City of Spokane v. State
| Decision Date | 28 April 1939 |
| Docket Number | 27437. |
| Citation | 198 Wash. 682,89 P.2d 826 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | CITY OF SPOKANE v. STATE. |
Suit by City of Spokane, a municipal corporation, against the State for the abatement of certain taxes on personalty purchased subsequent to April 30, 1937, and used in the maintenance and operation of its waterworks system. From a judgment for the plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Reversed and action dismissed.
Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County; John M. Wilson, judge.
G. W Hamilton and R. G. Sharpe, both of Olympia, for the State.
W. E Heidinger, of Tacoma, amicus curiae.
G. M Ferris, B. A. Farley, and H. E. T. Herman, all of Spokane, for respondent.
In July, 1938, this court handed down an opinion in the case of Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Henneford, 195 Wash. 553, 81 P.2d 786, in which it held that, in enacting Title IV, section 31 et seq., chapter 180, p. 726, Laws of 1935, as amended by chapter 191, p. 943, Laws of 1937, levying a tax 'for the privilege of using' within the state of Washington 'any article of tangible personal property purchased subsequent to April 30, 1935,' it was the legislative intent that such tax should not be levied with respect to the use of articles not available for purchase within the state.
During the following October, the city of Spokane, relying upon the rule laid down in that case (which, for the sake of brevity and convenience, will hereinafter be referred to as the telephone case), appealed to the superior court of Thurston county from a levy and assessment by the state tax commission of taxes with respect to the use by the city of certain articles of personal property purchased subsequent to April 30, 1937, and used in the maintenance and operation of its waterworks system. It was agreed by the parties to the case that the articles involved were classifiable as follows:
(A) Articles which, at the time of purchase and use, were neither manufactured, nor available for purchase, in the state of Washington;
(B) Articles which could be purchased in the state, but could not be had in sufficient quantity to satisfy the city's needs;
(C) Articles which could be purchased in the state, but were not of the quality required to fill the city's needs;
(D) Articles, satisfactory in quality, which were manufactured, or were available for purchase, in the state of Washington in quantities sufficient for the city's needs.
Briefly, the position taken by the city was that, under the decision in the telephone case, it was not taxable as to the privilege of using the articles falling under classifications A, B, and C, and, this being so, not even as to the articles classified under D. For, it contended, the legislative attempt to exact a tax on the use of competitive articles, while exempting non-competitive articles, constituted an arbitrary and capricious classification, violative of the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment to the Federal constitution, U.S.C.A., and of the special privilege and immunity clause of the state constitution, art. 1, § 12; hence, Title IV and the whole thereof is void.
The trial court accepted the city's contention and granted its prayer that the tax be abated with reference to the use of all four classes of articles. As to a portion, at least, of that relief, the trial court had no option in the matter, unless it chose to disregard the decision of this court in the telephone case. If that decision was correct as to the proper interpretation of the statute, the decision of the lower court in this case was correct, at least in part, but, if the interpretation of the statute made in the telephone case is erroneous and unsound, then the judgment appealed from must be reversed in its entirety.
For the purpose of supporting its contention that the interpretation put upon Title IV in the opinion in the telephone case was erroneous, the state took the oral testimony of the members of the state tax commission at the trial. The depositions of the governor of the state, of the chairman of the revenue and taxation committee of the Senate during the 1935 session, of the chairman of the same committee of the House, and of the speaker of the House during that session, had already been taken, stating, apparently, what they, respectively, thought the act meant at the time when each of them exercised his appropriate functions with regard to it. Nor was this all. Affidavits executed by thirty-three senators and sixty-eight representatives who served in the 1935 legislative session, and by thirty-three senators and seventy representatives who served in the 1937 session, were also offered in evidence. These affidavits are to the same effect, being upon identical forms prepared and sent out to the respective legislators, for their execution under oath. We set out the form sent to the members of the 1935 legislature, quoting it from the appendix to the state's brief:
'That at said 1935 session of the Washington legislature, affiant was _____ (or was not) a member of the Committee on Revenue and Taxation of the _____ (Senate or House), which committee recommended the passage of said House Bill 237.'
The depositions of the various state officers and the affidavits of the legislators were not read into the record, but were offered as exhibits. The city strenuously objected to their admission. The trial judge held them inadmissible, but permitted them to be made a part of the record on the remote chance that this court might think otherwise. They remain unread in the unbroken original package in which they were brought here; for, it is perfectly clear, both upon reason and authority, that the legislative intent in passing the statute cannot be shown or proven in any such manner. 59 C.J. 1017, 1038; Pagaud v. State, 13 Miss. 491, 5 Smedes & M. 491; Wiseman v. Madison Cadillac Co., 191 Ark. 1021, 88 S.W.2d 1007, 103 A.L.R. 1208; Ex parte Goodrich, 160 Cal. 410, 117 P. 451, Ann.Cas.1913A, 56; In re Lavine, 2 Cal.2d 324, 41 P.2d 161; Barlow v. Jones, 37 Ariz. 396, 294 P. 1106; Stewart v. Atlanta Beef Co., 93 Ga. 12, 18 S.E.981, 44 Am.St.Rep. 119; Abernethy v. Board of Com'rs, 169 N.C. 631, 86 S.E. 577; Goins v. Indian Training School, 169 N.C. 736, 86 S.E. 629; Tallevast v. Kaminski, 146 S.C. 225, 143 S.E. 796; Ocean-Forest Co. v. Woodside, 184 S.C. 428, 192 S.E. 413.
At the time the telephone case was decided, there was a great deal to indicate that various state officers, charged directly or indirectly with the administration of Title IV, Laws of 1935, chapter 180, as amended in 1937, had, previously and from the time of the original passage of the act, given it the interpretation which the court adopted in the opinion in that case. As pointed out in the opinion, the state tax commission, in its regulations issued in October, 1935, said--and substantially the same language appears in regulations issued after the 1937 amendment: 'The primary purpose of the Compensating Tax is to protect the merchants of Washington from discrimination arising by reason of our inability, under Federal Law, to impose a tax upon sales made to our residents by competitive merchants in other states.' [195 Wash. 553, 81 P.2d 790.]
With reference to that declaration, an able and distinguished Federal judge had said, in an opinion in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Henneford, D.C., 15 F.Supp. 302, 304 'In the absence of this frank declaration, it is plain from the law itself that such is...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Gruen v. State Tax Commission
...... Pearson, Seattle, Solie M. Ringold, Seattle, for respondent. . . T. David Gnagey, Spokane, Clay Nixon, Ralph C. Hove, Seattle,. Walthew, Gershon, Yothers & Warner, Seattle, Joseph P. Adams,. Seattle, D. Van Fredenberg, Seattle, ... Chief Justice. . . Plaintiff,. who is a taxpayer engaged in the sale of cigarettes in the. city of Seattle, instituted this action in the superior court. of Thurston county. The complaint contains several. allegations attacking the ......
-
State v. McCollum, 28809.
...... constitutional and stated that Tacoma v. Krech, supra, was. properly overruled. See Patton v. City of. Bellingham, 179 Wash. 566, 38 P.2d 364, 98 A.L.R. 1076. . . Judge. Rudkin refused to concur in the per ... many instances. In State ex rel. McIntyre v. Superior. Court of Spokane County, 21 Wash. 108, 57 P. 352, this. question was squarely presented in a. [141 P.2d 618] . mandamus case where the case of ......
-
State v. McCollum, 28809.
...Lynn, 6 Wash.2d 507, 529, 108 P.2d 365. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Henneford, 195 Wash. 553, 81 P.2d 786, overruled by Spokane v. State, 198 Wash. 682, 89 P.2d 826. Purdy v. State, 199 Wash. 638, 92 P.2d 880, overruled by Washington Security Co. v. State, 9 Wash.2d 197, 205, 114 P.2d 965, 1......
-
Harbour Village Apts. v. City of Mukilteo
....... The city misplaces its reliance on Black v. State, 67 Wash.2d 97, 406 P.2d 761 (1965) . There Black was subjected to a $17,000 sales tax on a $425,000 ship lease payment because it was "an excise ...Salter, 190 Wash. 703, 705-06, 70 P.2d 1056 (1937) (motor vehicle tax measured as percentage of vehicle's value upheld as excise); City of Spokane v. State, 198 Wash. 682, 89 P.2d 826 (1939); (tax on use of personal property purchased at retail upheld as excise); Klickitat County v. Jenner, ......
-
A New Approach to Statutory Interpretation in Washington
...City of Yakima v. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 469, 117 Wash. 2d 655, 818 P.2d 1076 (1991); City of Spokane v. State, 198 Wash. 682, 687, 89 P.2d 826, 828-29 138. See, e.g., W. Telepage, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 140 Wash. 2d 599, 611, 998 P.2d 884, 891 (2000) (noncontemporaneo......
-
Legislative History in Washington
...opinion, intentions, or motive. This approach is strongly criticized in California, supra note 2. See also Smith, supra note 7. 120. 198 Wash. 682, 685-87, 89 P.2d 826, 828-29 121. "[O]ne cannot rely on affidavits or comments of individual legislators to establish legislative intent. What m......