City of Sioux Falls v. Peterson

• Citation: 71 S.D. 446,25 N.W.2d 556
• Decision Date: 30 December 1946
• Docket Number: 8879
• Parties: CITY OF SIOUX FALLS, Appellant, v. SIDNEY PETERSON, Respondent.
• Court: Supreme Court of South Dakota

71 SD 446, 25 NW2d 556 (1946)

CITY OF SIOUX FALLS,

Appellant,

v. SIDNEY PETERSON,

Respondent.

South Dakota Supreme Court

Appeal from Municipal Court, Sioux Falls, SD

Hon. Walter Conway, Judge

#8879—Reversed

Roy. D. Burns, Gene E. Pruitt, Sioux Falls, SD

Attorneys for Appellant.

Henry C. Mundt, Sioux Falls, SD

Attorney for Respondent.

Opinion Filed Dec 30, 1946

SMITH, Judge.

The defendant was charged with violation of an ordinance of the City of Sioux Falls in that he “drove a motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in damage to property and failed to immediately stop at the scene of such accident and give the information required” by the ordinance. On motion of the defendant the complaint was dismissed upon the ground that the city had exceeded its powers in adopting the ordinance. The city has appealed.

Our municipal corporations derive all of their powers from the legislature. Article X, Constitution of South Dakota. Ericksen v. The City of Sioux Falls, 70 SD 40, 14 NW2d 89.

By SDC 45.0102(32) there is delegated to every municipality power “To regulate the use of motor vehicles, ...” and by SDC 45.0201(19) , “To enact, ... all such ordinances ... as may be proper and necessary to carry into effect the powers granted thereto, ... .”

The ordinance in question provided in part that

“The driver of any vehicle involved in any accident resulting in injury or death to any person or damage to property shall immediately stop and give his name, address, and the registration number of his vehicle and exhibit his registration receipt to ... the driver or occupants of any vehicle collided with ... .”

It is asserted that the power “To regulate the use of motor vehicles” does not comprehend the provisions of the quoted ordinance.

We are considering a delegation of police power. “It is a principle settled by the concurrence of many authorities that acts of the state legislature granting the police power to municipal corporations ... will be strictly construed ....” 37 Am. Jur. 908, § 280. Cf. Wangsness v. McAlpine, 47 SD 472, 199 NW 478. The quoted principle has application when the intention of the legislature is in doubt. It does not justify a court in narrowing an unambiguous express power.

The comprehensive and unambiguous terms employed by the legislature clearly reflect an intention to clothe our municipalities with broad powers. The ordering of a dangerous traffic so as to safeguard persons and property while expediting commerce is the obvious purpose in view. The function of determining the measures to be adopted to accomplish that end is delegated to the governing body of the municipality. In such circumstances the courts will not interfere until convinced that an adopted measure is inappropriate and unreasonable. Ericksen v. The City of Sioux Falls, supra. If the adopted regulation contributes substantially to the object sought to be accomplished by the grant of power it cannot be set aside by a court as unreasonable. City of Huron v. Munson, 67 SD 88, 289 NW 416.

The ordinance requires one involved in an accident resulting in an injury promptly to identify himself and the vehicle used. The purpose which motivated the legislature in delegating this power of regulation to the municipalities is the same purpose which influenced those who drafted the Uniform Motor Vehicle Act. It is noteworthy that after a critical study of the problem of regulation of the use of motor vehicles, the drafters of that act deemed it advisable to include such a requirement in the Uniform Act. Section 30, Ch. 251, Laws of 1929. It promotes the exercise of care, furthers the interests of those whose property has been injured through the use of a motor vehicle, and aids those in control of municipal traffic. We conclude that the requirement is appropriate and reasonable, and hence within the limits of the power delegated to the city.

The foregoing conclusion was reached after separately considering the power “to regulate the use of motor vehicles.” As indicated supra, the legislature adopted the Uniform Motor Vehicle Act in 1929. In slightly revised form, it remains in force as SDC 44.03. The phrasing of the ordinance in question is identical with that of SDC 44.0330. It is suggested that when the granted power is considered against this background of legislation, a different conclusion is impelled.

The ordinance is not invalid because identical with the statute. The competency of the legislature to confer power to ordain an act an offense against municipal authority, not withstanding such act has been made a public offense by statute, is settled in this jurisdiction. City of Yankton v. Douglass, 8 SD 441, 66 NW 923;...