City of St. Louis v. Laughlin

• Decision Date: 31 March 1872
• Citation: 49 Mo. 559
• Parties: CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Respondent, v. HENRY D. LAUGHLIN, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

49 Mo. 559

CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Respondent,

v.HENRY D. LAUGHLIN, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March Term, 1872.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.

R. E. Rombauer, for appellant.

I. Corporate powers, especially the power of taxation, will be strictly construed, and cannot be claimed unless clearly within the limits of the charter; any doubt or ambiguity must be resolved against the corporation and in favor of the public. (Cool. Const. Lim. 195; Clark v. Davenport, 14 Iowa, 495, 500; Savannah v. Hartridge, 8 Ga. 23; Beatty v. Knowles' Lessee, 4 Pet. 152; Minturn v. Larue, 23 How. 435; Grand Rapids v. Hughes, 15 Mich. 54; Sprague v. Birdsall, 2 Cow. 419.)

II. The general clause “and all other business, trades, avocations or professions whatever,” following the special enumeration, must be construed as applicable to the persons particularly mentioned, and persons ejusdem generis. (Sedgw. Stat. and Const. Law, 423; Sandiman v. Breach, 7 B. & C. 99, 100; Kitchen v. Shaw, 1 Nev. & P. 794-5; Reed v. Ingram, 3 Ell. & Bl. 900; United States v. Irvin, 5 McLean, 179; Chapman v. Forsyth, 2 How. 202; Peate v. Dicken, 1 Crompt., M. & R. 147.)

III. In ascertaining the intention of the law-givers, the fact that obscure professions, numbering but a few members, are expressly selected for taxation, while the profession of lawyers--a profession, as the agreed case finds, very numerous and well known--is omitted, ought of itself be deemed as controlling.

E. P. McCarty, for respondent.

I. There is but one question in this case, namely, whether the ninth paragraph of article III of the city charter confers upon the city of St. Louis power to tax the profession or calling of lawyers residing and practicing within its limits. (Sess. Acts 1870, p. 464, par. 9.) It is admitted by the agreed case that the profession as followed by appellant is a “business profession,” and respondent submits that by the above act the Legislature meant to confer the power to tax all such--that is, all “business professions whatever.” This is the language of the act, the fair, natural meaning of the words used; and this, when unambiguous--and there is no ambiguity here--is the absolute guide to the legislative intent. (54 Penn. St. 86, 180; Broom's Leg. Max. 503.)

II. Any construction which does not interpret the act as meaning a grant of the power of taxation, not only over the subject-matters of the special enumerations, but over such other professions, avocations or callings as are distinctly “business professions,” “business avocations,” etc., fails to give effect to the entire language used. For it is noticeable that the word “business” is used adjectively as describing the professions, etc., other than those enumerated, that may be taxed. The interpretation contended for by respondent would be to give the same effect to this paragraph, and that only, that it would have if this adjective were stricken out. It renders a potential qualifying term unmeaning. I submit that no word can be construed as unmeaning and surplusage, if a construction can be legitimately found which will give force to and preserve all the words of the statute. Effect must be given to the entire language used. (Leversee v. Reynolds, 13 Iowa, 310; Rawson v. State, 19 Conn. 299.)

III. A comparison of this act with the former charter shows the object of the section to be the increase of the subject-matters of taxation for municipal purposes, and the construction must be with reference to and in furtherance of this object. (The People v. Dana, 26 Cal. 11.) Nor is there anything in the rules invoked by appellant--namely, that corporate grants should be strictly construed, and that general words following specific enumerations are to be construed as applicable to the persons mentioned and persons ejusdem generis-- that properly applied changes the interpretation of the section in controversy.

IV. There is no material difference between corporate grants and other statutes, in the principles of construction, as to the intent of the Legislature. (United States v. Winn, 3 Sumn. 211; Foster v. Blount, 18 Ala. 689; 1 Gallis, 117; 19 Conn. 299.)

V. The doctrine of ejusdem generis, or noscitur a sociis, is applicable only where not only there are general words following special enumerations, but also where there is no language in the statute indicating the use of the general words with reference to any thought other than that contained in the preceding special words. (Littlefield v. Winslow, 19 Me. 394; Foster v. Blount, 18 Ala. 689; Grumley v. Webb, 44 Mo. 458.) In the case at bar, the Legislature, after passing from the special enumerations by using the word “business” as an adjective, introduces itself a qualification of the general words, and thus negatives the presumption that the general words were used with reference only to the preceding special enumerations.

VI. Even if it be assumed that these concluding general words are applicable only to persons ejusdem generis, as those specially enumerated, the result of this case is not altered. The special enumeration covers the most opposite callings. Nothing can be affirmed as common or generic to all or a majority of the special enumerations, except it be that they in each case constitute a distinctively “business trade,” or “business profession,” as distinguished from officers, judges, ministers or laborers, and the like. The reason of the rule that limits the scope of general words in such cases, limits them only by the generic idea that runs through the enumerations. The application of the rule in most if not all of the adjudications is to cases where the enumerations belong to some general class, where something can be affirmed as common to all, and thus showing the mind to have been occupied with this generic idea. The subsequent sweeping terms are simply presumed (nothing contrary appearing in the language used) to have been used with reference to the same general thought, as in Chapman v. Forsyth, 2 How., U. S., 208; 13 N. Y. 228; 2 B. & A. 596; 3 Ell. & Bl. 898; 9 Wall. 343.

WAGNER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

This case comes here for review on an appeal from the Criminal Court, where the defendant was found guilty and a fine was assessed against him. The facts in the case are agreed upon, and by them it appears that the defendant is a practicing lawyer in the city of St. Louis, and that, while practicing his profession, he neglected and refused to pay a license tax imposed by an ordinance of the city upon all lawyers before they were allowed to practice or engage in their...