City of Trussville v. Pers. Bd. of Jefferson Cnty.

• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
• Writing for the Court: THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.
• Citation: City of Trussville v. Pers. Bd. of Jefferson Cnty., 313 So.3d 566 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020)
• Decision Date: 12 June 2020
• Docket Number: 2190075
• Parties: CITY OF TRUSSVILLE v. PERSONNEL BOARD OF JEFFERSON COUNTY

313 So.3d 566

CITY OF TRUSSVILLE

v.PERSONNEL BOARD OF JEFFERSON COUNTY

2190075

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

June 12, 2020

Richard A. Bearden of Massey, Stotser & Nichols, PC, Birmingham, for appellant.

Alfred F. Smith, Jr., Jennifer A. Hanson, and Elizabeth L. Nicholson of Bainbridge, Mims, Rogers & Smith, LLP, Birmingham, for appellee.

THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.

The City of Trussville ("the city") appeals from a preliminary injunction that the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the trial court") entered prohibiting the city from separating from the Personnel Board of Jefferson County ("the PBJC") and forming its own civil-service system.

The PBJC was created by two acts passed by the Alabama Legislature in 1935 and 1945, respectively, which together are commonly referred to as "the enabling act." Act No. 284, Ala. Acts 1935, and Act No. 248, Ala. Acts 1945. Pursuant to the enabling act, the PBJC was authorized to administer the civil-service system for Jefferson County and for municipalities within the county whose populations were 5,000 or more according to the last federal census.

In 1977, the legislature passed two amendments to the enabling act at the same time on the same day. The amendments each purport to be the most current version of the enabling act, but they contain inconsistent or contradictory provisions. It appears that those inconsistencies have never been addressed by an appellate court, and we are not asked to do so in this case. The PBJC points out in its appellate brief that, at trial and on appeal, the parties relied exclusively on the language in the higher numbered act, Act No. 782, Ala. Acts 1977; thus, this court, too will rely on the language in Act No. 782. That act states, in pertinent part:

"In the event the governing body of any municipality whose corporate limits lie partly within [Jefferson C]ounty and partly within any other county and having a population of five thousand or more inhabitants, according to the last federal census, or any succeeding federal census, shall adopt a resolution in favor of such municipality coming under the provisions of this [A]ct, and transmit or cause to be transmitted a certified copy of such resolution to the [PBJC], then, sixty days after the effective date of such resolution, the provisions of this Act shall apply to any such municipality having a required number of inhabitants and whose corporate boundaries lie party within [Jefferson C]ounty and partly without said county. Any municipality which adopts a resolution and comes under the provisions of this Act, as herein provided, shall thereafter remain under this Act, and may not repeal or rescind such action either by the adoption of a resolution or otherwise."

Act No. 782, § 1 (amending § 2 of Act No. 248).

The city lay entirely within Jefferson County until June 1986, when the city annexed property in St. Clair County, thus extending its boundaries into St. Clair County. The federal census of 1990 showed that, for the first time, the city had reached a population of more than 5,000. In September 1991, the PBJC passed a resolution to exercise jurisdiction over the city's qualified public employees. In October 1991, the city filed an action in the trial court against the PBJC in an effort to prevent its inclusion within the PBJC's authority. One year later, on October 3, 1992, the city and the PBJC entered into a settlement agreement ("the agreement") pursuant to which the city agreed that all of its classified and regular employees were deemed to be under the PBJC's jurisdiction. Furthermore, the city agreed "to comply with all of the rules and regulations" of the PBJC. The parties agreed to the entry of a final judgment incorporating the agreement, which was binding on them, their successors, and assigns. The trial court entered the judgment on October 29, 1992 ("the 1992 judgment").

On June 20, 1992, and again on May 5, 2005, the city annexed additional property outside of Jefferson County. On April 23, 2019, the city passed an ordinance forming its own civil-service system. On September 8, 2019, the city filed this action in the trial court seeking a judgment declaring that it had the authority to separate from the PBJC and to create its own civil-service system. The city also began advertising for openings for public-employee positions and hired a personnel director, among other things.

On October 8, 2019, the PBJC filed a motion to dismiss the city's action on the ground that it was barred by the doctrines of judicial estoppel and res judicata. Specifically, the PBJC argued that, because of the agreement reached in the previous action and the 1992 judgment, the city could not sustain the current action. Also on October 8, 2019, the PBJC filed a motion for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and for a preliminary injunction and attached four exhibits in support of the motion.

On October 10, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the motion for a TRO and a preliminary injunction. The trial court heard the arguments of the parties at that hearing, but no testimony was taken at that time. We note, however, that the record on appeal does not show that the city ever objected to the exhibits the PBJC submitted in support of the motion for a TRO and a preliminary injunction.

On October 10, 2019, the trial court entered an order granting the PBJC's request for a preliminary injunction. The order read:

"This matter came before the court on a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Based upon the Court's review of the written submissions of the Parties and extensive oral argument by counsel, the court finds that the material facts are without dispute, that [PBJC] faces an imminent threat of irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief which substantially outweighs any harm that may be caused to [the city] by the imposition of the injunctive relief sought. Therefore, the court concludes that the motion is due to be and is hereby granted and further orders as follows:

1. [The city] is ordered and directed to cease and desist from:

a. Separating or purporting to separate from the PBJC;

b. Forming its own civil service system; or

c. Taking any actions related thereto or in furtherance thereof.

2. [The city] is ordered and directed to comply with all PBJC Rules and Regulations."

The order also stated that the preliminary injunction would stay in effect until the final disposition of the matter. The city filed a timely appeal of the order granting the preliminary injunction to the Alabama Supreme Court on October 21, 2019. See Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P. The Supreme Court transferred the case to this court, pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code 1975.

On appeal, the city argues that the trial court entered the preliminary injunction without evidence or with insufficient evidence to support its decision to grant the injunction. It also argues that the order fails to meet the requirements of Rule 65(d)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P.

"When reviewing a preliminary injunction, this Court must consider both whether the evidence in the record supports the issuance of the preliminary injunction and whether the form of the preliminary-injunction order itself complies with the requirements of Rule 65(d)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P." Stephens v. Colley, 160 So. 3d 278, 282 (Ala. 2014).

"When this Court reviews the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction, ‘ "[w]e review the ... [c]ourt's legal rulings de novo and its ultimate decision to issue the preliminary injunction for [an excess] of discretion." ’ Holiday Isle, LLC v. Adkins, 12 So. 3d 1173, 1176 (Ala. 2008) (quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed. 2d 1017 (2006) )."

Monte Sano Research Corp. v. Kratos Defense & Sec. Solutions, Inc., 99 So. 3d 855, 861–62 (Ala. 2012).

" ‘The decision to grant or to deny a preliminary injunction is within the trial court's sound discretion. In reviewing an order granting a preliminary injunction, the Court determines whether the trial court exceeded that discretion.’ SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, N.A. v. Webb–Stiles Co., 931 So. 2d 706, 709 (Ala. 2005).

"A preliminary injunction should be issued only when the party seeking an injunction demonstrates:

" ‘ "(1) that without the injunction the [party] would suffer irreparable injury; (2) that the [party] has no adequate remedy at law; (3) that the [party] has at least a reasonable chance of success on the ultimate merits of his case; and (4) that the hardship imposed on the [party opposing the preliminary injunction] by the injunction would not unreasonably outweigh the benefit accruing to the [party seeking the injunction]." ’

" Ormco Corp. v. Johns, 869 So. 2d 1109, 1113 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Perley v. Tapscan, Inc., 646 So. 2d 585, 587 (Ala. 1994) ).

"To the extent that the trial court's issuance of a preliminary injunction is grounded only in questions of law based on undisputed facts, our longstanding rule that we review an injunction solely to determine whether the trial court exceeded its discretion should not apply. We find the rule applied by the United States Supreme Court in similar situations to be persuasive: ‘We review the District Court's legal rulings de novo and its ultimate decision to issue the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.’ Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed. 2d 1017 (2006)...."

Holiday Isle, LLC v. Adkins, 12 So. 3d 1173, 1175–76 (Ala. 2008).

Rule 65(d)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in pertinent part, that "[e]very order granting an injunction shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; [and] shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; ...."

In Monte Sano Research Corp., supra, our supreme court held that a recitation of the elements required to warrant the entry of a preliminary...