City of Seattle v. Webster
| Decision Date | 06 December 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 56959-2,56959-2 |
| Citation | 115 Wn.2d 635,802 P.2d 1333 |
| Parties | , 7 A.L.R.5th 1100 The CITY OF SEATTLE, Petitioner, v. Arlander D. WEBSTER, Respondent. En Banc |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Mark H. Sidran, Seattle City Atty., Douglas B. Whalley, Jeanne Innis, Assts., Seattle, for petitioner.
Seattle-King County Public Defender Ass'n, Kenneth Friedman, Seattle, for respondent.
J. Mark Weiss, Seattle, amicus curiae for respondent on Behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union.
The City of Seattle sought review of a King County Superior Court decision affirming the Seattle Municipal Court which dismissed charges against Respondent Arlander Duke Webster for violation of the Seattle Pedestrian Interference Ordinance, Seattle Municipal Code 12A.12.015(B)(1). Both courts concluded that the section of the ordinance under which respondent was charged was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We disagree and remand the case to the Seattle Municipal Court for trial.
The principal question we consider in this case is whether subsection (B)(1) of Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 12A.12.015 (pedestrian interference ordinance) is unconstitutional on its face because it is vague and overbroad. We also consider whether the ordinance is unreasonable and whether it violates equal protection of the law. We answer those questions in the negative and uphold the constitutionality of the ordinance.
We reverse the Superior Court and the Municipal Court and reinstate the charge against Respondent Webster. The case should then proceed to trial in the ordinary course. Essential facts will then become of record. Respondent Webster will not be precluded from again raising the issue of constitutionality of the ordinance at a proper stage of the proceedings. 1
Respondent Arlander Duke Webster was charged with violating SMC 12A.12.015(B)(1), a portion of the Seattle "pedestrian interference ordinance," on April 10, 1988. The ordinance makes it unlawful to intentionally obstruct pedestrian or vehicular traffic.
When the case was called, Respondent Webster moved for dismissal, challenging the ordinance as unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and unreasonable and as a violation of his equal protection rights.
On May 27, 1988, the Honorable Barbara A. Madsen, Seattle Municipal Court, granted respondent's motion for dismissal, stating:
[A] person could be charged with this, under this ordinance, and be doing something that no one in the world would think was unlawful conduct, including on a very nice hot sunny day being age sixteen sitting on a sidewalk watching cars go by, which of course I think that all of us have done; being a Santa Claus at Christmas time and standing ringing a bell at a front door of a department store; walking from the side of the store out to the street to see if your bus has come yet and making people walk around you. I just could imagine many, many, many, many circumstances under which it would be based on the discretion of police authority as to whether you should be charged or not based on conduct, that if you were an attractive looking person who probably was a person of some means [you] wouldn't be arrested, and if you were a scrubby looking individual looking like you didn't have the where with all [sic] for the next cup of coffee, you would be charged, or [sic] I find that unconstitutional and I would grant the defendant's motion to dismiss based on the lack of constitutionality of the ordinance.
The City of Seattle appealed the dismissal to the Superior Court.
On November 17, 1988, the Honorable R. Joseph Wesley, King County Superior Court, affirmed the dismissal, concluding that "[t]he ordinance, SMC 12A.12.015(B)(1), is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad."
On December 7, 1988, the City of Seattle filed a notice for discretionary review. By order dated March 6, 1990, the Court of Appeals, Division One, certified the case to this court. This court accepted certification on March 9, 1990.
Because the case was dismissed before trial upon a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the ordinance, there is no factual record. The police report on the underlying charge, which is the only source of information relating to the charge, is reproduced in its entirety:
NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE
The Seattle "pedestrian interference ordinance," SMC 12A.12.015, adopted in October 1987, provides in relevant part:
A. The following definitions apply in this section:
1. "Aggressively beg" means to beg with intent to intimidate another person into giving money or goods.
* * * * * *
3. "Obstruct pedestrian or vehicular traffic" means to walk, stand, sit, lie, or place an object in such a manner as to block passage by another person or a vehicle, or to require another person or a driver of a vehicle to take evasive action to avoid physical contact. Acts authorized as an exercise of one's constitutional right to picket or to legally protest ... shall not constitute obstruction of pedestrian or vehicular traffic.
* * * * * *
B. A person is guilty of pedestrian interference if ... [that person] intentionally:
1. Obstructs pedestrian or vehicular traffic; or
2. Aggressively begs.
C. Pedestrian interference may be punished by a fine not to exceed Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) or by imprisonment in jail for a term not to exceed ninety (90) days or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Facts are not essential for consideration of a facial challenge to a statute or ordinance on First Amendment grounds. 2 Constitutional analysis is made upon the language of the ordinance or statute itself. 3
We first consider whether SMC 12A.12-015(B)(1) is unconstitutionally overbroad.
This court summarized the overbreadth doctrine in Seattle v. Huff, 111 Wash.2d 923, 925, 767 P.2d 572 (1989) as follows:
A law is overbroad if it sweeps within its prohibitions constitutionally protected free speech activities. The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine may invalidate a law on its face only if the law is "substantially overbroad." In determining overbreadth' "a court's first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct." Criminal statutes require particular scrutiny and may be facially invalid if they "make unlawful a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct ... even if they also have legitimate application." 4
A statute which regulates behavior, and not pure speech, "will not be overturned unless the overbreadth is 'both real and substantial in relation to the ordinance's plainly legitimate sweep.' " 5 However, despite the obligation to construe the language of an ordinance to uphold its constitutionality, this court will not do so if it is "unable to place a sufficiently limited construction upon the standardless sweep of [the] legislation." 6
Respondent argues that "[t]he Seattle ordinance has a potentially enormous scope, since it is not uncommon to innocently walk, stand, sit, lie, or place an object in such a manner as to block passage of another." However, the ordinance is written to apply only to persons intentionally "block[ing] passage by another person or a vehicle" and "requir[ing] another person or a driver of a vehicle to take evasive action to avoid physical contact" by "walk[ing], stand[ing], sit[ting], l[ying], or plac[ing] an object".
The ordinance does not prohibit innocent intentional acts which merely consequentially block traffic or cause others to take evasive action. Many of those "consequential" results may arise from protected activities such as collecting signatures on a petition. In addition, "mere sauntering or loitering on a public way is lawful and the right of any man, woman, or child." 7 Under SMC 12A.12.015(B)(1), it is not unlawful to exercise that right even though it may cause another person or driver to "take evasive action".
The City of Seattle argues that inclusion in the ordinance of the element of specific intent saves it from being unconstitutionally overbroad. We agree. In Seattle v. Slack, 8 we held that the element of specific intent saved another Seattle Municipal Ordinance from unconstitutional overbreadth.
In Slack, this court considered the constitutionality of SMC 12A.10.010, Seattle's "prostitution loitering ordinance." The court was unanimous in upholding the ordinance which clearly required specific intent for specified acts.
In this case, the language of SMC 12A.12.015(B)(1) clearly indicates that, before there can be a charge or conviction under the ordinance, a person must act with intent to block another's passage or with intent to cause a person or vehicle to take evasive action. The element of intent in the ordinance sufficiently narrows its scope to save SMC 12A.12.015(B)(1) against a claim of unconstitutional overbreadth.
We next consider whether SMC 12A.12.015(B)(1) is unconstitutionally vague.
The due process doctrine of "void for vagueness" has two central principles. First, criminality must be defined with sufficient specificity to put citizens on notice concerning conduct they must avoid. And second, legislated crimes must not be susceptible of arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement. 9 A statute is unconstitutionally vague if "persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." 10
In Seattle v. Huff, 11 this court summarized the "void for vagueness" doctrine:
Under this analysis, the factual setting of this case is irrelevant and we look only to whether " '... any conviction under the statute could be constitutionally upheld.' " An ordinance is presumed constitutional and the party challenging the constitutionality of the law has the burden of proving it is unconstitutionally vague beyond a reasonable doubt. This presumption "should be overcome only in exceptional cases."
When a legislative enactment is challenged on vagueness grounds, the issue is...
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