City of Sun Prairie v. Davis

• Decision Date: 18 June 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97-1651,97-1651
• Parties: CITY OF SUN PRAIRIE, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. William D. DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 635

595 N.W.2d 635

226 Wis.2d 738

CITY OF SUN PRAIRIE, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. William D. DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

No. 97-1651.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued March 3, 1999.

Decided June 18, 1999.

For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by Stephen E. Mays, formerly of Kalal & Associates and now of Thomas, Kelly, Habermehl & Wood, S.C. Madison and oral argument by Stephen E. Mays.

For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by Richard K. Nordeng, Peter T. Julka, Matthew P. Dregne and Stafford, Rosenbaum, Rieser & Hansen, Madison and oral argument by Richard K. Nordeng.

¶1 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J

The City of Sun Prairie Municipal Court entered a default judgment against petitioner, William D. Davis (Davis), an Illinois resident, for his failure to comply with a municipal court order requiring Davis to personally appear at trial on a civil forfeiture action. The issue presented is whether the municipal court has inherent authority to enter such an order. Because we hold that a municipal court does not have inherent authority to order an out-of-state defendant to personally appear at a trial on a civil forfeiture action, we reverse the court of appeals' decision and remand the cause to the municipal court for proceedings on the merits.

¶2 The facts are not in dispute. In March 1996, Davis was arrested and cited by the City of Sun Prairie Police for Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of an Intoxicant (OWI) and for Operating a Motor Vehicle with a Prohibited Alcohol Concentration (PAC), both in violation of city ordinance 10-1-1 which adopted Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) and (b) (1993-94). ¹ Both citations issued to Davis informed him of a date for an initial appearance. The citations also notified Davis that his appearance was mandatory in the City of Sun Prairie Municipal Court which had jurisdiction over this civil forfeiture action.

¶3 On the date scheduled for Davis' initial appearance, March 13, 1996, neither Davis nor his counsel were present. However, because Davis' attorney had sent the court a letter stating that Davis refused to enter pleas on the two charges, the City of Sun Prairie Municipal Court, the Honorable Frank J. Willkom presiding, entered not guilty pleas on behalf of Davis on both charges.

¶4 About one month after the initial appearance, the municipal court held a pretrial conference. The City of Sun Prairie (City) was represented by a city attorney and Davis' counsel appeared on behalf of Davis. Davis did not appear personally. Following the pretrial conference, the municipal court issued a Pretrial Conference Order and Notice of Trial which provided that "[t]he defendant must appear at the trial in person." The trial was ultimately scheduled for October 30, 1996.

¶5 On October 22, 1996, Davis' counsel sent a letter to the municipal court objecting to the court's order that Davis appear in person. Counsel indicated that he did not intend to present Davis personally at the trial. He also indicated that if the City wanted the defendant present, it could subpoena him.

¶6 On October 28, 1996, the municipal court responded to Davis' counsel by issuing an order indicating that Davis would be sanctioned if he failed to personally attend his trial, scheduled for two days later. The municipal court listed the possible sanctions including entry of judgment against the defendant, contempt, money terms, orders limiting or barring the presentation of testimony or introduction of evidence at trial, any combination of these sanctions, or other sanctions as the court might deem appropriate.

¶7 Davis' counsel immediately responded to the municipal court's order with another letter stating that he would not present Davis personally unless the court or the City could point to a statute requiring Davis' personal appearance. Neither the City nor municipal court responded to this letter.

¶8 On October 30, 1996, the municipal court called Davis' case. The City was represented by a city attorney, and Davis' counsel appeared on behalf of Davis. Davis did not appear personally. Upon the City's motion, the municipal court entered judgment against Davis as a sanction for what the court found to be an intentional and egregious violation of the court's order.

¶9 In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment issued on December 27, 1996, the municipal court stated that having the defendant physically present assisted the court in five ways:

a. It promotes prompt justice. If a defendant's attorney appears without the defendant, the defendant's attorney is more likely to be unwilling to enter into trial stipulations or meaningful settlement discussions, either because the attorney does not know certain facts known to the defendant or because the attorney cannot obtain the necessary consent from the defendant. If the defendant is present, the defendant's attorney always has the defendant's knowledge of the facts and the defendant's authority immediately available b. It enhances the search for the truth. During trials, this court often has questions that the court puts directly to the defendant. The court can do that only if the defendant is present.

c. It enhances the search for the truth in another way. When the defendant is in court, the court is able to observe the defendant's demeanor, an important consideration for the finder of fact.

d. It allows the appropriate disposition of the case. If a defendant is found guilty, it may be appropriate for the court to admonish the defendant. The court can admonish the defendant only if the defendant is in court.

e. It discourages abuse of the municipal court. It is the court's experience that sometimes a defendant (i) will not attend the defendant's own municipal court trial, but will appear by an attorney, (ii) will, through the defendant's attorney, cross examine the City's witnesses, apparently for purposes of discovery, (iii) will avoid examination by not appearing in court, and then (iv) will appeal an adverse judgment to the circuit court and request a new trial. Use of the municipal court to engage in discovery in preparation for a subsequent trial in the circuit court is an abuse of the municipal court. This abuse is discouraged if the defendant must attend his or her trial in municipal court.

Respondent's App. at C3-C4. The municipal court determined that Davis' failure to appear made it impossible for the court to proceed in a way that it determined to be fundamental and essential to the fair and efficient operation of the court. The municipal court further concluded that Davis' failure to personally appear was egregious conduct and done in bad faith. Accordingly, the municipal court entered judgment against Davis on both charges.

¶10 Davis appealed this decision to the circuit court, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 800.14. The Dane County Circuit Court, the Honorable Michael N. Nowakowski presiding, affirmed the municipal court's judgment in its entirety. Davis appealed the circuit court order to the court of appeals.

¶11 In a split decision, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court order. The court of appeals determined that as part of the municipal court's inherent authority to efficiently manage its cases, the municipal court has authority to order the defendant to appear personally and to sanction him for failing to do so. City of Sun Prairie v. Davis, 217 Wis.2d 268, 277, 282-83, 579 N.W.2d 753 (Ct.App.1998). The dissent stated that by ordering the physical presence of the defendant, the municipal court shed its cloak of neutrality and gave the appearance of favoring the municipality. Id. at 285, 579 N.W.2d 753. The dissent concluded that the municipal court would continue to function in an orderly manner if it could not issue orders requiring the physical presence of a defendant. Id. at 286, 579 N.W.2d 753.

¶12 Davis petitioned this court for review which we granted. The issue is whether a municipal court has inherent authority to order an out-of-state defendant to personally appear at trial on a civil forfeiture action. If the municipal court has such inherent authority we must also determine whether it has inherent authority to enter a default judgment against the defendant for his or her failure to personally appear. The question of judicial authority is a question of law that we review de novo. In Interest of E.C., 130 Wis.2d 376, 381, 387 N.W.2d 72 (1986) (citing Ball v. District No. 4, Area Board, 117 Wis.2d 529, 537, 345 N.W.2d 389 (1984)).

¶13 An order requiring the defendant to personally appear is, in essence, a subpoena. "A subpoena is a command to appear at a certain time and place to give testimony upon a certain matter." Black's Law Dictionary at 1426 (6 th ed.1990). The power of a municipal court to authorize the subpoena of a defendant is unquestioned when the defendant is within Wisconsin. See Wis. Stat. § 885.04 (reprinted below). ² However, there is no statutory authority for a municipal court to subpoena, or order the presence of an out-of-state defendant. If such authority exists it must be found within the court's inherent authority.

¶14 Inherent powers have been frequently discussed by this court. See, e.g., Barland v. Eau Claire County, 216 Wis.2d 560, 579-83, 575 N.W.2d 691 (1998); Flynn v. Department of Administration, 216 Wis.2d 521, 548-551, 576 N.W.2d 245 (1998); State ex rel. Friedrich v. Dane County Cir. Ct., 192 Wis.2d 1, 16, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995). In addition to the powers expressly granted to the courts in the constitution, courts have "inherent, implied and incidental powers. These terms 'are used to describe those powers which must necessarily be used' to enable the judiciary to accomplish its constitutionally or legislatively mandated functions." Friedrich, 192 Wis.2d at 16, 531 N.W.2d 32 (citing State v. Holmes, 106 Wis.2d 31, 44, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982) (quoting State v. Cannon, 199 Wis. 401, 402, 226 N.W. 385 (1929))). Inherent...