City of Springfield v. State
| Citation | 60 N.E.3d 649 |
| Decision Date | 26 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2015–CA–77.,2015–CA–77. |
| Parties | CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellant v. STATE of Ohio, Defendant–Appellee. |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Ohio) |
Jerome M. Strozdas, Springfield, OH, for Plaintiff–Appellant.
Halli Brownfield Watson, and Nicole M. Koppitch, Columbus, OH, for Defendant–Appellee.
DONOVAN
, P.J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant City of Springfield (hereinafter “Springfield”) appeals a decision of the Clark County Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division, denying its motion for summary judgment and granting the motion for summary judgment of defendant-appellee the State of Ohio (hereinafter “the State”). Springfield filed a timely notice of appeal with this Court on August 20, 2015.
{¶ 2} On March 18, 2015, Springfield filed a “Complaint,” in which it challenged the constitutionality of Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 342 (hereinafter “Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342”) on the grounds that it violates Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution
, otherwise known as the “Home Rule Amendment.” Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 served to amend and enact several statutory provisions governing traffic law photo-monitoring devices. See R.C. 4511.092 –R.C. 4511.0914.
{¶ 3} In its complaint, Springfield specifically challenged the requirement in R.C. 4511.093(B)(1)
that a law enforcement officer be present at the location of any traffic law photo-monitoring device when it is being operated. Springfield also challenged R.C. 4511.095(A)(1) and (2), the provisions which require that a local authority must conduct a safety study and public information campaign for the location under consideration for the placement of a new device before any new photo-monitoring equipment can be deployed. Springfield further asserted that R.C. 4511.0912(A) and (B) violated the home rule amendment because it prohibits municipal authorities from issuing speeding tickets for violations recorded by traffic law photo-monitoring devices unless the individual was driving more than six miles per hour above the speed limit in a school zone and/or park, or ten or more miles per hour above the speed limit in any other location. Springfield argued that the aforementioned provisions of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 “interfere with the City's power of ‘local self-government’ and with the City's exercise of its police power in a manner ‘not in conflict with general laws.’ ” We note that although Springfield's complaint only references five specific provisions which it finds objectionable, it sought a declaratory judgment that all of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 violates the home rule amendment, and is therefore unconstitutional.
{¶ 4} On May 26, 2015, Springfield filed its motion for summary judgment. In addition to arguing that R.C. 4511.093(B)(1)
, 4511.095, and R.C. 4511.0912 were unconstitutional as it had in its complaint, Springfield asserted that R.C. 4511.0911, R.C. 4511.092, R.C. 4511.094, R.C. 4511.096, R.C. 4511.097, and R.C. 4511.099 were unconstitutional “incursions” into its power of local self-government. Springfield also argued that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 is not a general law because it does not “prescribe a rule of conduct for citizens generally,” but only serves to place unconstitutional limits on a municipality's legislative ability. Finally, Springfield asserted that the only provisions of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 that could survive being severed were R.C. 3937.411, R.C. 4511.010, and R.C. 4511.204(C)(2). According to Springfield, the remainder of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 should be stricken as unconstitutional.
{¶ 5} Shortly thereafter on June 9, 2015, the State filed its motion for summary judgment and memorandum contra in which it argued that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 is a general law, and therefore not subject to the home rule amendment to the Ohio Constitution. As such, the State asserted that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 was constitutionally permissible.
{¶ 6} On August 17, 2015, the trial court issued an entry overruling Springfield's motion for summary judgment. In the same entry, the trial court granted the State's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 was constitutionally valid in its entirety, and therefore did not violate the home rule provisions of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶ 7} It is from this judgment that Springfield now appeals.
{¶ 8} On February 15, 2005, Springfield enacted an ordinance authorizing an “automated traffic control photographic system” (ATCPS) for placement at intersections throughout the city. The system only provides for the enforcement of red light violations. The ordinance is codified in Section 303.09 of the Codified Ordinances of the City of Springfield, Ohio. Springfield states that the purpose of the traffic law photo-monitoring system is to reduce the number of red light violations and automobile accidents in the city. Springfield also asserts that the system helps to conserve limited police resources. According to Springfield, there are approximately ten intersections where red light cameras are operating throughout the city.
{¶ 9} Springfield maintains that the ordinance creates a system which is civil in nature, not criminal. The ordinance provides for civil enforcement imposing monetary fines upon the owners of vehicles who commit red light violations. Offenders who are recorded by the ATCPS are not issued criminal traffic citations, and offenses are not adjudicated by the Springfield municipal court. Offenders are not assessed points on their driving records, and Springfield has created and implemented an administrative hearing process presided over by an independent third party not employed by the City of Springfield or the police department. The ordinance states, however, that the Springfield Police Division shall administer the ATCPS program.
{¶ 10} Contained in the notice of liability sent to the offender are the following: 1) the images of the vehicle and its license plate; 2) the ownership records of the vehicle; 3) the nature of the violation and the date upon which the offense occurred; 4) the amount of the civil penalty imposed; and 5) a signed statement by a Springfield Police Officer stating that a violation had occurred based upon review of the recorded images. The recorded images and speed measurement readings taken from the ATCPS device are considered under the ordinance to be prima facie evidence of a violation. The ordinance further provides a means by which the owner of a vehicle can dispute a violation if he or she was not driving the vehicle at the time that the ATCPS recorded a violation. Owners choosing to appeal must send a written request to the Springfield Police Department within fifteen days of receiving the notice of liability. If an administrative hearing is held, the standard of proof utilized by the hearing officer is preponderance of the evidence.
{¶ 11} Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 was signed into law on December 19, 2014, and became effective shortly thereafter on March 23, 2015. The following Revised Code sections were enacted as a result of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342's passage: 4511.092; 4511.093; 4511.095; 4511.096; 4511.097; 4511.098; 4511.099; 4511.0910; 4511.0911; 4511.0912; 4511.0913; 4511.0914; and 4511.204(C)(2). Viewed collectively, the new sections provide a comprehensive definition section (R.C. 4511.092
) and expand upon existing requirements for municipalities who employ the use of traffic photo-monitoring systems. We note that R.C. 4511.094 was already in existence prior to the passage of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342, but parts of the section were updated by the new law including requirements for signs informing drivers that traffic law photo-monitoring devices are being operated in a particular area.
begins by stating that “[a] local authority may utilize a traffic law photo-monitoring device for the purpose of detecting traffic law violations.” Clearly, the initial decision whether to implement the use of traffic cameras is left to the individual municipality. Once the decision is made to install traffic cameras, their continued use becomes subject to the statewide conditions enunciated in the remainder of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342. Specifically, R.C. 4511.093(B)(1)
provides that if a municipality implements the use of a traffic law photo-monitoring device, a law enforcement officer must be present at the location of the device while it is being operated. R.C. 4511.093(B)(2) simply states that a law enforcement officer who is present while the photo-monitoring device is operating can issue a ticket for any violation he or she personally witnesses. Alternatively, if the officer who is present did not issue a ticket for the observed violation, the municipality may issue a ticket for a civil violation if it was recorded by the photo-monitoring device. R.C. 4511.093(B)(3).
requires municipalities to perform certain pre-implementation procedures before deploying a traffic law photo-monitoring device that was not in existence at the time that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 became effective. Specifically, R.C. 4511.095(A)(1) requires a municipality to conduct a safety study of intersections or locations under consideration for placement of a traffic camera. The municipality is also required to conduct a public information campaign to inform drivers about the use of traffic cameras at new system locations prior to their implementation at the new location. R.C. 4511.095(A)(2). Municipalities are also required to publish at least one notice in a local newspaper of general circulation regarding their intent to use traffic cameras at new locations, the locations of the traffic cameras, and the date on which the first traffic camera will become operational. R.C. 4511.095(A)(3). Additionally, when a new traffic camera is deployed, the municipality must “refrain from levying any civil fines” for violations detected by the device for at least thirty days after it becomes operational. R.C....
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City of Springfield v. State
...trial court rejected that challenge, and the court of appeals concluded that the enactment is "constitutional in its entirety." 2016-Ohio-725, 60 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 34.{¶ 4} Our decision in Dayton requires that the decision below be reversed as to two specific provisions of S.B. 342 that were he......