City of Sioux City v. Indep. Dist. of Sioux City.

• Decision Date: 11 December 1880
• Citation: 55 Iowa 150,7 N.W. 488
• Parties: CITY OF SIOUX CITY v. INDEPENDENT DISTRICT OF SIOUX CITY.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

55 Iowa 150

7 N.W. 488

CITY OF SIOUX CITY

v.INDEPENDENT DISTRICT OF SIOUX CITY.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed December 11, 1880.

Appeal from Woodbury district court.

The plaintiff is a corporation existing under the general incorporation law. The defendant is a school-district, and the owner of certain real estate within the city limits which is used solely for school purposes. The city council determined that a certain sidewalk in front of said real estate should be repaired. The city furnished the material and caused the same to be done, and seeks in this action to recover therefor. Trial to the court and judgment for the plaintiff, but the court refused to make an order for the sale of the real estate. The defendant appeals.Joy & Wright, for appellant.

J. M. Cleland, for appellee.

SEEVERS, J.

The general incorporation statute provides-- First, that cities have the power to construct and repair sidewalks, and levy a special tax on the lots and parcels of land fronting on the streets thus improved to pay therefor; second, they may, by ordinance, determine the mode such charge shall be assessed; third, such assessment is made a personal charge against the owner, and also a lien on the real estate which may be collected, and the lien enforced by a proceeding in law or equity; fourth, cities may, by ordinance, if they so elect, cause such special tax to be certified to the county auditor, to the end it may be collected as other taxes. Code, §§ 478, 479, 481.

Under the authority conferred the city passed the requisite ordinances, and among other things provided for the certification of such special taxes to the county auditor and their collection as are other taxes. No complaint is made of the mode of assessment in any respect, and counsel for the appellant state the question to be determined to be, “whether school property used for school purposes only is subject to any tax levy, charge, or assessment, or expense for building sidewalks adjacent to the same, by the city, and whether defendant is liable to pay the same.” In relation thereto we have to say:

1. The statute designates the assessment made in this case as a special tax, and it will be so regarded. It is, however, a tax or charge imposed because of a special benefit, and therefore distinguishable from ordinary taxes which are imposed for the support of the government or municipality. The defendant was under obligation to provide not only schools and school-houses, but reasonably sufficient ways to reach the same. It is but reasonable, we think, in an incorporated city or town, a school-district should provide sidewalks in front of its property or pay therefor, in all cases where the city requires or constructs the same in pursuance of statutory authority. As we understand, the defendant claims if this be conceded the property of the defendant has been exempted from taxation of every character. The statute relied on is found in title 6 of the Code, which relates exclusively to revenue or ordinary taxes. It is therein provided that the following classes of property “are not to be taxed, and they may be omitted from the assessments herein required: * * * * the property of a county, township, city, incorporated town, or school-district, when devoted entirely to public use and not held for pecuniary profit.” Code, § 797. The special tax assessed by cities for the construction of sidewalks is not assessed under title 6 of the Code, but under title 4, c. 10, which relates to cities and incorporated towns.

Taxation is the rule and exemption the exception, and, therefore, strict construction of the statute under which the exemption is claimed is the rule. Trustees of Griswold College v. The State, 46 Iowa, 275;...