City of St. Paul v. Morris, 37909

Decision Date22 July 1960
Docket NumberNo. 37909,37909
Citation258 Minn. 467,104 N.W.2d 902
PartiesCITY OF SAINT PAUL, Respondent, v. Robert MORRIS, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

The use of vile and obscene language toward police officers was of such a nature, under the circumstances here, as to outrage the sense of public decency and violated a city ordinance prohibiting disorderly conduct.

Otis H. Godfrey, Sr., St. Paul, for appellant.

Louis P. Sheahan, City Atty., Robert E. Faricy, Asst. City Atty., St. Paul, for respondent.

DELL, Chief Justice.

Defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct under St. Paul City Ordinance 438.02. 1 He appeals from the judgment of conviction.

On January 10, 1959, at approximately 1:30 a.m., the defendant's half brother, Booker T. Parker, was arrested with two others on a charge of consuming liquor in a restaurant not licensed for such consumption. As the officers left the establishment and were leading the accused to the police car, the defendant walked behind them asking the officers why they were arresting his brother who, defendant claimed, had done nothing to warrant arrest. The defendant then said to the officers two or three times, 'You white mother f--kers, what are you picking on us for, why don't you pick on the white people?' He was then placed under arrest. While it appears from the record that other persons were close enough to hear what was said, no claim is made that persons other than the officers did, in fact, hear the defendant's remarks or that, apart from the words referred to, the defendant created any disturbance.

Defendant contends that the use of abusive language toward a police officer does not, in itself, constitute disorderly conduct. In support of his argument he cites numerous authorities, particularly New York cases, holding that since an officer is charged with preserving the peace, offensive language directed solely toward an officer, however abusive or vile it may be, cannot be said to tend to provoke a breach of the peace. This largely fictional reasoning has been vigorously repudiated in other jurisdictions, 2 and not always followed in New York. 3

Regardless of the merits of these cases they are of little significance since the conduct prohibited by the ordinance here involved is not limited to acts which tend to breach the peace or cause actual disturbance. It is the rule in this state, as it is generally elsewhere, that legislation relating to disorderly conduct also embraces acts which corrupt the public morals or outrage the sense of public decency. 4 Under the circumstances before us the foul, vulgar, and obscene expressions admittedly used by the defendant constituted conduct of such a nature. While it is obvious that not every abusive epithet directed toward police officers would be sufficiently disturbing or provocative to justify arrest for disorderly conduct, there is no sound reason why officers must be subjected to indignities such as present here, indignities that go far beyond what any other citizen might reasonably be expected to endure.

Since this opinion was written a dissent has appeared even though the only issue briefed and argued is the one disposed of by the majority opinion. Ordinance 438.02 is the only one involved. The trial and conviction in the court below as sell as the briefs of both parties here were based on that ordinance. No other ordinance was mentioned.

The question of whether the ordinance involved is sufficiently definitive to meet constitutional requirements was not argued by the defendant. Nevertheless it is clear from our discussion in State v. Reynolds, 243 Minn. 196, 66 N.W.2d 886, in which we held that the offense of 'disorderly conduct,' as defined in M.S.A. § 615.17, was not too vague or indefinite, 5 that an ordinance of the type here involved is also sufficiently certain to meet objections on constitutional grounds.

Nor can we adopt the suggestion made in the dissenting opinion that the foul and vulgar expletive here used became offensive only because it was addressed by a colored person to a Caucasian officer and referred to the 'white' race. While each case must rest upon the probable and natural consequences of the defendant's own conduct, under the particular facts involved, we have no doubt that the expression would be equally provocative and offensive to any citizen, regardless of race.

No racial issue was raised in this appeal, and as pointed out in footnote 17 of the dissent, the record does not even show that the defendant and his companions were of the colored race while the officers were of the Caucasian race. We think it would have been a great deal better, and certainly far more judicial, to have waited until a case was presented to us dealing squarely with this issue than to inject it, as was unfortunately done here, through the dissent.

The defendant's other assignments, dealing with procedural matters only, have not been briefed or argued. In any event they are without merit.

Affirmed.

LOEVINGER, Justice (dissenting).

This case presents the issue whether using an obscene expletive to a policeman sustains a conviction for 'disorderly conduct' under the ordinances of St. Paul. Behind this apparently simple issue lurk considerations of basic importance in the relationship of government to individual. These deserve careful examination and therefore require extended discussion.

The liberty of the individual, which is rightfully one of the proudest possessions of the American people, is largely a freedom from arbitrary action by those possessed of the power of government. This is so important a matter to our people that the very structure of the government itself was formed to secure this end. The powers of government were divided among legislative, executive, and judicial branches to insure, so far as any device could do so, against abuse, arbitrary exertion, or usurpation of power. 6 This concept has roots deep in our legal history. In the Magna Charta signed by King John at Runnymede in 1215, it was promised that no freeman should be penalized unless 'by the law of the land.' 7 It is now generally agreed that these words were intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government. 8 This specific guarantee of Magna Charta has been carried into our constitutional law in the prohibition against the deprivation of life, liberty, or property without 'due process of law.' These words have the same meaning as the phrase 'by the law of the land' used in Magna Charta in the thirteenth century. 9 This basic requirement that government proceed by due process of law has been a part of the Bill of Rights of the Minnesota constitution since it was approved by the people in 1857. 10 The same provision has been a part of the Federal Constitution since ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791 as a standard for the Federal government, 11 and as a standard for state governments since ratification of U.S.Const. Amend. XIV in 1868. 12

This ancient and basic concept of American government has been developed and refined over the years by numerous applications and expositions. Through these it has come to be recognized as imposing certain specific minimum requirements for governmental action. Essentially these require that all three branches of government act in their respective capacities before a penalty is imposed. The legislative branch must define the offense and stipulate the penalty by proper enactment. The executive branch must apprehend the offender, institute prosecution, and present evidence showing a violation of the legislative enactment. The judicial branch must consider the charge and the evidence impartially and reach a reasoned determination that the evidence establishes violation of the legislative enactment.

These requirements are sometimes called 'technical,' and they may be. Nevertheless, they are the means by which the ancient and basic guarantee against arbitrary government action inflicting a penalty or curtailing individual liberty is made effective. The courts have no more important function in our system of government than the maintenance of this principle in unimpaired vitality and the application and enforcement of the technical requirements by which this purpose is secured.

It has been repeatedly hedl that it is fundamental to due process of law that no person be penalized except for commission of an offense which was clearly forbidden and defined by legislative enactment. While mathematical precision is not required, the legislative definition of an offense must be specific enough to give fair notice of what is forbidden to men of common intelligence and to provide a reasonably certain guide to the lawyer defending the person charged and the judge engaged in applying the law. 13 State action failing to meet this standard violates both the Minnesota constitution 14 and the Federal Constitution. 15

It is generally stated that the reason for this rule is to give fair notice to all individuals as to what conduct will render them subject to penalties. 16

However, an equally important consideration appears to be that this requirement minimizes the opportunity for abitrary action by executive and judicial officers of government. When penalties are imposed for offenses that are vaguely defined, then the police agencies become legislators and the courts are powerless to check abuses except by arrogating legislative authority to themselves. On the other hand, when penal laws are reasonably specific and definite, then police agencies, as well as the people, have guidance to recognize illegal conduct without resorting to their own ideas of what is proper or improper, and the courts similarly have standards by which to judge.

In the instant case defendant was in a restaurant when police officers arrested several other individuals in the restaurant, including defendant's half brother,...

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  • State v. John W.
    • United States
    • Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)
    • 25 Agosto 1980
    ...subjected to indignities that go far beyond what any other citizen might reasonably be expected to endure. City of St. Paul v. Morris, (Minn. 1960) 258 Minn. 467, 104 N.W.2d 902, 903. 290 A.2d at The wording of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 501(2) is substantially different from the version of 17 M.R.S.A......
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    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
    • 9 Septiembre 2010
    ...(D.C.1966) (recognizing that an officer “does not lose his human nature simply because he wears a star”); City of St. Paul v. Morris, 258 Minn. 467, 104 N.W.2d 902, 903 (1960) (stating “[w]hile it is obvious that not every abusive epithet directed toward police officers would be sufficientl......
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    • 15 Abril 1968
    ...Lippert v. State, 207 Misc. 632; 139 N.Y.S.2d 751, City of St. Petersburg v. Calbeck, 121 So.2d 814 (Fla.App.); City of Saint Paul v. Morris, 258 Minn. 467, 104 N.W.2d 902. Other cases are collected in a note, 34 A.L.R. 566.' (Emphasis Then in Harris v. State, 237 Md. 299, 303, 206 A.2d 254......
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    ...time to time, from region to region, and as between social, cultural, and ethnic groups. City of St. Paul v. Morris, 258 Minn. 467, 480-81, 104 N.W.2d 902, 910 (1960) (Loevinger, J., dissenting). "One [person's] vulgarity is another's lyric." Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25, 91 S.Ct. at In order to s......
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