City of Stamford v. Kovac
Decision Date | 07 December 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 14644,14644 |
Citation | 634 A.2d 897,228 Conn. 95 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | CITY OF STAMFORD v. Milivoje KOVAC et al. |
James V. Minor, Asst. Corp. counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Daniel McCabe, corporation counsel, for appellant (plaintiff).
Sigmund L. Miller, Bridgeport, for appellees (defendants).
Richard Blumenthal, Atty. Gen., and Janet P. Brooks, Asst. Atty. Gen., filed a brief for the Com'r of Environmental Protection as amicus curiae.
Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BERDON, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a temporary injunction should be deemed a permanent injunction, and hence an appealable order, because the injunction orders restorative work to be performed in order to prevent further environmental degradation. The plaintiff, the city of Stamford, brought an action seeking temporary and permanent injunctive relief against the defendant Milivoje Kovac alleging that he was the owner of property that was subject to a stipulated judgment concerning impairment of a wetlands in violation of General Statutes § 22a-36 et seq. On the motion of the plaintiff, Sylvester Beserminje and Lida Nosik were subsequently added as defendants. After a hearing, the trial court issued a temporary injunction ordering Kovac and Beserminje (the defendants) to remove fill and to replace native plants in order to stabilize the wetlands. The defendants appealed to the Appellate Court, which vacated the injunction. Stamford v. Kovac, 29 Conn.App. 105, 111, 612 A.2d 1229 (1992). We granted the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal, 1 and now reverse.
The opinion of the Appellate Court reports the relevant facts. "Kovac, acting as trustee for Gavra M. Kovac, his brother, purchased a lot on Long Ridge Road, Stamford, on November 5, 1988. On July 7 or 8, 1990, approximately 11,000 square feet of wetlands were filled with 800 cubic yards of fill. Testimony indicated that the fill caused siltation of a downstream pond and potential pollution of an underground aquifer and local wells.
Stamford v. Kovac, supra, 29 Conn.App. at 106-108, 612 A.2d 1229.
The Appellate Court, although it recognized that the trial court and the parties had treated the plaintiff's request for relief as an application for a temporary injunction and not for a permanent injunction, concluded that the terms of the order had converted it into a permanent injunction. Id., at 110, 612 A.2d 1229. Considering the order as a permanent injunction, the Appellate Court determined that its merits were immediately reviewable and that the trial court had exceeded its authority in ordering restoration of the wetlands prior to a final judgment rendered after a full exploration of all of the contentions of the parties. Id., at 111, 612 A.2d 1229. The court did not, therefore, consider the defendants' alternate claim that the temporary injunction violated their due process rights under the constitutions of the United States and the state of Connecticut. Id.
In the absence of an applicable statutory rule to the contrary, we have consistently held that a temporary injunction is not immediately appealable. See, e.g., Pendiman Corp. v. White Oak Corp., 195 Conn. 393, 396-99, 488 A.2d 449 (1985); Doublewal Corp. v. Toffolon, 195 Conn. 384, 392-93, 488 A.2d 444 (1985); Board of Education v. Shelton Education Assn., 173 Conn. 81, 88, 376 A.2d 1080 (1977); Northeastern Gas Transmission Co. v. Brush, 138 Conn. 370, 374-75, 84 A.2d 681 (1951); Olcott v. Pendleton, 128 Conn. 292, 294-95, 22 A.2d 633 (1941). The wisdom of such a rule is particularly evident in cases ordering the abatement of an environmental hazard, which would otherwise continue unchecked during the pendency of the appeal process. See, e.g., Public Acts 1993, No. 93-244. 2 Just as environmental appeals must conform to the rules for the exhaustion of administrative remedies; Polymer Resources, Ltd. v. Keeney, 227 Conn. 545, 564-65, 630 A.2d 1304 (1993); so they must conform to the rules that postpone appeals until the trial court has rendered a final judgment.
The defendants claim that these well established principles do not apply in this case because the terms of the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court did more than preserve the status quo. The defendants maintain that, although the trial court might have issued a temporary injunction to enjoin further degradation of the environment in the future, the trial court lacked the authority to issue a temporary injunction that orders restoration of the environment. The defendants therefore contend that the trial court's mandatory injunction must be considered, despite its contrary denomination, a permanent injunction that is a final order. We disagree.
Although we have not previously considered whether a trial court has the authority to issue a mandatory injunction in advance of a final adjudication of the rights of the parties, there is ample precedent in other jurisdictions that a trial court, sitting as a court of equity, may issue such an order. Federal law has long taken a broad view of the equitable authority of trial courts to issue mandatory injunctions to preserve the status quo. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that "where a defendant, with notice of the filing of a bill for an injunction, proceeds to complete the acts sought to be enjoined, the court may, by mandatory injunction, compel a restoration of the status quo." Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Northside Belt Ry. Co., 276 U.S. 475, 479, 48 S.Ct. 361, 362, 72 L.Ed. 661 (1928). Earlier, then Circuit Judge Taft affirmed the court's equitable authority to issue a preliminary injunction that compels affirmative conduct in order to preserve the status quo. Toledo, Ann Arbor & North Michigan Ry. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 F. 730, 741 (N.D.Ohio 1893); see also Peoria Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 528, 535, 44 S.Ct. 194, 196, 68 L.Ed.2d 427 (1924). This principle continues to be followed in more recent federal cases. See, e.g., Stell v. Board of Education, 318 F.2d 425, 427 (5th Cir.1963) ( ); Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir.1962) ( ).
Courts in sister states have similarly recognized that trial courts have the discretionary authority, in the proper circumstances, to issue a preliminary mandatory injunction designed to preserve the status quo. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. McMahon, 219 Cal.App.3d 286, 295, 268 Cal.Rptr. 219 (1990); Bachman v. Harrington, 184 N.Y. 458, 464, 77 N.E. 657 (1906). The status quo, for these purposes, has been defined as "the last, actual, peaceable, noncontested condition which preceded the pending controversy." Chicago Title Ins. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., ...
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