City of Tucson v. Rickles

• Decision Date: 08 January 1973
• Docket Number: No. 10629--PR,10629--PR
• Citation: 109 Ariz. 82,505 P.2d 253
• Parties: CITY OF TUCSON, a municipal corporation, Appellant, v. Eugene C. RICKLES and Mildred Rickles, husband and wife, Appellees.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 253

505 P.2d 253

109 Ariz. 82

CITY OF TUCSON, a municipal corporation, Appellant, v. Eugene C. RICKLES and Mildred Rickles, husband and wife, Appellees.

No. 10629--PR.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.

Jan. 8, 1973.

Herbert E. Williams, City Atty., J. Dan O'Neill, Asst. City Atty., Tucson, for appellant.

Stubbs & Stephens, P.C., by Robert C. Stubbs, Tucson, for appellees.

LOCKWOOD, Justice.

In October of 1967, the City of Tucson sued to condemn a 15 by 580 foot strip of land which was needed in order to widen Prince Road on the west side of Tucson. The land had been part of a mobile home park owned by Eugene and Mildred Rickles. In January, 1970, the case was tried without a jury. The trial court entered a judgment condemning the land and awarding the Rickles damages for the land and improvements taken and for severance damages to the remaining uncondemned land.

The City appealed, presenting two questions for review:

'(1) In a partial taking under eminent domain, is it proper to measure the value of the part taken by a standard other than the value of the land taken and the value of the improvements located within the taking?

'(2) In an eminent domain action, is evidence of an improvement district assessment and the amount and alleged effect thereof, properly admissible?'

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, City of Tucson v. Rickles, 15 Ariz.App. 244, 488 P.2d 180 (1971). A petition for review was filed and subsequently granted by this Court. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is vacated.

The valuation formula suggested at trial by Mrs. Rickles and her appraiser was unique. It urged that when assessing compensation for the land and improvements taken, the trial court should first compute an initial figure representing the total value of the entire park in the 'before' situation--including the land, trailer foundation slabs, trees, shrubs and other improvements, permanent office building, swimming pool, well, laundry, and recreation facilities. Because there were 85 trailer sites on the park in the 'before' situation, the Rickles' formula provided that the figure representing the total 'before' valuation be divided by 85--to arrive at a 'per site' value. And finally, because Mrs. Rickles testified that 'from (her) own observations' the condemnation had taken six sites from the park, the Rickles' formula required that the per site value figure be multiplied by six; the final figure would assertedly be the value of the land and improvements taken.

The City's valuation formula suggested that the court find an average per square foot value of the total trailer park land in its 'before' situation. Because the area condemned was composed of 8,718 square feet of land, the City's formula recommended that the per square foot value be multiplied by 8,718 to arrive at a suggested value for the Land taken. Concerning the Improvements taken, the City's appraiser testified as to the value of the four concrete foundation slabs and the other improvements which lay partially or entirely within the area taken and which presumably had been taken or rendered useless because of the condemnation. The separate values of the land and the improvements taken were then supposed to be added.

Not surprisingly, the ultimate figures proposed by the Rickles and by the City varied substantially concerning the true market value of the land and improvements taken. The Rickles sought $18,000, while the City urged that the actual damages amounted to $8,031.

We reject both methods of obtaining the true market value of the land and improvements taken. Section 9--610, A.R.S. sets forth the measure of damages.

On April 27, 1970, at the conclusion of the trial, the court approved and signed an instrument propounded by the attorney for the Rickles and entitled 'Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.' The findings stated, Inter alia, that as a result of the taking of 15 feet for the widening of Prince Road, the plaintiff, City, acquired Six trailer sites, maturing landscaping, and other miscellaneous improvements. The court further found that '(t)he value of the land and improvements actually taken was the sum of $15,600.00,' and that the bulk of the Rickles' property which the City had not sought to condemn had suffered 'the sum of $15,000' severance damages due to the street widening and as a result of the 'imposition of (municipal) street (improvement) assessments.'

The first question raised by the City requires us to review the entire procedure used by the trial court to assess damages for the land and improvements taken.

VALUATION OF THE LAND AND IMPROVEMENTS TAKEN

Counsel have cited no authorities discussing the valuation of trailer parks, nor are we able to find many cases. We must therefore approach the question by following the basic guidelines of our Constitution and statutes. The Constitution of Arizona, art. 2, § 17 (1970), A.R.S., requires that where private property is taken for public use, just compensation must be paid to the aggrieved landowner. A.R.S. § 9--606 (1956) provides that: 'The action shall be governed by the law of eminent domain, except as otherwise provided.'

After careful reading and study of the record, we are of the opinion that the only reasonable interpretation of the record, the judgment, and the verdict is that the trial court adopted the Rickles' 'per site' valuation formula. The clearest indicator of this fact is the express Finding of Fact that 'six sites' were 'acquired' by the City. Practically all the evidence offered throughout the trial by the Rickles was based upon the court's adoption of a per site valuation formula. The evidence offered by the City was equally strong in its opposition to such a technique. The size of the verdict also indicates that the court must have chosen the Rickles' formula.

The Rickles' per site valuation formula was improper as a matter of law. Not only was it an unrecognized method of assessing market value, but it resulted in an award of damages which was based upon speculation and assumptions which were not justified by the evidence. See Board of Regents v. Cannon, 86 Ariz. 176, 342 P.2d 207 (1959).

While condemnation proceedings are generally based on A.R.S. § 12--1122 (1956), 'Opening, Widening and Closing Public Ways' by cities or towns are governed by A.R.S. § 9--606 (1956), which specifically states that '(t)he action shall be governed by the law of eminent domain, Except as otherwise provided.'

The language of A.R.S. § 9--610, subsec. B (1956) contemplates that in Arizona damages for land and improvements taken by condemnation for an improvement district (as were the Rickles' land and improvements) should be assessed with a certain degree of specificity, not by generalization. The formula offered by the Rickles simply did not take into account all of the facts existing with respect to the trailer park in its 'before' and 'after' situations. For example, the City did not condemn 'six trailer sites,' as assumed by the trailer court. Rather, the exhibits and other evidence show that the condemned strip of land probably included within its boundaries Portions of eight trailer sites. Further, there was no significant evidence during the trial to justify the trial court in assuming that the amount of square feet within the strip of land taken would approximate the amount of square feet constituting any six trailer sites in the 'before' situation.

The land taken did not consist entirely of trailer site ground. Other types of land were also included in the condemned strip, to wit: portions of several streets and alleys and one portion of the common recreation area....