City of Vinton v. Engledow
Decision Date | 08 March 1966 |
Docket Number | No. 51699,51699 |
Citation | 140 N.W.2d 857,258 Iowa 861 |
Parties | CITY OF VINTON, Iowa, Appellee, v. Robert W. ENGLEDOW, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Francis J. Pruss, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Lawrence F. Scalise, Atty. Gen., Don R. Bennett, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Boyd Milroy, City Atty., Vinton, for appellee.
This is an appeal from final judgment based on conviction of a traffic offense in violation of city ordinance.
The defendant was charged as follows:
'The defendant is accused of the crime of reckless driving and driving on the wrong side of the street.
'For that the said defendant on or about the 13 day of July A.D., 1964 within the corporate limits of the City of Vinton, County of Benton, State of Iowa, did violate the Municipal Code of the City of Vinton, Iowa, and in particular Title 5, Chapter 2, Section 3 and 22 by driving his car in a reckless and negligent manner so as to scare a horse and cause it to bolt and in driving on the wrong side of the street, contrary to the Municipal Code of said city in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of said city and state.'
From conviction before the mayor of the City of Vinton defendant appealed to the District Court where trial was de novo. Section 367.8 and 762.48.
The district court found defendant guilty as charged, imposed a fine of $100. and costs, with the usual incarceration provisions in default of payment of fine.
Defendant presents two issues for our consideration, (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, (2) the adequacy of the ordinance to support a conviction.
I. It was the function of the trial court to determine the facts. We will not interfere if the findings are supported by the evidence. State v. Frink, 255 Iowa 59, 63, 64, 120 N.W.2d 432; State v. Miskell, 247 Iowa 678, 73 N.W.2d 36. We consider the record without regard to technical errors. Section 793.18, Code, 1962
On the conflict between testimony offered by the prosecution and that offered by defendant, the court found for the prosecution. The record supports the finding.
The factual situation of this case will be summarized only briefly. On July 13, 1964, at about noon, Wayne V. Holliday was riding a three-year-old saddle horse with a ten year old boy in front of him in the saddle. The horse was walking at a normal pace on the right hand side of 8th Avenue in Vinton near the edge of the traveled roadway. Defendant approached from behind, drove his car very close to the horse, speeded or 'reved' his motor, causing the engine to roar and race as if it were out of gear. The horse balked and jumped sideways as the car drove past. Mr. Holliday shouted to defendant asking him not to do it again. Defendant proceeded up the street, turned around and returned on the wrong side of the road coming very close to the horse, at a speed testified to by Mr. Holliday as 40 miles an hour, came about ten feet away from the horse, turned to the right and applied the brakes. Mr. Holliday was a rider with experience having ridden since he was five years of age, for the past 16 or 17 years. He controlled the horse with difficulty. The court found defendant's conduct, while driving south, directly toward the horse and so close to it before the turned to the right, was intentional, not inadvertent. The trial court's more complete findings were substantiated by the record; a finding of reckless driving was fully justified as was the maximum fine of $100. There was no error in this regard.
II. We now consider defendant's second challenge to this conviction which, despite the aggravated nature of defendant's actions, must be determinative of the case. If it be the fact that the defendant was charged under an invalid ordinance, this conviction cannot be sustained, regardless of our view of the factual situation.
The information refers to two ordinances. The matter of the charge of driving on the wrong side of the street will be considered in Division IV, infra. The reckless driving charge is bottomed on the following ordinance.
Care Required of Drivers Municipal Code, City of Vinton, Title 5, Chapter 2, Section 3.
This ordinance now has no conterpart in our state code, but our statutes did once contain some similar language, § 5028 of the 1931 Code provided 'Any person who drives any motor vehicle upon a highway carelessly and heedlessly in wilful and wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others, or without due caution and circumspection, or at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property, shall be guilty of reckless driving, and upon conviction shall be punished as provided in section 5089.' (Emphasis supplied.)
In 1937 that section was repealed in a general revision of what is now Chapter 321, and we now have § 321.283 as follows:
The obvious difference between the two sections is underlined by the case of Neessen v. Armstrong, 213 Iowa 378, 239 N.W. 56, which states 'The second alternative, to wit, 'or without due caution and circumspection,' constitutes no more than negligence; for if one drive a motor vehicle upon a highway without due caution and circumspection, that is, without such caution and circumspection as an ordinarily careful and prudent person would exercise under the same circumstances, he is guilty of negligence.'
Thus the inclusion of general negligence as a basis for criminal prosecution or as a part of a definition of recklessness was deleted from the state statutes. The concept has not been restored. In view of this history, we must face the following legislative policy pronouncements in §§ 321.235 and 321.236, Code, 1962. 'Provisions uniform. The provisions of this chapter shall be applicable and uniform throughout this state and in all political subdivisions and municipalities therein and no local authority shall enact or enforce any rule or regulation in conflict with the provisions of this chapter unless expressly authorized herein. Local authorities may, however, adopt additional traffic regulations which are not in conflict with the provisions of this chapter.
Thereafter certain fields for regulation by local authorities are listed. None covers the ordinance here considered. This review would indicate nonuniformity such as this ordinance creates is prohibited.
III. The need for consistency and uniformity in our traffic regulations has been declared as legislative policy. Such need is emphasized by consideration of § 321.209 Code, 1962. In Bergeson v. Pesch, 254 Iowa 223, 117 N.W.2d 431 we considered that statute dealing with mandatory revocation of driver's licenses and there said that 'two convictions of reckless driving, whether under [s] 321.283 or a valid city ordinance, afford cause for revocation'. (Emphasis supplied.)
The term reckless driving has been defined by statute. It has a definite technical legal meaning. The privilege of operation of motor vehicles on the highways of this state will be mandatorily denied upon two convictions of reckless driving. A city ordinance cannot be allowed to change the statutory definition either by enlargement or diminution. '[T]he test of the validity of a statute or ordinance is not what has been done under it but what may be done by its authority.' Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific R. Co. v. Liddle, 253 Iowa 402, 112 N.W.2d 852.
The legislature has deleted from the reckless driving section those words which would define ordinary negligence, Division II, supra. A reenactment, or continuance, of such prohibition by ordinance would destroy the uniformity necessitated by §§ 321, 235 and 321.236. It is to be noted that those sections declare that local authorities are not only prohibited from enacting non-conforming statutes but also from enforcing or maintaining any such ordinances, rules or regulations. Consistent enforcement of the traffic laws is of major importance in this era of increasing injury, death and destruction on the highways. The laws enforced must likewise be consistent. The rules of the road must have reasonable uniformity in the City of Vinton with the rules in force elsewhere in the state. This we take to be the legislative policy. The ordinance is therefore invalid.
IV. The city argues that the conviction here should stand because the facts substantiate a guilty verdict on the basis of driving on the wrong side of the street. Section 773.3 provides in part that an indictment shall be sufficient to give the court and the accused notice of what offense is intended to be charged. Section 773.35 provides that each indictment must charge but one offense. Subsequent sections allow indictments to charge separate offenses in separate counts under clearly defined fact situations. Section 762.4 suggests the form of...
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