8.3(b) is identical to CrRLJ 8.3(b), the rule before us here. In Wilson the superior court dismissed robbery and attempted robbery charges due to governmental misconduct. 149 Wash.2d at 6, 65 P.3d 657. The Court of Appeals reversed. We affirmed the Court of Appeals because we found dismissal under the rule to be inappropriate. Id. at 12, 65 P.3d 657. We emphasized that the trial judge erred by dismissing the case outright instead of taking ameliorative action. “The trial judge in each case ignored ‘intermediate remedial steps' when it ordered the ‘extraordinary remedy of dismissal.’ ” Id. (quoting Koerber, 85 Wash.App. at 4, 931 P.2d 904). We stated that the lower court abused its discretion by failing to consider a “less extreme alternative[ ]” to dismissal. Id. at 12, 65 P.3d 657.

¶ 13 We addressed a similar dilemma in Marks, 114 Wash.2d 724, 790 P.2d 138. Marks involved a former version of CrR 8.3(b), but the rule contained the same pertinent phrase: “may dismiss.” ⁷ Relying on the then-recently decided case of City of Seattle v. Orwick, 113 Wash.2d 823, 784 P.2d 161 (1989), we held that “[d]ismissal is unwarranted in cases where suppression of evidence may eliminate whatever prejudice is caused by governmental misconduct.” Marks, 114 Wash.2d at 730, 790 P.2d 138.

¶ 14 The municipal court relied on the Court of Appeals case of Busig to suppress, rather than dismiss, the prosecution. Busig does not undertake an in-depth analysis of suppression versus dismissal, as Wilson, Marks, and Orwick do, but it does clearly contemplate suppression as an alternative to dismissal. See Busig, 119 Wash.App. at 390, 81 P.3d 143 (“neither dismissal nor suppression of the evidence under CrR 8.3(b) was justified” for the alleged government misconduct ⁸ (emphasis added)); see also State v. McReynolds, 104 Wash.App. 560, 579, 17 P.3d 608 (2000) (“Dismissal is not justified when suppression of evidence will eliminate whatever prejudice is caused by the action or misconduct.”).

¶ 15 There is no tension between our precedent and the plain language of CrRLJ 8.3(b). The rule says that the court “may” go to the extreme measure of dismissal. It sets the outer bounds of the court's discretion and power. Nothing in the plain language of the rule prohibits other less severe remedies within those bounds. The rule does not limit the court's discretion. Here suppression presents an appropriate, less severe...