City of St. Petersburg v. Bowen
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
| Writing for the Court | CAMPBELL |
| Citation | City of St. Petersburg v. Bowen, 675 So.2d 626 (Fla. App. 1996) |
| Decision Date | 22 May 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-03437,95-03437 |
| Parties | 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1239 CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, Florida, Appellant, v. William A. BOWEN, as Trustee of the William A. Bowen Trust Agreement, Appellee. |
Michael S. Davis, City Attorney, and John Thor White, Assistant City Attorney, St. Petersburg, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Wendy S. Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Amicus Curiae State of Florida.
Robert H. Willis, Jr. of Skelton, Willis & Bennett, St. Petersburg, for Appellee.
Appellant, City of St. Petersburg, Florida (City), challenges the summary judgment which resolved the issue of liability in favor of appellee, William A. Bowen, as Trustee of the William A. Bowen Trust Agreement (Bowen), in Bowen's inverse condemnation action against the City. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv). After a review of the record before us, we conclude that the trial judge's summary judgment was a correct application of the pertinent law to the undisputed facts of the case. We affirm.
In 1991, Bowen acquired ownership of The Lorraine Apartments in St. Petersburg. The City, in 1993, filed an administrative complaint with its Nuisance Abatement Board (NAB) against Bowen alleging that The Lorraine Apartments constituted a nuisance by virtue of the purported use of drugs by tenants and other persons at the property. No unlawful activity on the part of Bowen was alleged. The City's complaint was filed pursuant to section 893.138, Florida Statutes (1991) and the City's enabling ordinance which substantially tracks the statute. See 19-66 to 19-71, St. Petersburg City Code. Section 893.138 provides as follows (1) Any place or premises that has been used on more than two occasions, within a 6-month period, as the site of the unlawful sale or delivery of controlled substances or as the site of a violation of s. 796.07, or any place or building used by a youth and street gang for the purpose of conducting a pattern of youth and street gang activity may be declared to be a public nuisance, and such nuisance may be abated pursuant to the procedures provided in this section.
(2) Any county or municipality may, by ordinance, create an administrative board to hear complaints regarding the nuisances described in subsection (1). Any employee, officer, or resident of the county or municipality may bring a complaint before the board after giving not less than 3 days' written notice of such complaint to the owner of the place or premises at his last known address. After a hearing in which the board may consider any evidence, including evidence of the general reputation of the place or premises, and at which the owner of the premises shall have an opportunity to present evidence in his defense, the board may declare the place or premises to be a public nuisance as described in subsection (1).
(3) If the board declares a place or premises to be a public nuisance, it may enter an order immediately prohibiting:
(a) The maintaining of the nuisance;
(b) The operating or maintaining of the place or premises; or
(c) The conduct, operation, or maintenance of any business or activity on the premises which is conducive to such nuisance.
(4) An order entered under subsection (3) shall expire after 1 year or at such earlier time as is stated in the order.
(5) An order entered under subsection (3) may be enforced pursuant to the procedures contained in s. 120.69. This subsection does not subject a municipality that creates a board under this section, or the board so created, to any other provision of chapter 120.
(6) The board may bring a complaint under s. 60.05 seeking temporary and permanent injunctive relief against any nuisance described in subsection (1).
(7) This section does not restrict the right of any person to proceed under s. 60.05 against any public nuisance.
After a hearing on the City's complaint, the NAB ordered The Lorraine Apartments closed for a period of one year effective August 16, 1993. As a consequence of the ruling, Bowen was unable to put The Lorraine Apartments to any economic use and the property's fair market value was substantially diminished. Bowen has received no compensation from the City.
On August 11, 1993, Bowen filed a complaint for inverse condemnation against the City in circuit court. Bowen alleged that the closure of The Lorraine Apartments constituted a taking for a public purpose requiring just compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and article X, section 6, and article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution. The City moved to dismiss Bowen's complaint, asserting in part that an action for inverse condemnation may not arise from a temporary taking. On January 19, 1994, the trial judge granted the City's motion by finding that From that decision, Bowen filed an appeal and, on September 28, 1994, this court reversed per curiam, citing Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Authority v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 640 So.2d 54 (Fla.1994). Bowen v. City of St. Petersburg, Fla., 642 So.2d 837 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). On remand, both the City and Bowen moved for summary judgment upon stipulated facts.
On July 6, 1995, summary judgment was entered for Bowen. The trial judge found that the City imposed a temporary loss of all economic use of the apartments. The trial court also held that use of the property as an apartment house was not a nuisance at common law. The trial court concluded Bowen was entitled to compensation for the one-year taking of his property with the total amount of such compensation to be determined subsequently by the court.
At the outset, we note that the action of closing completely the apartments for one year was, in regard to Bowen's property rights, one of the most invasive methods of abating the purported nuisance that was available. In this appeal, we are presented with the narrow issue of whether the complete closure of The Lorraine Apartments for one year in order to curtail the illegal use of drugs by tenants and others was a compensable taking by the City.
As support for the summary judgment for Bowen, the trial judge has entered an "Order Granting Summary Judgment In Favor Of Plaintiff, William A. Bowen, Trustee." That order is complete, concise, scholarly and well-grounded. We see no need to attempt to add our reassessment to those findings and conclusions and, therefore, set forth below the trial judge's order, in full, and adopt it as our own:
Both Plaintiff, William A. Bowen, Trustee and Defendant, City of St. Petersburg, have filed Motions for Summary Judgment and submitted this case for decision as a matter of law on the stipulated facts as revealed in the record. Neither party asserts that there are any controverted issues of fact.
This is a Complaint for Inverse Condemnation. The City of St. Petersburg, through its Nuisance Abatement Board ordered the 15 unit apartment building, Lorraine Apartments, on land owned by Plaintiff, to be shut down for a one year period. The land and building can be put to no other use during this one year close down period.
The plaintiff does not contest the findings of the Nuisance Abatement Board (NAB) nor does the complaint allege that the one-year closure was not a proper exercise of police power. Plaintiff merely alleges that the closure is a compensable taking for which there has been no payment. He does not allege that the NAB findings of fact were unfounded or that its closure order was contrary to the Ordinance of the City.
The Florida Supreme Court in Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 563 So.2d 622 (Fla.1990) and again in Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Authority v. A.G.W.S. Corporation, 640 So.2d 54 (Fla.1994) has clearly recognized that if the state, through the use of its police power, deprives the owner of property of the economically viable use of his property, then that property owner must be compensated. Also, in these cases, the Florida Supreme Court recognized that temporary takings are compensable.
Regulations found by the courts to be invalid because they deprive landowners of substantially all use of their property without compensation are not ordinarily struck down as unconstitutional. The government is forced to choose between paying just compensation to keep the regulation in effect or removing the regulation.
[T]he state must pay when it regulates private property under its police power in such a manner that the regulation effectively deprives the owner of the economically viable use of that property, thereby unfairly imposing the burden of providing for the public welfare upon the affected owner. Joint Ventures, 563 So.2d at 624 (footnotes omitted).
Based upon the A.G.W.S. case and the Joint Ventures case, as well as numerous United States Supreme Court cases, if the closure of the Lorraine Apartments by the nuisance abatement board resulted in depriving the owner of all economic use of the property, even if this deprivation was temporary, then as a matter of law there is deemed to have been a taking and the property owner is entitled to be compensated for the economic loss suffered.
First English [Evangelical] Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 [107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250] (1987) addresses the issue of compensating a landowner for a temporary taking. In that case it was held that:
A landowner is entitled to bring an action in inverse condemnation as a result of the self-executing character of the constitutional provision with respect to compensation.
"Temporary" regulatory takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind from permanent...
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