City of St. Louis v. Gloner

• Decision Date: 17 March 1908
• Citation: 210 Mo. 502,109 S.W. 30
• Parties: CITY OF ST. LOUIS v. GLONER.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

109 S.W. 30

210 Mo. 502

CITY OF ST. LOUIS v. GLONER.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

March 17, 1908.

1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS—USE AND REGULATION OF STREETS.

While the city of St. Louis, under the direct provisions of article 3, § 26, cl. 2, of its charter (Ann. St. 1906, p. 4809), has the power to regulate the use of its streets, it may not do so in a way that interferes with the personal liberty of a citizen as guaranteed to him by the Constitution and laws.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—PERSONAL LIBERTY —MUNICIPAL REGULATIONS.

St. Louis City Charter, art. 3, § 26, cl. 2 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 4809), authorizes the city to regulate the use of its streets, and the municipal code of the city (section 1460) provides that any person who shall lounge, stand, or loaf around or at street corners or other public places shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Const. art. 2, § 4 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 128), guarantees to every citizen the right of personal liberty. Defendant was prosecuted under section 1460 for standing on the street corners; he being at the time engaged in picketing the premises of a store whose employés were on a strike, and was conducting himself in an orderly manner and not interfering with travel. Held, that defendant had the right to stop and remain on the street, so long as he conducted himself properly and did not interfere with the use of the street, and the ordinance was unconstitutional, as infringing upon the right of personal liberty, and was unreasonable and oppressive.

Error to St. Louis Court of Criminal Correction; Hiram N. Moore, Judge.

Jacob Gloner was prosecuted, under a provision of the municipal code of the city of St. Louis, for unlawfully standing on the street corners, and acquitted, and the city brings error. Judgment affirmed.

Charles W. Bates and Charles P. Williams, for plaintiff in error. C. J. Anderson, for defendant in error.

BURGESS, J.

This was a prosecution under section 1460 of the municipal code of the city of St. Louis, which reads as follows: "Any person who shall, on Sunday or any other day of the week, disturb the peace by any noisy, riotous or disorderly conduct in any park, street, alley, highway, thoroughfare or other public place or public resort for pleasure or amusement or other purposes, or any person or persons who shall lounge, stand or loaf around or about or at street corners or other public places, in the day or night time, or who shall use indecent, loud or profane language on the public street or other public place or who shall purchase or otherwise obtain any beer, wine or spirituous or malt liquors by the measure or in quantities greater than one-half pint, and drink the same upon the public streets, alleys, parks, or other public thoroughfares or places in the city, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, before either of the police justices, shall be fined in the sum of not less than five or more than fifty dollars. The above provision not to apply to workingmen drinking beer at lunch or dinner at their places of work." The information substantially charges that the defendant violated said ordinance on the 4th day of August, 1904, and on divers other days and times prior thereto, by unlawfully lounging, standing, and loafing around and about and at certain public street corners and other public places, to wit, Eleventh street and Washington avenue, in the day and night time, in the city of St. Louis. This case was first tried in one of the police courts of said city, whence an appeal was taken to the St. Louis court of criminal correction.

The testimony tends to show that on August 4, 1904, there was a strike of the employés of the Harris Bros. Clothing Company, whose place of business was at 1128 Washington avenue, in the city of St. Louis, and that defendant and three other strikers were doing what is termed "picket duty" at the corner of Eleventh street and Washington avenue, near the business place of said clothing company. Officer Pierson, who arrested defendant on said August 4th, testified that he had seen defendant at the corner of Eleventh street and Washington avenue the morning he arrested him, and had seen him there on prior mornings and evenings. The police officer further testified as follows: "Q. Was he doing anything but standing on the corner? A. No, sir. Q. Was he blocking the corner? A. No, sir. Q. How wide is the sidewalk there? A. Ten or twelve feet. Q. He was standing on the sidewalk on the corner, and you told him to move on? A. Yes, sir. Q. He wasn't talking to any one? A. No, sir. Q. There was a strike on, and these men were simply doing what is called `picket duty'? A. Yes, sir. Q. As I understand, picket duty consists in standing around corners and requesting men not to take striker's places. A. Yes, sir. Q. That was what this man was doing as they came from work in the evening? A. Yes, sir. Q. In other words, during this time there was nothing in his action that you as a police officer deemed it necessary to arrest him for? A. I watched him for two or three days. Q. You made the arrest, not because he was obstructing the sidewalk, but because he was doing picket duty? A. Because he was doing picket duty, and I was informed that they must stop it." The witness further testified that he saw the defendant stop and talk to some of the employés of the company against which the strike was directed. Three other witnesses, employés of the said company, testified to seeing the defendant standing on the street corner several mornings and evenings before the day he was arrested.

At the close of the city's case the defendant moved the court to discharge him, on the ground that the evidence introduced by the...