City of South Euclid v. Jemison
Decision Date | 26 December 1986 |
Docket Number | No. 85-1911,85-1911 |
Citation | 503 N.E.2d 136,28 OBR 250,28 Ohio St. 3d 157 |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Parties | , 28 O.B.R. 250 CITY OF SOUTH EUCLID, Appellant, v. JEMISON, Appellee. |
Syllabus by the Court
R.C. 4509.101 is unconstitutional under the doctrine of separation of powers, insofar as its effect is to permit an appeal of a decision of a trial court to the Registrar of Motor Vehicles.(State, ex rel. Shafer, v v. Otter[1922], 106 Ohio St. 415, 140 N.E. 399, paragraph four of the syllabus, followed.)
Bernard Mosesson, Pros.Atty., for appellant.
Thomas Meros, George Mineff, Jr. and Charles F. Wochna, Cleveland, for appellee.
Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Barbara A. Serve, Columbus, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Atty. Gen. of Ohio.
R.C. 4509.101, Ohio's "financial responsibility" law, became effective on January 1, 1984.(139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 679-686.)Shortly thereafter, several courts held certain provisions of the statute to be unconstitutional under the doctrine of separation of powers.See, e.g., Dayton v. Strausbaugh(1984), 10 Ohio Misc.2d 29, 462 N.E.2d 462;andBur. of Motor Vehicles v. Hill(1984), 12 Ohio Misc.2d 7, 466 N.E.2d 582.In response, the General Assembly amended the statute to substantially its present form, effective August 1, 1984.(140 Ohio Laws, Part II, 4722, 4727.)
In the cause sub judice, R.C. 4509.101 is again assailed on constitutional grounds as being violative of the doctrine of separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of Ohio state government.While Ohio, unlike other jurisdictions, does not have a constitutional provision specifying the concept of separation of powers, this doctrine is implicitly embedded in the entire framework of those sections of the Ohio Constitution that define the substance and scope of powers granted to the three branches of state government.SeeState v. Harmon(1877), 31 Ohio St. 250.See, also, State, ex rel. Bryant, v. Akron Metro. Park Dist.(1929), 120 Ohio St. 464, 166 N.E. 407.While no exact rule can be set forth for determining what powers of government may or may not be assigned by law to each branch, Harmon, supra, at 258, " * * * [i]t is nevertheless true, in the American theory of government, that each of the three grand divisions of the government, must be protected from encroachments by the others, so far that its integrity and independence may be preserved. * * *"Fairview v. Giffee(1905), 73 Ohio St. 183, 187, 76 N.E. 865.
The pertinent sections of the Ohio Constitution involved in the instant cause are Sections 1and3(B)(2) of Article IV.
Section 1, Article IV states:
"The judicial power of the state is vested in a supreme court, courts of appeals, courts of common pleas and divisions thereof, and such other courts inferior to the supreme court as may from time to time be established by law."1
Section 3(B)(2), Article IV provides:
"Courts of appeals shall have such jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district and shall have such appellate jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse final orders or actions of administrative officers or agencies."
Defendant-appellee contends, and the court of appeals below agreed, that certain provisions of R.C. 4509.101 violate the separation of powers doctrine by, in effect, allowing appeal of a court-ordered license suspension to the Registrar of Motor Vehicles.
In reviewing the scope of the statute in issue, it appears that division (A) of the statute defines the requirement of financial responsibility, the civil penalties to which violators are subject, and the persons who are subject to the statute.
Division (B) of R.C. 4509.101 deals specifically with defendants who appear in court and gives the trial court discretion to determine whether proof of financial responsibility has been satisfied under the statute.In those instances where a defendant either pleads or is found guilty of a traffic violation specified under Traf.R. 13(B), and where defendant fails to verify proof of financial responsibility, the court is required pursuant to R.C. 4509.101(B)(1) to do the following:
Clearly, the sanctions set forth above are equivalent to court orders, and are imposed when the court determines that the defendant has failed to establish financial responsibility at the time of the traffic offense.Once the court orders a suspension pursuant to this section, the defendant has five days to surrender his or her certificate of registration, registration plates, or license to the court.
After an order is entered, R.C. 4509.101(B)(2)(b) provides:
"The clerk of courts shall notify the registrar of the court's order, identify any defendant who is not in compliance with an order, identify any defendant who has not been found guilty of the traffic offense charged, unless such defendant has been permitted by the court to voluntarily present proof of financial responsibility establishing to the satisfaction of the court that the operation of the motor vehicle was covered by proof of financial responsibility, or who has forfeited bond or failed to appear on such a charge, identify any owner who is not the defendant but whose motor vehicle was being driven by the defendant at the time of the traffic offense, and send to the registrar any certificates of registration, registration plates, and licenses that it has received."
Appellee argues, and the court of appeals held, that the foregoing statutory provision is unconstitutional because it requires the court and its clerk to act as the de facto agents of the registrar to perform purely administrative functions.
In any event, the purpose of the notification set forth in the foregoing section is delineated in R.C. 4509.101(B)(3)(a), and provides as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
The court of appeals found the above-emphasized language to also be violative of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers in that it, in effect, gives the registrar appellate review of the trial court's suspension order.In addition, the appellate court found the same constitutional infirmity present in R.C. 4509.101(D), where it provides:
(Emphasis added.)
In determining the constitutionality of legislative enactments such as the one in the cause sub judice, we begin with the principle that all legislative enactments enjoy a presumption of constitutionality.See, e.g., ...
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