City of Spokane v. County of Spokane
| Decision Date | 16 November 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 77723-3.,77723-3. |
| Parties | CITY OF SPOKANE, a Washington first class charter city and municipal corporation, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF SPOKANE, a political subdivision of the State of Washington; Michael Padden, in his official capacity of Presiding Judge of Spokane County District Court, and in his official capacity as Spokane County District Court Judge; and Spokane County District Court, including its municipal department, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Howard Francois Delaney, Milton Rowland, Spokane, Salvatore J. Faggiano, Office of City Attorney, Spokane, for Appellant.
James Henry Kaufman, Spokane County Prosecutor's Office, Laurence Darrell Briney, Jr., Carl Edward Hueber, Winston & Cashatt, Spokane, for Respondents.
Daniel Brian Heid, Auburn, for Amicus Curiae, Washington State Ass'n of Municipal Attorneys.
¶ 1 The city of Spokane (City) currently operates its municipal court as a department of the Spokane County District Court (District Court) pursuant to chapter 3.46 RCW. The City seeks to terminate this arrangement and open its own independent municipal court pursuant to chapter 3.50 RCW. RCW 3.46.150(1) requires that before a city can give notice that it intends to terminate a district court municipal department, the city and county must enter into an agreement to provide for some of the costs resulting from the termination. This case involves several issues surrounding the City's proposed transfer to an independent municipal court, including what costs must be covered by the required agreement, whether the agreement in this case is sufficient to satisfy the statute, to what extent the presiding judge of the district court must participate in a transfer agreement, and which court must assume jurisdiction over open cases upon termination of the municipal department.
¶ 2 We hold that RCW 3.46.150(1) requires only that a city agree to pay for the costs of criminal cases that will be filed in district court as a result of the termination of a municipal department. The agreement between the City and Spokane County (County) in this case satisfies that requirement. We also hold that municipal cases open on the date that the municipal department is terminated must be transferred to the new independent municipal court. Accordingly, we reverse the superior court.
¶ 3 Currently, the City operates its municipal court as a department of the District Court pursuant to chapter 3.46 RCW. In November 2004, the mayor of Spokane notified the commissioners of the County that the City intended to create an independent Spokane municipal court pursuant to chapter 3.50 RCW, effective January 1, 2007.1 The City would therefore terminate the existing municipal department of the District Court on December 31, 2006. In the course of meetings discussing the transfer, disagreement arose as to what would happen to cases pending in the municipal department, subsequent proceedings in cases already adjudicated in the municipal department, and cases on probation (hereinafter "open cases"). The City's position was that all open cases would be transferred to the new municipal court. The District Court, however, believed open municipal cases would have to remain under the jurisdiction of the District Court and the City would have to continue to pay the County to handle those cases until all were disposed of.
¶ 4 RCW 3.46.150(1) sets forth requirements for termination of the municipal department of a district court. It provides:
Any city, having established a municipal department as provided in this chapter may, by written notice to the county legislative authority not less than one year prior to February 1st of the year in which all district court judges are subject to election, require the termination of the municipal department created pursuant to this chapter. A city may terminate a municipal department only at the end of a four-year judicial term. However, the city may not give the written notice required by this section unless the city has reached an agreement with the county under chapter 39.34 RCW [the Interlocal Cooperation Act] under which the county is to be paid a reasonable amount for costs associated with prosecution, adjudication, and sentencing in criminal cases filed in district court as a result of the termination. The agreement shall provide for periodic review and renewal of the terms of the agreement. If the municipality and the county are unable to agree on the terms for renewal of the agreement, they shall be deemed to have entered into an agreement to submit the issue to arbitration under chapter 7.04A RCW. Pending conclusion of the arbitration proceeding, the terms of the agreement shall remain in effect.
RCW 3.46.150(1). Thus, as a statutory prerequisite to termination of a municipal department, a city and county must enter into an agreement dealing with the costs associated with criminal cases "filed in district court as a result of the termination." Id.
¶ 5 Accordingly, the City and County entered into a transfer agreement for the purpose of satisfying the statutory prerequisite. The City and County agreed that effective January 1, 2007, all municipal criminal cases, civil infraction cases, and parking infraction cases filed on or after that date would be filed, administered, and adjudicated in the new City of Spokane Municipal Court. With regard to cases open on that date, the agreement provided:
The CITY proposes that all criminal causes occurring within the City of Spokane prior to January 1, 2007, and filed in the Spokane County District Court prior to January 1, 2007, but which have not been adjudicated prior to January 1, 2007, including related warrants thereto (hereinafter referred to in this subsection as "criminal causes"), [and all subsequent proceedings in criminal causes adjudicated prior to January 1, 2007] shall be taken under authority of . . . the new chapter 3.50 RCW City of Spokane Municipal Court for administration and adjudication effective January 1, 2007.
The COUNTY maintains that whether or not these criminal causes can be transferred is a legal issue having to do with the jurisdiction of the Spokane County District Court and new chapter 3.50 RCW City of Spokane Municipal Court. The COUNTY also believes that the transfer of these criminal causes as proposed by the CITY directly affects the administration and management of the Spokane County District Court. The Spokane County District Court is not a party to this Agreement. The COUNTY maintains it lacks the legal authority to independently negotiate or agree with the CITY's proposal on this matter. In the event it is determined with finality by [a] court of competent jurisdiction that the CITY's proposal to transfer criminal causes as provided for herein is not legally possible, the CITY agrees to immediately meet with the COUNTY and Spokane County District Court (for matters, if any, within its control as provided for under GR 29) to negotiate an agreement as required by RCW 3.46.150.
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 22. The agreement contained identical language with regard to civil infraction cases and parking infraction cases, and similar language regarding the transfer of probation files and other municipal department files.2
¶ 6 With regard to transfer costs, the agreement provided:
The CITY believes that there are no costs associated with criminal case filing, administration and adjudication in criminal cases [discussed above]. The COUNTY's position is set forth [above]. The Parties, however, shall continue negotiations and meetings to review any COUNTY or Spokane County District Court (to the extent it desires to participate in such meetings) proposed associated costs. If the Parties are unable to reach an agreement relating to these costs, the matter shall be referred to arbitration.
CP at 29. The agreement then set forth a time line for arbitration. It contained identical language with regard to transfer costs for infraction cases and parking cases.
¶ 7 The City also agreed to assume any and all costs for the transfer of probation files and other municipal court files to the new court. Furthermore, the agreement recognized that there may be transitional costs for informal and formal training of the new City of Spokane Municipal Court by current district court judges and employees. That section of the agreement again stated that the County believed it would be unable to independently negotiate this issue without the District Court's representative. However, the County agreed to meet with the City and District Court to address these issues. Finally, the City stated that it did not intend to repeal any city ordinance, but even so, agreed that if it were to do so, it would negotiate for the payment of resulting costs.
¶ 8 The agreement contained a severability clause that states, "[i]n the event any portion of this Agreement should become invalid or unenforceable, the rest of the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect." CP at 35. Finally, with regard to the joint city/county domestic violence program, the agreement provided that "[t]he Parties agree to take all reasonably necessary actions to maintain and not jeopardize current grant funding." CP at 36.
¶ 9 Despite the agreement, there has been no arbitration as to transfer costs. In April 2005, the City filed a complaint in Spokane County Superior Court against both the County and the District Court seeking declaratory judgment that all municipal cases pending or on probation on the date of termination of the municipal department be transferred to the new independent municipal court created under chapter 3.50 RCW. In response, the District Court asserted that such cases should be "subject to the continued jurisdiction of the Spokane County District Court and may not be transferred by ...
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