City of Shreveport v. Dantes

Decision Date10 December 1906
Docket Number16,084
Citation42 So. 716,118 La. 113
CourtLouisiana Supreme Court
PartiesCITY OF SHREVEPORT v. DANTES

Rehearing Denied January 7, 1907.

Appeal from City Court of Shreveport; Rhydon Dickens Webb, Judge.

Tom Dantes was convicted of violating an ordinance of the city of Shreveport, and appeals. Affirmed.

B. H Lichtenstein and Cal. Dial Hicks, for appellant.

Ruffin Golson Pleasant, City Atty., for appellee.

OPINION

BREAUX C. J.

The defendant, condemned

to pay a fine of $ 15, and in default of payment to work 15 days on the streets of the city of Shreveport, appeals from the sentence of the court.

The ordinance under which he was prosecuted provides that it shall be unlawful "for any person selling articles of any kind, from any stand, tray, vehicle or other container of goods of a similar nature, to stop on any alley, street or sidewalk or other place of this city, except he be actually engaged in making a sale of an article."

The affidavit against defendant charged him with having violated this ordinance.

The grounds of defense urged by defendant as a reason why the charge against him should be quashed are directed exclusively against the asserted illegality of the ordinance. He averred that he had a license from the city permitting him to sell candies, cakes, and other similar articles on the streets, and that the ordinance will stop him from carrying on the business which the license permits; that the ordinance is violative of both the state and the federal Constitutions, granting equal rights to all persons; it is also illegal and oppressive; moreover, that his stops to sell are limited, without regard to time or place; that he is met by this dilemma: stop and be arrested, or go and transact no business; that as a result his trade is injuriously affected by the ordinance of which he complains.

The city of Shreveport has the right to make and pass ordinances necessary and proper to regulate administration. She has the control of streets and other public places, and generally full police power. She is authorized to lay down regulations for the orderly conduct of business upon the public streets.

Having determined that the city is competent to regulate the occupations referred to, it remains for us to inquire whether in the determination to regulate it has gone too far, and whether on that ground the ordinance assailed is null because oppressive or discriminative, or because it violates some of the provisions of the Constitution.

As relates to the oppressiveness charged, it does not appear to be well founded. The ordinance requires hucksters to move on and not to remain in one place any longer time than actually necessary to sell their merchandise. is not against common right. It deprived defendant of none of his natural rights. He is free to act as he pleases, provided he acts so as not to interfere with the rights of others.

This brings us to the question whether or not the ordinance is discriminative.

On its face it is not. To be considered to have that effect, it would have to appear that it affects one person different from another. On the contrary, it affects all alike. It relates to all persons who walk about the streets and other public places to sell and hand over their small wares for a corresponding price.

It was not adopted in the interest of any one so far as we can see. It relates to persons and things as a class, and not to persons and things of a class. The question is not at all similar to that decided in the Chinese Laundry Cases by the Supreme Court of the United States. Yick Wo Case, 118 U.S. 358, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220, and other similar cases.

It is necessary to classify the inhabitants of a municipality for the purpose of police regulation. It was proper to classify the persons and things as they were classified in the ordinance assailed by the defendant.

One of defendant's grounds...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Beazley
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • December 17, 1907
    ... ... Brush Electric Light & Power Co. v. Wells, 110 Ga ... 192, 35 S.E. 365, and City Council of Augusta v ... Owens, 111 Ga. 464, 36 S.E. 830, contain valuable ... discussions of ... ...
  • State v. Harvey
    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • July 13, 1925
  • City of Stevens Point v. Bocksenbaum
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • July 3, 1937
    ...square or upon the streets. City of Waco v. O'Neal (Tex.Civ.App.) 33 S.W.(2d) 205; Ex parte Hogg, supra; City of Shreveport v. Dantes, 118 La. 113, 42 So. 716, 8 L.R.A.(N.S.) 304;Dent v. Oregon City, 106 Or. 122, 211 P. 909. Thus, the case is in the same state as though the council had enac......
  • Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Ray
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • December 21, 1906
    ... ... in cases where no direct appellate proceedings are provided ... by law. Basnet v. City of Jacksonville, 18 Fla. 523; ... Edgerton v. Mayor, etc., 18 Fla. 528; [52 Fla. 638] ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT