City of Seattle v. Jackson
| Citation | 425 P.2d 385,70 Wn.2d 733 |
| Decision Date | 16 March 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 38625,38625 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
| Parties | The CITY OF SEATTLE, Respondent, v. James A. JACKSON, Appellant. |
Alvin J. Ziontz, Michael H. Rosen, Seattle, for appellant.
A. L. Newbould, Corp. Counsel, Denny E. Anderson, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Seattle, for respondent.
On the 29th of March, 1965, a criminal complaint was filed in the municipal court of the city of Seattle. This complaint charged the defendant James A. Jackson, a Negro, with wilfully and unlawfully causing a loud and disturbing noise at 1726 24th Avenue South. The defendant was tried and found guilty as charged by Judge Charles Z. Smith. The defendant appealed to the superior court of King County. In the superior court he was tried de novo on November 8, 1965, and again found guilty, this time however, by a jury. After the jury returned its verdict the defendant moved in arrest of judgment for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The motions were denied.
At the threshold of our disposition of this appeal is the question of subject matter jurisdiction of the municipal court of the city of Seattle in the proceedings against the defendant. This question was first raised in oral arguments on this appeal. The defendant contends that the complaint against him was signed by an unauthorized party, therefore, it was void and all the proceedings against him were void also.
A Seattle police officer, H. W. Johnson, had signed under oath the criminal complaint against the defendant. This complaint was filed in the municipal court. It is stated that H. W. Johnson was not otherwise involved in the circumstances of the case.
The resolution of the question raised involves the application and meaning of the Criminal Rules for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction promulgated by this court. J Crim.R. 2.01, RCW vol. O states in part:
All criminal proceedings, except traffic and public intoxication cases, shall be initiated by a complaint as described below. The complaint is a statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. It shall be in writing and shall set forth:
(a) the name of the court (b) the title of the action and the name of the offense charged;
(c) the name of the party charged; and
(d) the offense charged, in the language of the statute, which such particulars as will enable the defendant to understand the character of the offense charged, with such particulars as to time, place, person and property as will enable the defendant to understand the character of the offense charged.
Unless a complaint is prepared and signed under oath by a prosecuting attorney or other officer authorized so to do, an oral complaint shall be made before a judge empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the state, who shall examine on oath the complaint and any witnesses the judge may require, take their statements, and cause the statements and the complaint to be subscribed under oath by the persons making them.
No complaint shall be held insufficient by reason of defects or imperfections which do not tend to prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits.
The complaint filed in this case complies with the requirements of this rule except that it is signed by an unauthorized person. The defendant contends that since H. W. Johnson was not a party authorized to sign the complaint within the purview of J Crim.R. 2.01, RCW vol. O, the municipal court had no jurisdiction to proceed with this case, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant appeared in municipal court and entered a plea. We disagree. We hold the defect is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings against the defendant. The requirement of a signature of a person named in J Crim.R. 2.01 is in the nature of a personal right of the accused. Brown v. State, 9 Okl.Cr. 382, 132 P. 359 (1913). In Roberts v. State, 72 Okl.Cr. 384, 388, 115 P.2d 270 (1941), a county prosecutor's stenographer signed an information charging misdemeanor. The court adopted language from Brown v. State, supra, stating:
'* * * where a defendant pleads to an information which is not signed by the county attorney, and without objection goes to trial thereon, he waives all right to afterwards object to the information upon this ground, and cannot be heard upon appeal to complain that the information was not signed by the county attorney as directed by law.'
As recognized in State v. Hurd, 5 Wash.2d 308, 105 P.2d 59 (1940), verifications, proper signatures and oaths are to insure good faith in the institution of the proceedings and to prevent vexations and unmeritorious complaints. These requirements can be waived. State v. Hurd, supra; Hammond v. State, 3 Wash. 171, 28 P. 334 (1891). It is stated in 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations § 305, 'Where the accusation is by complaint, * * * an objection that the complaint was not sworn to by the prosecuting witness is waived by failure to object at the trial.' Although the defendant had a right to challenge the irregularity or insufficiency of the complaint he failed to do so in a timely manner. By entering a plea and proceeding to trial without any objection to the sufficiency of the complaint the defendant waived his right. The defendant cannot raise such objections in this court for the first time.
The recent Washington case, Town of Orting v. Rucshner, 66 Wash.2d 732, 404 P.2d 983 (1965), is cited in support of the defendant's argument. In Orting this court was called upon to construe the Traffic Rules for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction where no complaint at all had been filed. We find that Orting, supra, does not control the present situation for the reason stated in City of Seattle v. Reel, 69 Wash.Dec.2d 232, 233, 418 P.2d 237 (1966), where we said:
In the Orting case there was no complaint of any kind whatsoever before the court. We held the trial court was, therefore, without jurisdiction, and remanded the case for dismissal. There is no question that there was a complaint in the instant case. The decision in Orting, supra, is therefore not apt.
State v. Alberg, 156 Wash. 397, 287 P. 13 (1930), is also cited by the defendant. That case does not control the present case. It was not held that a complaint without a verification conferred no jurisdiction, but this court merely remanded the case back to the superior court allowing the defendants the opportunity to challenge the legality of the proceedings in that court. Furthermore, since Alberg, supra, was decided we have held that an absence of a verification does not void the formal charge and such defect can be waived. See State v. Hurd, supra; State v. Taylor, 196 Wash. 37, 81 P.2d 853 (1938).
It has not been shown that a substantial right of the defendant has been prejudiced by the defect in the complaint.
Now we turn our attention to the arguments made in the defendant's opening brief. The sole basis presented by the defendant for arguing that the denial of his motions made at the conclusion of his trial was erroneous is an affidavit of one of the jurors hereinafter set out:
RICHARD POFF, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
That I reside at 2117 6th Place, Renton, Washington. I was a member of the jury that sat on the above-entitled case, which was heard before the Honorable Lloyd Shorett on the 8th day of November, 1965. I am an investigator and collector for Sparkman & McLean, realtors, and it is possible that I have visited the Jackson home regarding the matter of default on their mortgage payments on occasions prior to my being a member of the jury in the above case.
I am of the opinion that James A. Jackson did not receive a fair deliberation on the verdict that was returned by the jury. There was little discussion of the evidence, nor did the discussions follow the framework of the Court's instructions; more specifically, reasonable doubt or presumption of innocence were not discussed. The jury, without exception, appeared to be of the opinion that the defendant was guilty. I also heard some discussion of the Watts incident in California during which the statement was made that we did not want a similar incident to happen in our city. In my opinion, the verdict was reached as a racial...
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