City of St. Joseph ex rel. Fid. Cas. Co. v. Grantham Motor Sales, 39.

• Decision Date: 10 December 1934
• Docket Number: No. 39.,39.
• Citation: 269 Mich. 260,257 N.W. 701
• Parties: CITY OF ST. JOSEPH, for Use and Benefit of FIDELITY CASUALTY CO., v. GRANTHAM MOTOR SALES et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

269 Mich. 260

257 N.W. 701

CITY OF ST. JOSEPH, for Use and Benefit of FIDELITY CASUALTY CO.,

v.GRANTHAM MOTOR SALES et al.

No. 39.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 10, 1934.

Action by the City of Saint Joseph, a municipal corporation, for the use and benefit of the Fidelity Casualty Company, against the Grantham Motor Sales, a corporation, and the General Motors Acceptance Corporation of Indiana, Incorporated. From a judgment for plaintiff, the second-named defendant appeals, and the first-named defendant cross-appeals.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Berrien County; Charles E. White, judge.

Argued before the Entire Bench, except BUTZEL, J.

Charles W. Stratton, of St. Joseph, for appellant.

Stuart B. White, of Niles, for appellee.

FEAD, Justice.

March 18, 1932, Lafayette Wires, an employee of plaintiff city, was negligently killed in Michigan by a truck driven by John Ryan, an employee of defendant Grantham Motor Sales, an Indiana corporation, doing business at Gary, Ind. Plaintiff city, having been charged with payments to Wires' dependents under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Comp. Laws 1929, § 8407 et seq., as amended), brought this action for damages, by virtue of statutory subrogation. The court submitted to the jury only the issue whether the truck driven by Ryan caused Wires' death. Grantham Motor Sales has not prosecuted its appeal. Plaintiff had judgment. The question is whether General Motors Acceptance Corporation of Indiana (appellant) was liable for the injury as ‘owner’ of a motor vehicle driven with its express or implied consent or knowledge. Comp. Laws 1929, § 4648.

Grantham Motor Sales originally owned the truck. October 9, 1931, it sold it to C. C. Parr on conditional sales contract. Simultaneously it conveyed all its interest in the contract and truck to this appellant, which financed the transaction and paid Grantham Motor Sales the balance of the purchase price. In addition to such conveyance, Grantham Motor Sales guaranteed payment of the contract balance.

Parr applied for and received certificate of title in his name in Indiana. The certificate, however, was actually returned to and held by Grantham Motor Sales. In a few weeks Parr defaulted on his contract. Representatives of both Grantham Motor Sales and appellant repossessed the truck from Parr. Grantham Motor Sales kept possession of it ‘with no other rights in the truck except to sell it.’ It reconditioned the vehicle but was unable to sell it.

In January, 1932, Mr. Grantham and Mr. Ritt, manager of the Gary branch office of appellant, made an agreement that Grantham Motor Sales could use the truck, and others, for general trucking purposes, and it did so for about six months, paying appellant some of the earnings therefrom. It was in such use when the accident to Wires occurred. There was no agreement as to the length of time the truck was to be so used, and appellant could have terminated the use at any time.

After the accident, Grantham sold the truck on sales contract, executed repossession certificate required in Indiana, and had certificate of title issued in the name of the purchaser. The contract was defaulted and the truck repossessed by Grantham Motor Sales. In June Grantham and Ritt agreed to terminate the use for trucking purposes and appellant took possession of the truck and sold it.

Primarily the ‘owner’ of a motor vehicle, under Comp. Laws 1929, § 4648, is found from general law. Daugherty v. Thomas, 174 Mich. 371, 140 N. W. 615,45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 699, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 1163. Under other provisions of the motor vehicle acts, other persons are deemed ‘owners' for certain purposes, among them being persons having exclusive use of the vehicle for over thirty days under lease or otherwise. Comp. Laws 1929, § 4632 (c). The case is not complicated by such...