City of Toledo v. State
| Decision Date | 09 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | L-18-1016,No. L-18-1011,L-18-1011 |
| Citation | 2018 Ohio 4534,123 N.E.3d 343 |
| Parties | CITY OF TOLEDO, et al., Appellees v. STATE of Ohio, et al., Appellants |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Dale R. Emch, Law Director, and Thomas E. Puffenberger, for appellee, City of Toledo.
Beth A. Tischler, Law Director, for appellees, City of Maumee, City of Sylvania, City of Napoleon, and City of Perrysburg.
Michael DeWine, Ohio Attorney General, Sarah E. Pierce and Renata Y. Staff, Assistant Attorney Generals, for appellant, State of Ohio.
J. Philip Calabrese, Cleveland, Kathleen M. Trafford, and L. Bradfield Hughes, Andrew C. Emerson, Columbus, for appellant, CTIA.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
{¶ 1} In this consolidated appeal, defendant-appellant, the state of Ohio, and intervenor-appellant, CTIA—the Wireless Association, appeal the December 19, 2017 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, denying their motions for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to plaintiffs-appellees, the cities of Toledo, Maumee, Napoleon, Sylvania, and Perrysburg. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court judgment.
{¶ 2} On May 17, 2016, 2016 Am.S.B. No. 331 was introduced by the Ohio Senate, proposing to amend and enact numerous provisions to R.C. Chapter 956 (). The stated purpose of the bill was "to regulate the sale of dogs from pet stores and dog retailers and to require the Director of Agriculture to license pet stores."
{¶ 3} On May 25, 2016, the Senate passed the bill after expanding it slightly "to regulate the sale of dogs from pet stores and dog retailers, to require the Director of Agriculture to license pet stores, to revise the civil penalties applicable to dog breeders and other specified entities, and to make an appropriation." It was introduced to the House of Representatives on May 31, 2016.
{¶ 4} After stagnating in the House for several months, 2016 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 331 ("S.B. 331") eventually emerged from the House Finance Committee on December 7, 2016, with proposed amendments and enactments to R.C. Chapters 956, 959 (), 1717 (humane societies), 4111 (minimum fair wage standards), 4113 (miscellaneous labor provisions), and 4939 (use of municipal public way). The stated purpose of the bill was substantially expanded as follows:
[T]o regulate the sale of dogs from pet stores and dog retailers, to require the Director of Agriculture to license pet stores, and to revise the civil penalties applicable to dog breeders and other specified entities; to govern construction and attachment activities related to micro wireless facilities in the public way; to prohibit political subdivisions from establishing minimum wage rates different from the rate required by state law; to generally grant private employers exclusive authority to establish policies concerning hours and location of work, scheduling, and fringe benefits, unless an exception applies; to prohibit a person from engaging in sexual conduct with an animal and related acts, to provide for the seizure and impoundment of an animal that is the subject of a violation, and to authorize a sentencing court to require an offender to undergo psychological evaluation or counseling; to prohibit and establish an increased penalty for knowingly engaging in activities associated with cockfighting, bearbaiting, or pitting an animal against another; to remove the residency requirement for the appointment of an agent to a county humane society; and to make an appropriation.
{¶ 5} This version of the bill was passed by the House, approved by the Senate, and signed into law by Governor John Kasich on December 19, 2016, with an effective date of March 21, 2017.
{¶ 6} In separate actions, the city of Toledo and the cities of Maumee, Napoleon, Sylvania, and Perrysburg ("the cities"), filed complaints against the state of Ohio for declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking to invalidate S.B. 331. The cities' cases were consolidated on May 8, 2017. The cities raised a number of reasons to invalidate the bill. Pertinent to our discussion here, they claimed that it violates the one-subject rule of Article II, Section 15(D) of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶ 7} On July 12, 2017, the trial court granted a motion by CTIA-the Wireless Association ("CTIA") to intervene in this action. CTIA "represents diverse stakeholders in the wireless industry," and claimed that those stakeholders would be impacted by the amendments and enactments to R.C. Chapter 4939. CTIA had been permitted to intervene in a number of similar suits filed in Cuyahoga, Franklin, Hamilton, and Summit counties. See City of Cleveland v. State of Ohio, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-17-877584; City of Bexley v. State of Ohio, Franklin C.P., –––-Ohio-––––, 92 N.E.3d 397 (2017) ; City of Cincinnati v. State of Ohio, Hamilton C.P. No. A1701966; City of Hudson v. State of Ohio, Summit C.P. No. CV-2017-03-1103.
{¶ 8} All parties filed motions for summary judgment on the narrow issue of whether S.B. 331 violates the one-subject rule of Article II, Section 15(D) of the Ohio Constitution. In a judgment journalized on December 19, 2017, the trial court found that the bill does violate the one-subject rule, and it granted summary judgment in favor of the cities and against the state and CTIA. It declared S.B. 331 unconstitutional and incapable of being severed.
{¶ 9} The state and CTIA both appealed. The state assigns the following error for our review:
The trial court erred when it invalidated Senate Bill 331 under Article II, Section 15(D) of the Ohio Constitution, commonly referred to as the single-subject rule.
CTIA assigns the following errors:
{¶ 10} Appellate review of a summary judgment is de novo, Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996), employing the same standard as trial courts. Lorain Natl. Bank v. Saratoga Apts., 61 Ohio App.3d 127, 129, 572 N.E.2d 198 (9th Dist.1989). The motion may be granted only when it is demonstrated:
(1) that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 67, 375 N.E.2d 46 (1978), Civ.R. 56(C).
{¶ 11} When seeking summary judgment, a party must specifically delineate the basis upon which the motion is brought, Mitseff v. Wheeler , 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 526 N.E.2d 798 (1988), syllabus, and identify those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Dresher v. Burt , 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). When a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, an adverse party may not rest on mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must respond with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Civ.R. 56(E) ; Riley v. Montgomery , 11 Ohio St.3d 75, 79, 463 N.E.2d 1246 (1984). A "material" fact is one which would affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law. Russell v. Interim Personnel, Inc. , 135 Ohio App.3d 301, 304, 733 N.E.2d 1186 (6th Dist.1999) ; Needham v. Provident Bank , 110 Ohio App.3d 817, 826, 675 N.E.2d 514 (8th Dist.1996), citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
{¶ 12} The state's single assignment of error and CTIA's first assignment of error both challenge the trial court's determination that S.B. 331 violates the one-subject rule of Article II, Section 15(D) of the Ohio Constitution. CTIA's second assignment of error challenges the trial court's decision invalidating the provisions of S.B. 331 related to the statewide regulation of micro-wireless equipment. We begin by addressing the one-subject rule challenge. We next address the trial court's decision invalidating the provisions of the bill impacting CTIA.
{¶ 13} Article II, Section 15(D) of the Ohio Constitution provides that "No bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." The rule is designed to prevent logrolling, "which occurs when legislators combine disharmonious proposals in a single bill to ensure passage of proposals that might not have won acceptance on their own." State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emp. Assn. v. State , 146 Ohio St.3d 315, 2016-Ohio-478, 56 N.E.3d 913, ¶ 15, citing State ex rel. Dix v. Celeste , 11 Ohio St.3d 141, 142-143, 464 N.E.2d 153 (1984). The one-subject rule is mandatory, however, courts must "liberally construe the term ‘subject’ for purposes of the rule." Id. at ¶ 16, citing State ex. rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward , 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 498, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999).
{¶ 14} The one-subject rule does not prohibit lawmakers from passing a bill addressing a plurality of topics; it prohibits them from passing a bill containing "a disunity of subjects." Id. at ¶ 17, citing State ex rel. Hinkle v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections , 62 Ohio St.3d 145, 148, 580 N.E.2d 767 (1991). That a bill addresses multiple topics is not fatal so long as there exists a common purpose or relationship between the topics. Id., citing ...
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