City of Tulsa v. Langley

Citation168 P.2d 116,1946 OK 123,196 Okla. 680
Decision Date16 April 1946
Docket NumberCase Number: 30672
PartiesCITY OF TULSA v. LANGLEY
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
Syllabus

¶0 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS--Adoption and amendment of charters authorized by Constitution.

Section 3 of article 18 of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma authorizes municipalities of the state having a population of more than 2,000 to form and adopt charters, and to change the same by amendment, the provisions of which are of governing importance in purely municipal affairs when consistent with the Constitution and general laws of the state.

2. SAME--Water commission of city of Tulsa properly created by charter amendment.

Creation by charter amendment of a "water commission" as a separate board to manage the municipally owned and operated water department of the city of Tulsa held proper under section 3 of article 18 of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma,

3. SAME--Authority of water commission to obligate city upon contract connected with water department.

Water commission of city of Tulsa held to possess authority to obligate city upon contract connected with the management, operation and expansion of the water department, subject to limitations upon such authority imposed by the Constitution and general laws of the state.

4. SAME--When debt limiting provision of Constitution applicable to transactions connected with public utility of municipality.

The constitutional limitation of indebtedness established by section 26 of article 10 of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma applies to transactions connected with a municipally owned and operated water plant or other public utility when the method of operation is such that the funds derived from its operation are directly or indirectly connected with the taxation and the transaction involved is not clearly severable and self liquidating.

5. SAME--Debt against municipality collectible if within constitutional limitations when created though available funds subsequently exhausted.

Subject to exception created by statute, when a debt of a municipality or other governmental subdivision of the state is within constitutional limitations at the time of its creation, the fact that funds available or revenues provided for its payment are subsequently exhausted by municipal authorities does not prevent the collection of the debt by the creditor in an appropriate action for that purpose.

6. SAME--Date of creation of debt by contract.

A municipal indebtedness may be created by contract at the time the contract is made or may be created or undertaken to be created at a later date pursuant to contract.

7. SAME--Contract with municipality for services payable on quantum basis-Effect of funds becoming exhausted.

When a contract with a municipality does not prescribe a definite and certain or immediately ascertainable sum to become payable but prescribes payment on a quantum basis for services to be rendered in the future, and the funds or provided revenues available to pay for such contemplated services become exhausted before the complete performance of the services, only that portion of the services may be paid for which had been performed before the funds or provided revenues became exhausted or depleted to such an extent that further services could not be paid for.

Appeal from District Court, Tulsa County; Leslie Webb, Judge.

Action by Harve N. Langley against the City of Tulsa. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

E. M. Gallaher, John W. McCune, Thos. I. Munroe, and C. Lawrence Elder, all of Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.

Duff & Manatt, of Tulsa, for defendant in error.

DAVISON, J.

¶1 This is an action by Harve N. Langley, as survivor of the partnership of Langley & Langley, attorneys, to recover a money judgment against the city of Tulsa for the alleged value of legal services asserted to have been rendered that municipality pursuant to agreement.

¶2 The cause was instituted and prosecuted to judgment in the district court of Tulsa county. It was tried to the court without the aid of a jury. The judgment was against the city for the principal sum of $14,100.

¶3 The defendant city appears before this court as plaintiff in error, thus reversing the order of appearance. Our continued reference to the parties will be by their trial court designation.

¶4 The asserted indebtedness upon which the judgment of the trial court rests is connected with the acquisition of a source of water supply by the city of Tulsa, which owns and operates its own water system.

¶5 In July of 1921, a bonded indebtedness of $25,000 was approved by the qualified property tax-paying voters of the city for the purpose of providing funds to determine whether Spavinaw creek, located in Mayes and Delaware counties, and about 60 miles from the defendant city, was a feasible and practical source of water supply. Thereafter, in February of 1922, an additional bonded indebtedness of $6,800,000 was approved by the properly qualified voters of the city to extend the waterworks system and acquire the source of water supply on Spavinaw creek.

¶6 The water commission of the city of Tulsa, which was then the governing board of the municipal water plant, decided to avail itself of the legal services of the partnerdhip of Langley & Langley, located at Pryor, in Mayes county, which will hereinafter be referred to as plaintiff. The commission authorized one of its members, Cyrus S. Avery, to open negotiations with the plaintiff firm with a view to procuring its services in connection with the acquisition of the water rights on Spavinaw creek and the acquisition of property for use in connection with the water supply system and other incidental legal services.

¶7 In May of 1922, an agreement was made whereby the plaintiff firm was employed to perform the contemplated legal services, the same to be paid for in accord with the value thereof. There was no definite agreement as to the amount to be ultimately paid. The understanding was that as services were performed the water commission was to be "billed" and claims to be filed in accord with the reasonable value of the services rendered. The general nature of the agreement is reflected by the record of the action taken by the water commission on the matter and by oral testimony produced at the trial. Mr. Avery testified:

"Q. In other words, they were to be paid for according to whatever they were worth? A. That is right. I think I told Mr. Langley if it was too high, we would cut it down, if it was too low, we would not say anything about it."

¶8 And Mr. Langley, the surviving member of the partnership, testified:

"A. Well, the conversation was substantially this: That the city commission, water commission, needed the services of local counsel there in the acquisition of rights of way and acquisition of adequate water right on the creek and that it was a new endeavor and there was no measuring stick by which services may be gauged in advance and he said it correctly awhile ago, as I recall, because I added several claims we filed, that 'if your claims are too high we will cut them down and if they are too low we will let them alone.' "

¶9 Mr. Langley also testified that services for which recovery was sought in this action were all rendered pursuant to the foregoing agreement of May, 1922, and that no other contract or agreement was made with the city in the subsequent years throughout which the services were rendered.

¶10 There is considerable testimony in the record describing specifically and in detail the services performed for which recovery is herein sought. These services consisted of an investigation of the law with reference to the acquisition of water rights; taking the necessary steps, administrative and legal, to acquire those rights; and finally the institution, prosecution, and subsequent favorable termination of litigation to bar other adverse or possible adverse claimants.

¶11 The legal action to confirm and adjudicate the rights of the municipality in and to the water was instituted in February of 1934 and terminated by judgment in February of 1938. No appeal was taken and the judgment of the trial court in that action became final.

¶12 There is ample testimony in the record supporting the view of the trial court that the services of the plaintiff connected with the acquisition of water rights extending from 1922 to 1938 were reasonably worth the sum of $15,000. The record reflects that four partial payments for these services were made as follows: October 6, 1932, $250; June 29, 1934, $200; July 12, 1935, $200; July 1, 1937, $250; making a total of $900 paid and leaving a balance due of $14,100.

¶13 In March of 1939 plaintiff prepared a claim for the fee, reciting in detail the services rendered. The same was submitted to the' defendant city and disapproved. Thereafter this action was commenced.

¶14 Incidentally, it is proper to observe at this point that pursuant to the agreement of May, 1922, the plaintiff performed and was paid for other legal services not directly connected with the acquisition of water rights, which other services and payments for the same are not a subject of dispute in this action.

¶15 Additional details in connection with the facts will be interpolated in our subsequent discussion of the legal questions involved in this appeal.

¶16 As we understand the briefs, the parties are in agreement that the evidence supports the trial court's view that the services rendered were reasonably worth the sum of $15,000. It is the position of the defendant city that regardless of the worth of the services it cannot legally pay for them.

¶17 It is first urged that: "No valid contract of employment existed between the defendant in error and the city of Tulsa." Under this proposition the defendant city urges in substance that the water commission had no authority to make the agreement here involved for and on behalf of the city of Tulsa. The theory seems to be...

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5 cases
  • Morris v. City of Oklahoma City, 37345
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • 26 Junio 1956
    ... ...         In Atlas Life Insurance Company v. Board of Education of City of Tulsa, 83 Okl. 12, 200 P. 171, this Court upheld a 99 year lease by a school district. The first paragraph of the syllabus is as follows: ... 'Municipal ... See City of Tulsa v. Langley, 196 Oil. 680, 168 P.2d 116, 117. In that case, we held: ... 'The constitutional limitation on indebtedness established by Section 26 of Article ... ...
  • Selected Investments Corp. v. City of Lawton
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • 20 Noviembre 1956
    ... ... were not invalid as in contravention of the municipal debt limitation provisions of our Constitution, under the doctrine referred to in City of Tulsa v. Langley, 196 Okl. 680, 168 P.2d 116, 123. See also Faught v. City of Sapulpa, 145 Okl. 164, 292 P. 15. In his dissenting opinion in Kelley v ... ...
  • Wyatt-Doyle & Butler Engineers v. City of Eufaula
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • 3 Octubre 2000
    ... ... Tulsa v. Langley, 1946 OK 123, ¶ 52, 168 P.2d 116, 123, and Board of County Com'rs of Tulsa County v. Mullins, 1950 OK 95, ¶ 28, 217 P.2d 835, 842, to ... ...
  • City of Tulsa v. Langley
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • 16 Abril 1946
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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