City of Springfield v. Gee

• Decision Date: 30 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. 26227.,No. 26209.,26209.,26227.
• Parties: CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, Missouri, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Vincent Lee GEE and Peggy L. Gee, Defendants-Respondents. City of Springfield, Missouri, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Johnnie Paul Spence and Katherine A. Williams, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

149 S.W.3d 609

CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, Missouri, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Vincent Lee GEE and Peggy L. Gee, Defendants-Respondents.

City of Springfield, Missouri, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Johnnie Paul Spence and Katherine A. Williams, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 26209.

No. 26227.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Two.

November 30, 2004.

Ron Dirickson, Asst. City Atty., Springfield, MO, for appellant.

Robert E. Childress, Springfield, MO, for respondents.

JEFFREY W. BATES, Chief Judge.

In this case of first impression, we must decide whether the trial court properly entered summary judgments against the City of Springfield, Missouri ("the City") in two civil actions seeking forfeiture of motor vehicles pursuant to an ordinance enacted by the City after the passage of § 82.1000.¹ The trial court dismissed the forfeiture actions with prejudice because, in each instance, the City failed to prove that the vehicle's operator was convicted of a felony on a charge substantially related to the forfeiture as required by § 513.617.1. On appeal, the City contends that § 82.1000 is the controlling statute, and it does not require proof of any conviction before a judgment of forfeiture can be entered. Because the legal issue presented by the two cases is the same and all of the respondents are represented by the same attorney, we have consolidated the City's two appeals in order to address the City's arguments in one opinion. The facts in each case, which are quite similar, are set out below.

I. City v. Johnnie Spence and Katherine Williams

On August 3, 2001, Johnnie Spence ("Spence") was operating a 1984 Mercedes on McDaniel Street in Springfield, Missouri. The Mercedes was co-owned by Spence and Katherine Williams ("Williams"). At the intersection of Main and Mt. Vernon streets, a Springfield police officer observed Spence make a left turn without signaling and initiated a traffic stop. The officer smelled a strong odor of intoxicants on Spence's breath. Spence failed the gaze nystagmus, one-leg stand, and walk and turn field sobriety tests, and he refused to supply a breath sample to determine his blood alcohol content. Spence did not have a valid operator's license because his license had been revoked on July 23, 1999 and he was not eligible for reinstatement until December 21, 2009. Spence also had numerous prior convictions for driving while intoxicated.² He was issued tickets for driving while intoxicated, driving while revoked, and failure to use his turn signal. The officer placed a hold for "D.W.I. forfeiture" on the Mercedes and had it towed to an impoundment lot.

On August 10, 2001, the City filed a petition for forfeiture in the Circuit Court of Greene County, Missouri, based on Sec. 106-207 of the City Code. The City sought forfeiture of the Mercedes pursuant to this ordinance because: (1) the vehicle had been operated within the City by Spence; (2) he had one or more intoxication-related traffic offenses, as defined by § 577.023; and (3) he was operating the Mercedes while his license was revoked. Motions for summary judgment were filed by defendants Spence and Williams, as well as the City. In March 2002, Spence and Williams filed a motion for a stay of proceedings pursuant to § 513.617. The trial court granted the motion and stayed the case. In March 2003, the City filed a motion to lift the stay based on the undisputed fact that Spence had pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge of driving while intoxicated in the Associate Division of the Circuit Court of Greene County, Missouri.

II. City v. Vincent Gee and Peggy Gee

On February 3, 2003, a Springfield police officer observed Vincent Gee ("Gee") driving a 1992 Toyota pickup the wrong way on Jefferson Avenue, a one-way street in Springfield, Missouri.³ The Toyota was co-owned by Gee and his wife, Peggy. The officer noticed that Gee's eyes were bloodshot and watery, his speech was slurred and confused, and he moved in slow, deliberate movements. Gee was unable to perform the walk and turn test, and he refused to attempt the one-leg stand test. He also refused to give a breath sample so his blood alcohol content could be determined. After running a check through the Missouri Uniform Law Enforcement System ("MULES"), the officer determined that Gee had previously been convicted of three alcohol-related traffic offenses.⁴ He was issued tickets for driving while intoxicated, driving the wrong way on a one-way street and having no insurance. The officer placed a hold for "D.W.I. forfeiture" on the Toyota and had it towed to an impoundment lot.

On February 13, 2003, the City filed a petition for forfeiture in the Circuit Court of Greene County, Missouri, based on Sec 106-207 of the City Code. The City sought forfeiture of the Gees' Toyota pursuant to this ordinance because: (1) the vehicle had been operated within the City by Gee; (2) he had two or more intoxication-related traffic offenses, as defined by § 577.023; and (3) he had refused an officer's request to submit to a chemical test of his blood alcohol concentration pursuant to § 577.041. In August 2003, the City filed a motion for summary judgment. In October 2003, the Gees filed a motion to stay the proceeding pursuant to § 513.617. The trial court granted the motion and stayed the case. In December 2003, the City filed a motion to lift the stay based on the undisputed fact that Gee had pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge of driving while intoxicated in the Associate Division of the Circuit Court of Greene County, Missouri.

III. Disposition in the Trial Court

On January 22, 2004, the trial court held a hearing in both cases. In City of Springfield v. Spence, the defendants asserted the defense that Spence had not been convicted of a felony on a charge substantially related to the forfeiture proceeding and sought dismissal of the case. In City of Springfield v. Gee, the defendants asserted the same defense and sought the same relief. The City also sought summary judgment and argued that no conviction was required in order to forfeit the vehicle pursuant to Sec. 106-207 of the City Code. After considering the undisputed facts, the court granted a summary judgment of dismissal in each case based on the common defense asserted by all defendants. Thereafter, the City filed a motion for new trial and a motion to amend the judgment, which were denied. A final judgment of dismissal was entered in each case on April 1, 2004, and the City appealed.

IV. Standard of Review

The material facts presented for the trial court's consideration in the motions for summary judgment were undisputed, and all parties agree this appeal presents an issue of law for our determination. See Daniels v. Senior Care, Inc., 21 S.W.3d 133, 135 (Mo.App.2000). Therefore, we employ a de novo standard of review. Bland v. IMCO Recycling, Inc., 122 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Mo.App.2003). In the case at bar, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants. A defending party may establish a right to judgment by showing: (1) facts that negate any one of the claimant's elements facts; (2) that the non-movant, after an adequate period of discovery, has not been able to produce, and will not be able to produce, evidence sufficient to allow the trier of fact to find the existence of any one of the claimant's elements; or (3) that there is no genuine dispute as to the existence of each of the facts necessary to support the movant's properly-pleaded affirmative defense. ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 381 (Mo. banc 1993). The right to judgment as a matter of law may be independently established by any one of these three means. Payne v. City of Osage Beach, 132 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Mo.App.2004). Therefore, our task is to decide whether the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law for any one of these three reasons. See State v. Eicholz, 999 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Mo.App.1999).

V. Discussion and Decision

This appeal requires us to examine the interrelationship among two state statutes and one city ordinance: (1) the Criminal Activity Forfeiture Act ("CAFA"), which is codified at §§ 513.600-513.653; (2) § 82.1000, which is the enabling statute authorizing the City to adopt a forfeiture ordinance; and (3) Sec. 106-207 of the City's Code, which is the forfeiture ordinance itself.

CAFA was enacted in 1986. See §§ 513.600-513.645 RSMo (1986). Section 513.607.1 RSMo (1986) stated:

All property of every kind used or intended for use in the course of, derived from, or realized through criminal activity is subject to civil forfeiture. Civil forfeiture shall be had by a civil procedure known as a CAFA forfeiture proceeding.

CAFA authorized the attorney general or the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the property was seized to institute an in rem or in personam forfeiture proceeding by filing a forfeiture petition. § 513.607.3 RSMo (1986); § 513.607.4 RSMo (1986). If the petition was filed before the seizure occurred, it had to "state what property is sought to be forfeited, that the property is within the jurisdiction of the court, the grounds for forfeiture, and the names of all persons known to have or claim an interest in the property." § 513.607.5(1) RSMo (1986). If the petition was filed after the seizure, it also had to state the date and place of the seizure. The burden of proving these allegations in the petition was placed on the State. § 513.607.5(2) RSMo (1986); § 513.605(5) RSMo (1986).

Even if the State met its burden of proving that the property identified in the petition was subject to forfeiture pursuant to § 513.607.1 RSMo (1986), however, CAFA provided two statutory defenses that could be asserted in the forfeiture proceeding. First, § 513.615 stated that "[t]he interest of an innocent party in the property shall not be subject to forfeiture." This statute permitted an innocent party to intervene in the forfeiture proceeding to assert this...