City of South St. Paul v. Lamprecht Bros. Co., 1,043.

• Decision Date: 27 June 1898
• Docket Number: 1,043.
• Parties: CITY OF SOUTH ST. PAUL v. LAMPRECHT BROS. CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

88 F. 449

CITY OF SOUTH ST. PAUL v. LAMPRECHT BROS. CO.

No. 1,043.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

June 27, 1898

Albert Schaller, for plaintiff in error.

O. M Metcalf and Henry C. James, for defendant in error.

Before SANBORN and THAYER, Circuit Judges, and SHIRAS, District Judge.

THAYER Circuit Judge.

This was an action on coupons detached from 74 municipal bonds which were issued by the city of South St. Paul in the year 1891, to aid in defraying the cost of constructing a railroad and wagon bridge across the Mississippi river, on which said city is located. The case was tried in the circuit court on a written stipulation waiving a jury, and the trial judge made a special finding of facts. The questions to be considered therefore, are those which were raised during the trial by exceptions to the admission and exclusion of evidence, or such as are comprehended by the general inquiry whether the facts found by the trial judge are sufficient to sustain the judgment. Searcy Co. v. Thompson, 27 U.S.App. 715 13 .C.C.A. 349, and 66 F. 92. We will consider them mainly in the order in which they have been discussed by counsel.

The first proposition to be noticed is the contention of the defendant city that the bonds from which the coupons were detached were issued without authority of law, and are therefore void. On April 23, 1891, the legislature of the state of Minnesota passed an act entitled 'An act to amend 'An act to incorporate the city of South St Paul,' as amended by the several acts amendatory thereof, and to authorize said city to issue bonds for various purposes. ' Sp. Laws Minn. 1891, p. 674, c. 58. This act altered various provisions of the law under and by virtue of which the city of South St. Paul had been incorporated, and was in the nature of a revision of the existing city charter. All the provisions of the act related to the powers which the city might exercise, or to the mode and manner of their execution. The eighteenth section of said act was as follows:

'The common council is hereby authorized to issue the bonds of said city for the purpose of aiding in defraying the cost and expense of constructing a combination railroad and wagon bridge, or both, as may be determined hereafter, to an amount not to exceed seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000.00), to be issued in such denominations and payable at such times not to exceed thirty (30) years, and at such rate of interest not to exceed six (6) per cent. per annum, and at such place as may be determined.'

It was then provided, in substance, that, before the bonds should be issued, the common council, by a three-fourths vote of all its members, should agree upon a 'proposal or plan' for constructing the bridge which should embody an estimate of its total cost; that the proposition to issue bonds should be submitted to a popular vote of the electors of the city, at a special election, and receive the approval of a majority of the electors voting at such election before the bonds were issued; and that such election should be called within 60 days after the adoption by the council of the proposal or plan for building the bridge.

It is claimed by counsel for the city, as we understand, that, because for the construction of a bridge, it embraced more than one subject, and was therefore obnoxious to section 27, art. 4, of the constitution of the state of Minnesota, which declares that 'no law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in its title. ' This contention, we think, is based upon a misconception of the meaning and purpose of the constitutional provision in question. It was not adopted to prevent the legislature from inserting in an act any provision which is germane to the general subject to which the act relates, but to prevent surreptitious legislation, and the union in the same act of incongruous matters, which have no natural relation to each other, or to the general subject with which an act deals. City of Omaha v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 36 U.S.App. 615, 623, 20 C.C.A. 219, and 73 F. 1013; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Township of Oswego, 19 U.S. App. 321, 332, 7 C.C.A. 669, and 59 F. 58; Tabor v. Bank, 27 U.S.App. 111, 10 C.C.A. 429, and 62 F. 383; Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 577, 50 N.W. 923; Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 2 Sup.Ct. 391; Cooley, Const. Lim. (6th Ed.) pp. 169-172, and cases there cited.

This provision of the constitution ought not to receive a narrow or technical construction, which will embarrass legislation by making laws unnecessarily restrictive in their scope and operation; but, like all provisions of the organic law, it should be fairly and liberally interpreted and enforced, so that it will serve to prevent the abuses at which it was aimed, without placing unnecessary restraints upon legislative action. An act like the one now in hand, which revises and amends the charter of a city located on the bank of a large river, is certainly not obnoxious to a constitutional provision limiting legislative measures to one subject, merely because the act authorizes the municipality, among other things, to issue bonds for the purpose of defraying the cost of a railroad and wagon bridge across such river. A provision of that kind has a natural and an obvious relation to the general subject, to which the attention of the legislature was for the time being addressed, and for that reason such a provision must be pronounced germane to the general purpose of the act. We have no doubt that the act of April 23, 1891, would be pronounced valid by the courts of Minnesota. City of St. Paul v. Colter, 12 Minn. 41, 50 (Gil. 16); City of Winona v. School Dist. No. 82, 40 Minn. 13, 41 N.W. 539; Boyle v. Vanderhoof, 45 Minn. 31, 47 N.W. 396; Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 50 N.W. 923; State v. La Vaque, 47 Minn. 106, 49 N.W. 525; Willis V. Mabon, 48 Minn. 140, 155, 50 N.W. 1110.

A variety of other questions are suggested in the brief of counsel for the city, and have been argued at some length, which, for the sake of brevity, may be disposed of collectively. It is contended, in substance, that the act of April 23, 1891, did not authorize an issue of bonds to build a bridge like the one involved in the case at bar, which was partly outside of the corporate limits of the city; that it did not warrant the issuance of bonds to build a bridge across a navigable stream unless the consent of the secretary of war to the proposed location of the bridge had been obtained; that the common council did not adopt a proposal or plan for building the bridge, within the fair intent and meaning of the act of April 23, 1891, before the bonds in controversy were issued; that the proposal or plan, such as it was, contained no estimate of the cost of the structure; that the original resolution of the council adopting such proposal or plan, if the same was adopted by the council, was never signed by the mayor of the city, as it should have been to become operative; that William Thuet, who signed the bonds as comptroller of the city, was not at the time a city officer; that no valid election was held to obtain authority from the electors to issue the bonds; and that the provisions of the charter of the city of South St. Paul relative to the signing and publication of ordinances and resolutions were not followed in so far as the ordinances and resolutions relating to the issuance of the bonds in suit were concerned.

It is to be observed, however, that some of the assumptions of fact contained in the foregoing propositions are contrary to the special finding which was made by the trial judge. The trial judge found, among other things:

'That the common council of South St. Paul, by a vote of more than three-fourths of all its members, agreed to adopt, and did adopt, on or about May 7, 1891, a proposal or plan for building a combination railroad and wagon bridge across the Mississippi river, at or near South St. Paul, which proposal or plan stated the plan and specifications for constructing said bridge, together with an estimate of the total cost thereof, and that on the same date said

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