City of St. Paul v. Franklin

• Decision Date: 20 February 1970
• Docket Number: 41561,Nos. 41579,s. 41579
• Citation: City of St. Paul v. Franklin, 175 N.W.2d 16, 286 Minn. 194 (Minn. 1970)
• Parties: CITY OF SAINT PAUL, Respondent, v. Lewis FRANKLIN and Charlene G. Franklin, Appellants. CITY OF SAINT PAUL, Respondent, v. Jose FLOOD, a.k.a. Clarence Flood, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 16

175 N.W.2d 16

286 Minn. 194

CITY OF SAINT PAUL, Respondent, v. Lewis FRANKLIN and Charlene G. Franklin, Appellants.

CITY OF SAINT PAUL, Respondent, v. Jose FLOOD, a.k.a. Clarence Flood, Appellant.

Nos. 41579, 41561.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Feb. 20, 1970.

Syllabus by the Court

St. Paul Legislative Code, c. 469.01, entitled 'Disorderly Houses,' is not unconstitutionally vague on its face, nor are its terms in conflict with Minn.St. 609.33.

Douglas W. Thomson, John R. Wylde, Jr., and Jack Nordby, St. Paul, for appellants.

Joseph P. Summers, City Atty., Thomas M. Mooney, Asst. City Atty., Daniel A. Klas, Sp. Asst. City Atty., St. Paul, for respondent.

Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and NELSON, MURPHY, OTIS and ROGOSHESKE, JJ.

OPINION

ROGOSHESKE, Justice.

The two issues in these cases, consolidated for hearing on appeal, are whether St. Paul Legislative Code, c. 469.01, entitled 'Disorderly Houses,' is unconstitutional as vague and indefinite on its face, and whether it is in conflict with Minn.St. 609.33, covering the same subject matter.

Each of the male defendants was convicted in municipal court of keeping a disorderly house, and defendant Charlene G. Franklin was convicted of aiding and abetting her husband in keeping a disorderly house. Defendants Franklin were arraigned upon a 'tab charge,' and defendant Flood, upon a complaint which essentially elleged that he did 'wrongfully, unlawfully, and intentionally keep a disorderly house.' Defendant Flood appeals from the conviction which followed his appeal to the Ramsey County District Court. Defendants Franklin appeal from the municipal court convictions.

Defendants' sole challenge here is limited to the claim that the ordinance, without regard to the particular facts of these cases, is unconstitutionally vague in its overbroad scope. Defendants did not request a bill of particulars of the acts claimed to constitute a violation of the ordinance before trial, nor do they make any claims that they were prejudiced by reason of any inadequacies in the charge or that the evidence is insufficient to support their respective convictions. The record upon which the convictions were found is not submitted for review. We are advised, however, that the conduct of the defendants giving rise to the prosecution was that of permitting gambling and tippling, that is, illegal sales and consumption of liquor by the drink on the premises of houses kept by them. ¹

The ordinance provides:

'Disorderly Houses. Any person or persons who shall, within the limits of the City of St. Paul, keep a house of ill-fame, or place resorted to for the purpose of prostitution or lewdness, or who shall keep a disorderly or ill-governed house or place, or a house or place for the practice of fornication, or for the resort of persons of evil name or fame, or dishonest conversation, or who shall permit or suffer to come together, at such houses or place, persons of ill name or fame, or who shall commit or suffer to be committed therein any immoral, immodest, or other improper conduct or behavior, or any tippling, revelling, rioting, or disturbance, and all persons, male or female, who resort to or visit such disorderly houses or house of ill-fame for the purpose of fornication or dishonest conversation or any immoral, immodest or other improper conduct or behavior, or any tippling, revelling, rioting, or disturbance, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.'

There are a host of decisions in most jurisdictions, including decisions of the United States Supreme Court, involving application of the 'void for vagueness doctrine.' The doctrine, which stems from the common-law principle of strict construction and nonenforcement of incomprehensible penal statutes, is now embodied in the constitutional command of due process. ² When it is claimed that penal statutes or ordinances are void or unenforceable for unconstitutional uncertainty, the question to be determined is whether their 'words and phrases are so vague and indefinite that any penalty prescribed for their violation constitutes a denial of due process of law.' ³ Such a legislative enactment offends the first essential of due process when it forbids the doing of an act or a course of conduct in language so vague 'that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' ⁴ We have applied these fundamentals to cases involving similar attacks on statutes proscribing a course of conduct as well as specific acts. The rules, including the canons of construction, which govern a determination of such a constitutional attack are well stated in these cases and need not be repeated. State v. Johnson, 282 Minn. 153, 163 N.W.2d 750; City of St. Paul v. Morris, 258 Minn. 467, 104 N.W.2d 902; State v. Suess, 236 Minn. 174, 52 N.W.2d 409; State v. Eich, 204 Minn. 134, 282 N.W. 810; State v. Northwest Poultry & Egg Co., 203 Minn. 438, 281 N.W. 753.

The difficulty we experience with defendants' constitutional attack is that it seeks to invalidate the ordinance in toto. Defendants challenge the city's power to punish any violation of the ordinance where the charge is simply that of keeping a disorderly house by the argument that without a precise definition of a disorderly house, the language of the ordinance is so 'broad, esoteric, redundant, archaic, and confusing' that hypothetically it may be interpreted by those charged with its enforcement to permit punishment of acts or conduct falling within the protection of the constitutional guaranty of privacy. As defendants frame their attack upon the ordinance, we are compelled to ignore completely the conduct of defendants which gave rise to their prosecutions. Stated another way, whether defendants' conduct is outside the scope of any provision of the ordinance, or whether punishment for such conduct would unduly infringe upon constitutional guaranties, is irrelevant to the constitutional issue by de...