City of Waco v. Dock

• Citation: 961 N.W.2d 220
• Decision Date: 16 June 2021
• Docket Number: A19-1099
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: CITY OF WACONIA, Respondent/Cross-Appellant, v. Jayson DOCK, et al., Appellants/Cross-Respondents.

961 N.W.2d 220

CITY OF WACONIA, Respondent/Cross-Appellant,

v.Jayson DOCK, et al., Appellants/Cross-Respondents.

A19-1099

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: June 16, 2021

Jared D. Shepherd, George C. Hoff, Hoff Barry, P.A., Eden Prairie, Minnesota, for respondent/cross-appellant.

Mark W. Vyvyan, Pari I. McGarraugh, Frederickson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellants/cross-respondents.

Susan L. Naughton, League of Minnesota Cities, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae League of Minnesota Cities.

OPINION

ANDERSON, Justice.

We are asked to decide two questions in this appeal. The first is whether the appeal filed by appellants Jayson and Cristine Dock (the owners) was timely. The second is whether an ordinance that purports to regulate docks via a statutory city's authority under Minn. Stat. § 412.221, subd. 12 (2020), is subject to the procedural requirements for adopting or amending a zoning ordinance under Minn. Stat. § 462.357 (2020), or a surface-use ordinance under Minn. Stat. §§ 86B.205, 459.20 (2020).

The district court granted respondent City of Waconia's request for a permanent injunction against the owners. Instead of appealing from that order, the owners appealed from the final judgment, which was entered in the district court less than 30 days after the filing of the order. The City contends that the owners’ appeal was untimely because the time to appeal from an injunction order, see Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(b) (allowing an appeal to be taken from an order that grants an injunction), had expired before that appeal was filed. The court of appeals rejected this argument, concluding that the owners’ appeal could be taken from the final judgment and therefore was timely.

On the merits, the owners argue that the City's ordinance, which prohibits them from building a permanent dock on their lakeshore property, is void because the City did not follow the procedures required for adopting a zoning or surface-use regulation. See Minn. Stat. §§ 462.357, subd. 3 (requiring public notice, a public hearing, and referral to a planning agency when amending a zoning ordinance), 86B.205, subds. 2, 4 (requiring various approvals when adopting a surface-use ordinance). The court of appeals rejected this argument, holding that the City had sufficient authority to adopt the ordinance under a separate statute that does not contain those procedural requirements, see Minn. Stat. § 412.221 (2020), and holding that the zoning and surface-use statutes did not apply.

We conclude that the appeal was timely and that the City's ordinance is subject to the procedural requirements of section 462.357 for municipal zoning, including notice and a public hearing. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the court of appeals.

FACTS

The owners have lakeshore property on Lake Waconia in the city of Waconia. In June 2017, the owners began building a year-round dock extending from their property into the lake. One month later, the City adopted Ordinance 705, an interim ordinance that prohibited the construction of any permanent dock for one year.

To stop dock construction by the owners, the City served a cease-and-desist order on the owners and also began litigation to enforce the ordinance. The district court denied the City's request for a temporary injunction against the owners but warned the owners that proceeding with construction would be at their own financial peril should they ultimately lose on the merits of the litigation.

In early October 2017, the City repealed Ordinance 705 and enacted Ordinance 707. This ordinance amended the Waconia city code to prohibit permanent docks in public waters from riparian (lakeshore) lots within the city. It also required all seasonal docks to be removed from public waters for at least 90 days between November 1 and April 1 of each year. The purpose of Ordinance 707 was to "control and regulate Docks for riparian properties that have shoreline within the city to [e]nsure safety for person and property." For authority, the City cited its power to regulate docks under Minn. Stat. § 412.221, subd. 12.¹ The City did not cite its zoning authority under Minn. Stat. §§ 462.351 –.365 (2020), and the ordinance expressly denied regulating the surface use of waters under Minn. Stat. § 86B.205, subd. 2.

By November 2017, construction of the owners’ dock was nearly complete. The City filed an amended complaint that sought a permanent injunction under the new ordinance to halt further construction of the dock and to require its removal. The owners counterclaimed, seeking an injunction to prevent the City from ordering removal of the dock and bringing various other claims.²

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the City asserted that the owners were in violation of the ordinance, and the owners claimed that the ordinance was procedurally defective for two reasons. First, the City did not give notice and hold a public hearing, as required for a zoning ordinance under section 462.357. Second, the City did not receive the required agency approval or approval from other townships adjacent to Lake Waconia, as required for a surface-use ordinance under sections 86B.205 and 459.20. The City countered that the ordinance was neither a zoning nor a surface-use ordinance because it was enacted under an independent source of authority, Minn. Stat. § 412.221, subd. 12.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The court concluded that Ordinance 707 was not a zoning ordinance because the City chose to rely on its powers under section 412.221 rather than on the zoning or surface-use statutes. Further, because the owners were in violation of the ordinance, the court granted the City's request for an injunction requiring the owners to remove their dock. The court also denied the request of the owners for an injunction and rejected their other claims.

The order for summary judgment was filed on May 2, 2019. On May 3, the City served notice on the owners of the filing of the order. The May 2 order was entered as the judgment of the court on May 28.

On July 16, 2019, the owners filed a notice of appeal. The City moved to partially dismiss the appeal, asserting that the appeal period for the injunction began on May 3, when the City served the owners with notice of the filing of the district court's May 2 order. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 104.01, subd. 1 (measuring an appeal period from the date of service of written notice of the filing of an appealable order). Thus, the City argued, under the provision that authorizes an appeal from an order that grants an injunction, Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(b), the time for appeal had expired before the owners filed their appeal. The court of appeals denied this motion, concluding that the owners’ appeal could be taken under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(a) from the final judgment and therefore was timely. City of Waconia v. Dock , Order (Minn. App. Aug. 13, 2019).

On review of the merits, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision, City of Waconia v. Dock , No. A19-1099, 2020 WL 1909700, at *1 (Minn. App. Apr. 20, 2020), but on different grounds. The court held that Ordinance 707 is not a zoning ordinance because it applies "generally" and does not "regulate activities within specific zones." Id. at *6. It also held that the surface-use statute did not apply because Lake Waconia was not solely within the City's jurisdiction and because the City had no joint powers agreement with neighboring municipalities. Id. at *5.

The owners sought review on the merits and the City sought review on the timeliness of the owners’ appeal. We granted review to address two questions: one, was the owners’ appeal timely? and two, is Ordinance 707 subject to the procedural requirements for adopting a zoning ordinance under Minn. Stat. § 462.357 or a surface-use ordinance under Minn. Stat. §§ 86B.205, 459.20 ?

ANALYSIS

I.

We first consider whether the appeal by the owners was timely under the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. "Construction and application of a rule of procedure is a legal issue, which we review de novo." Olson v. Synergistic Techs. Bus. Sys., Inc. , 628 N.W.2d 142, 153 (Minn. 2001). We will apply the plain language of the rule unless we determine that the language is subject to multiple reasonable interpretations and therefore is ambiguous. Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A. , 851 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Minn. 2014).

We begin by explaining the nature of the dispute. Rules 103 and 104 of our Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure identify categories of appealable decisions from the district courts and the timing for appeals from those decisions. As relevant here, an appeal may be taken from a final judgment, Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(a), within 60 days from the entry of judgment, Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 104.01, subd. 1. An appeal also may be taken from an order that "grants, refuses, dissolves or refuses to dissolve, an injunction," Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(b), within 60 days after written notice of the filing of the order is served, Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 104.01, subd. 1.

Ordinarily, an order granting summary judgment requires an entry of judgment to be appealable. See Johnson & Peterson, Inc. v. Toohey , 289 Minn. 362, 184 N.W.2d 586, 587 (1971) ("An order granting summary judgment is an intermediate order which requires a subsequent judgment to give it effect and is not appealable." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). But when an order that decides a motion for summary judgment resolves a request for injunctive relief, we have considered appeals taken from that order as appealable under Rule 103.03(b). See State v. Minn. Sch. of Bus., Inc. , 899 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Minn. 2017) (concluding that appellate jurisdiction was proper under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(b) over an appeal from the district court's order denying summary judgment and refusing a request for a permanent injunction); Hursh v. Vill. of Long Lake , ...