City of St. Petersburg v. Nasworthy, 1D99-1222.
| Decision Date | 06 March 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D99-1222.,1D99-1222. |
| Citation | 751 So.2d 772 |
| Parties | CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, Appellant, v. Carlos NASWORTHY, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Nancy L. Cavey, St. Petersburg, for Appellant.
Gregory P. Linehan and Alex Lancaster of Lancaster & Eure, P.A., Sarasota, for Appellee.
In this workers' compensation case, the self-insured employer seeks review of an order which it contends incorrectly determined the amount of impairment income benefits to which the claimant was entitled. Because we agree that the judge of compensation claims erroneously computed the amount of impairment income benefits to which the claimant was entitled pursuant to section 440.15, Florida Statutes (1995), we reverse.
In January 1996, the claimant sustained a compensable work-related injury. The employer began paying temporary total disability benefits in February. The claimant's average weekly wages were $1,249.96, resulting in a weekly compensation rate of $833.35. However, by virtue of section 440.12(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the claimant's benefits were capped at the maximum compensation rate of $465.00 per week. In June 1996, the claimant reached maximum medical improvement, with a 29-percent permanent impairment rating. From June 1996 until February 1998, the employer paid weekly impairment income benefits of $232.50 (50 percent of the maximum compensation rate) to the claimant. The claimant filed a petition for benefits challenging the employer's calculation of those benefits. According to the claimant, he was entitled to $416.68 per week (50 percent of 662/3 percent of the average weekly wages). Following a hearing, the judge of compensation claims agreed with the claimant. This appeal follows.
Entitlement to impairment income benefits is conferred by section 440.15, Florida Statutes (1995), the pertinent portions of which read:
The employer had concluded from section 440.15(3)(a)3 that the claimant was entitled to weekly impairment income benefits totaling 50 percent of the maximum compensation rate established pursuant to section 440.12(2), or $232.50, which sum it paid to the claimant. The claimant argued that he was entitled to 50 percent of his "average weekly temporary total disability benefit," provided that the resulting amount did not exceed the maximum compensation rate. According to the claimant, section 440.15(2)(a) set his temporary total disability benefit at 662/3 percent of his average weekly wages of $1,249.96, or $833.35. Because 50 percent of that amount was $416.68, a sum less than the maximum compensation rate, the claimant argued that he was entitled to $416.68, rather than to the $232.50 per week that the employer had been paying. Concluding that "a literal reading of section 440.15(3)(a)3" supported the claimant's argument, the judge of compensation claims held that the claimant was entitled to impairment income benefits of $416.68 per week. We conclude that the judge of compensation claims incorrectly interpreted section 440.15(3)(a)3.
Section 440.15(3)(a)3 clearly states that "[i]mpairment income benefits are payable weekly at the rate of 50 percent of the employee's average weekly temporary total disability benefit" (emphasis added). It is undisputed that the claimant's "average weekly temporary total disability benefit" was the maximum compensation rate established pursuant to section 440.12(2), or $465.00 per week. Fifty percent of $465.00 is $232.50, the amount paid by the employer.
Moreover, the interpretation of section 440.15(3)(a)3 proffered by the claimant and accepted by the judge of compensation claims incorrectly presumes that the phrase "not to exceed the maximum weekly benefit under s. 440.12" is intended to refer to the phrase "[i]mpairment income benefits," rather than to the phrase "the employee's average weekly temporary total disability benefit." Such a presumption would be at odds with the "doctrine of...
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...immediately preceding, and are not to be construed as extending to, or including, others more remote." City of St. Petersburg v. Nasworthy, 751 So.2d 772, 774 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). The last antecedent is "the last word, phrase, or clause that can be made an antecedent without impairing the m......
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...or including, others more remote.’ " Kasischke v. State , 991 So.2d 803, 811 (Fla. 2008) (quoting City of St. Petersburg v. Nasworthy , 751 So.2d 772, 774 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) ); see also Jacques v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof. Regulation , 15 So.3d 793, 796 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (same)......
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