City of Seattle v. Montana

Decision Date22 October 1996
Docket NumberNo. 63056-9,63056-9
Citation129 Wn.2d 583,919 P.2d 1218
CourtWashington Supreme Court
PartiesThe CITY OF SEATTLE, Petitioner, v. Alberto MONTANA, Respondent. The CITY OF SEATTLE, Petitioner, v. Henry McCULLOUGH, Respondent.
Mark Sidran, Seattle City Atty., and Margaret Boyle, Asst. City Atty., Seattle, for Petitioner

Seattle-King County Public Defender, Miriam Schwartz, Neil M. Fox, Seattle, for Respondents.

TALMADGE, Justice.

Alberto Montana was arrested for drug traffic loitering, and a paring knife with a three-inch blade was found concealed on his person. Henry McCullough was arrested for theft. A knife with a long blade (six to nine inches) used for filleting fish was found in a sheath

under his shirt. Both defendants were convicted in Seattle Municipal Court under Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 12A.14.080, which prohibits carrying a dangerous knife in Seattle. The King County Superior Court ruled SMC 12A.14.080 violated the right to bear arms in art. I, § 24 of the Washington Constitution, and reversed the convictions. Art. I, § 24 of the Washington Constitution, however, is not absolute and permits reasonable regulation of arms. We find SMC 12A.14.080 is a reasonable arms regulation and exercise of police power that is neither vague nor overbroad. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the King County Superior Court and reinstate the conviction of defendant Montana and remand defendant McCullough's case to the trial court for further proceedings.

ISSUES

1. Does SMC 12A.14.080 violate the right to bear arms in art. I, § 24 of the Washington Constitution?

2. Is SMC 12A.14.080 unconstitutionally vague or overbroad?

FACTS

In 1990, Seattle police officers arrested defendant Alberto Montana on a Seattle street. In his inside breast pocket, the officers found a small, straight-edged knife, with a fixed blade about three inches long. Montana was charged in Seattle Municipal Court with drug traffic loitering, and with unlawful use of weapons (UUW) under SMC 12A.14.080 and 12A.14.010. The jury convicted him only on the UUW charge, and he appealed.

In 1991, two security guards detained defendant Henry McCullough after seeing him steal a watch inside a Seattle hardware store. In a sheath, worn under his shirt, McCullough carried a six- to nine-inch long fish fillet knife, with duct tape for a handle. He did not contend below

that he was having the knife sharpened or repaired. The jury in Seattle Municipal Court convicted McCullough of theft and UUW, and he appealed the UUW conviction. The King County Superior Court reversed both defendants' UUW convictions, holding the ordinance violated WASH. CONST., art. I, § 24, and was vague and overbroad. Seattle sought review. Division One certified the cases to this court, and we accepted transfer under RCW 2.06.030.

DISCUSSION
A. SEATTLE'S REGULATION OF KNIVES

Seattle's Municipal Code contains a comprehensive scheme for regulating weapons generally, and knives in particular. SMC 12A.14. Seattle bans the sale, manufacture, purchase, possession, or carrying of switchblade knives. SMC 12A.14.010E; SMC 12A.14.080A. Seattle makes it unlawful for a person to carry "dangerous knives," whether concealed or unconcealed. SMC 12A.14.080B. "Dangerous knives" are defined as any "fixed-blade knife" or any other knife with a blade more than three and one-half inch in length. SMC 12A.14.010A. A "fixed-blade knife" is further defined as

any knife, regardless of blade length, with a blade which is permanently open and does not fold, retract or slide into the handle of the knife, and includes any dagger, sword, bayonet, bolo knife, hatchet, axe, straight-edged razor, or razor blade not in a package, dispenser or shaving appliance.

SMC 12A.14.010B.

Seattle also exempts certain individuals and activities from the regulation of dangerous knives:

A. A licensed hunter or licensed fisherman actively engaged in hunting and fishing activity including education and travel related thereto; or

B. Any person immediately engaged in an activity related to a lawful occupation which commonly requires the use of such knife, provided such knife is carried unconcealed C. Any person carrying such knife in a secure wrapper or in a tool box while traveling from the place of purchase, from or to a place of repair, or from or to such person's home or place of business, or in moving from one (1) place of abode or business to another, or while in such person's place of abode or fixed place of business.

provided further that a dangerous knife carried openly in a sheath suspended from the waist of the person is not concealed within the meaning of this subsection;

SMC 12A.14.100.

Thus, under Seattle's Municipal Code, a person is banned from carrying, concealed or unconcealed, dangerous knives, although significant exceptions are established for certain recreational, work-related, and personal uses of dangerous knives. Seattle's regulatory scheme, however, does not completely ban the possession of dangerous knives, but instead regulates the possession and carrying of such weapons.

B. SMC 12A.14.080 DOES NOT VIOLATE ART. I, § 24

Montana and McCullough initially contend that SMC 12A.14.080 violates art. I, § 24 of the Washington Constitution which states:

The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself, or the state, shall not be impaired, but nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing individuals or corporations to organize, maintain or employ an armed body of men.

In challenging the constitutionality of SMC 12A.14.080, Montana and McCullough face a heavy burden. A legislative enactment is presumed constitutional, and the parties challenging it must prove it violates the Constitution beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Myles, 127 Wash.2d 807, 812, 903 P.2d 979 (1995); State v. Ward, 123 Wash.2d 488, 496, 869 P.2d 1062 (1994); City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d 171, 177, 795 P.2d 693 (1990); State v. Brayman The threshold inquiry under art. I, § 24 is whether the defendants' ordinary knives are "arms" within the meaning of this provision. This is a question of first impression in Washington. 1 Under even the broadest possible The parties here have not undertaken the analysis required by State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808, 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986), with respect to the interpretation of "arms" under art. I, § 24. The respondents summarily contend that art. I, § 24 is to be interpreted more broadly than the Second Amendment, citing State v. Rupe, 101 Wash.2d 664, 706, 683 P.2d 571 (1984), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061, 108 S.Ct. 2834, 100 L.Ed.2d 934 (1988), and State v. Spencer, 75 Wash.App. 118, 876 P.2d 939 (1994), review denied, 125 Wash.2d 1015, 890 P.2d 20 (1995). Br. of Resp'ts at 8 n. 5. But this analysis pertained to firearms, not knives. In the absence of a Gunwall analysis on the question of whether, or what type of, knives constitute "arms" under art. I, § 24, we decline to reach this question. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 176, 795 P.2d 693; State v. Reding, 119 Wash.2d 685, 696, 835 P.2d 1019 (1992).

110 Wash.2d 183, 193, 751 P.2d 294 (1988); State v. Maciolek, 101 Wash.2d 259, 263, 676 P.2d 996 (1984). If possible, a court will construe a legislative enactment so as to render it constitutional. State v. Reyes, 104 Wash.2d 35, 40, 700 P.2d 1155 (1985) construction, the term "arms" extends only to weapons designed as such, and not to every utensil, instrument, or thing which might be used to strike or injure another person. 2 Only "[i]nstruments made on purpose to fight with are called arms." State v. Nelson, 38 La.Ann. 942, 946, 58 Am.Rep. 202 (1886).

If the knives here are not "arms" within the meaning of art. I, § 24, SMC 12A.14.080 is still valid only to the extent that it is a reasonable exercise of police power and is not in conflict with general law. WASH. CONST., art. XI, § 11. Courts give municipalities considerable latitude in exercising police powers. Lenci v. City of Seattle, 63 Wash.2d 664, 667-68, 388 P.2d 926 (1964). Seattle's SMC 12A.14.080 is a reasonable exercise of the police power to promote safety, peace and good order. The Seattle City Council is authorized to enact needed police regulations to punish practices dangerous to public safety or health, and preserve the public peace and good order. WASH. CONST., art. XI, § 11; RCW 35.22.280(35). As the Court of Appeals noted with respect to RCW 9.41.270, which makes it unlawful for a person to carry a "firearm, dagger, sword, knife or other cutting or stabbing instrument" in a manner which warrants alarm in others:

                ordinance is presumed to be constitutional, Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 177, 795 P.2d 693.   A law is a reasonable regulation if it promotes public safety, health [919 P.2d 1223] or welfare and bears a reasonable and substantial relation to accomplishing the purpose pursued.  Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wash.2d 19, 27, 586 P.2d 860 (1978).  It is presumed that the legislation was passed with respect to any state of facts which could be reasonably conceived to warrant the legislation.  Id. at 27, 586 P.2d 860;  Lenci, 63 Wash.2d at 668, 388 P.2d 926.   If the regulation tends to promote public safety, health, morals or welfare, then its wisdom or necessity is a matter left exclusively to the legislative body.  Duckworth, 91 Wash.2d at 27, 586 P.2d 860
                

People have a strong interest in being able to use public areas without fearing for their lives. The statute protects this interest by requiring people who carry weapons to do so in a manner that will not warrant alarm.

Spencer, 75 Wash.App. at 124, 876 P.2d 939.

SMC 12A.14.080 furthers a substantial public interest in safety, addressing the threat posed by knife-wielding individuals and those disposed to brawls and quarrels, through reducing the number and availability of fixed-blade knives in public places in Seattle....

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