City of Waterbury v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities

• Decision Date: 07 January 1971
• Citation: 278 A.2d 771,160 Conn. 226
• Parties: CITY OF WATERBURY v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 771

278 A.2d 771

160 Conn. 226

CITY OF WATERBURY v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Jan. 7, 1971.

F. Michael Ahern, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Robert K. Killian, Atty. Gen., and David B. Beizer, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants (defendants).

John F. Phelan, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Edward F. Bradley, Waterbury, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before ALCORN, C.J., and HOUSE, COTTER, THIM and RYAN, JJ.

ALCORN, Chief Justice.

The city of Waterbury brought this action against the commission on human rights and opportunities, an administrative agency of the state, the commission's director, and three of the commission's hearing examiners.

In its complaint, the plaintiff sought temporary and permanent injunctions to prevent the defendants from proceeding with a hearing pursuant to General Statutes § 53-36 on a complaint filed by an individual claiming that the Waterbury police department had violated § 53-34 of the General Statutes. The court granted a permanent injunction on the ground that § 53-36 did not permit the defendant commission to hold a hearing upon a complaint filed by an individual alleging a violation of § 53-34. The defendant has appealed, assigning error in the court's conclusion that an injunction should issue and also in the court's denial of a motion made by the defendants to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint for failure to join, as a necessary party, the individual who had made the complaint upon which the defendant commission purported to act.

The case is presented on an unorthodox and unsatisfactory record. The case was heard by the court subsequent to the return day, although no answer had been filed by the defendants. A memorandum of decision appears in the record but there is no finding. Consequently, the only question before us is whether error appears on the face of the record. Maltbie, Conn.App.Proc., p. 155. The transcript of testimony cannot take the place of a finding because we are without power to find facts. Id., p. 156. We may, however, refer to the memorandum of decision in order to learn the basis for the court's decision. Hughes v. Town Planning & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 505, 506, 242 A.2d 705. There we find that the court not only considered the intent of § 53-36 but, as bearing on the issue before it, stated '(i)t certainly would be a gross abuse of the Commission's authority to carry out its announced intention 'to restructure' the Police Department of the plaintiff, City of Waterbury.'

Section 53-36 of the General Statutes, under which the defendants are assuming to proceed with a hearing, provides that '(i)n addition to the penalties provided for violation of sections 53-34, 53-35 and 53-35a, any person claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of any such section may, by himself or his attorney, make, sign and file with commission on human rights and opportunties a complaint in writing under oath which shall state the circumstances of such violation and the particulars thereof and shall contain such other information as may be required by the commission. In addition, the commission, whenever it has reason to believe that section 53-35 or section 53-35a has been or is being violated, may issue a complaint. The commission may thereupon proceed upon such complaint in the same manner and with the same powers as provided in chapter 563 in the case of unfair employment practices, and the provisions of said chapter as to the powers, duties and rights of the commission, * * * shall apply to any proceeding under the provisions of this section.' Section 53-34 of the General Statutes provides that '(a)ny person who subjects, or causes to be subjected, any other person to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities, secured or protected by the constitution or laws of this state or of the United States, on account of alienage, color or race' shall be fined or imprisoned. A complaint was filed with the defendant commission pursuant to § 53-36 on January 20, 1968, by Roland O. Miller against the Waterbury police department charging the department with violating his § 53-34 rights. The Miller complaint was annexed as exhibit A to the plaintiff's complaint in the present injunction action.

The plaintiff's complaint in the injunction action recites that the defendant commission directed a notice of a public hearing, with the Miller complaint attached, to the Waterbury police department. How the notice of hearing came to the attention of the Waterbury police department is not alleged and does not appear. The plaintiff's complaint alleges, however, that on April 29, 1969, the defendant Arthur L. Green, the commission's director, notified the Waterbury corporation counsel that the hearing set for April 29 was 'rescheduled' to May 13 and that, on the latter date, the defendants who composed the hearing tribunal commenced a public hearing. It is alleged that the city objected to the jurisdiction of the tribunal to conduct the hearing and the objection was overruled by the hearing tribunal which proceeded to hear testimony. At a further hearing on May 20, the plaintiff requested a continuance pending a judicial determination of the issue of jurisdiction which also was denied and the hearing continued. Prior to the scheduled date of a further hearing, the present injunction action was brought.

A prayer for injunctive relief is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and the court's ruling can be reviewed only for the purpose of determining whether the decision was based on an erroneous statement of law or an abuse of discretion. Weil v. Poulsen, 142 Conn. 213, 216, 112 A.2d 890. It is clear that an administrative body must act strictly within its statutory authority, within constitutional limitations and in a lawful manner. Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Public Utulities Commission, 144 Conn. 516, 523, 134 A.2d 351. It cannot modify, abridge or otherwise change the statutory provisions under which it acquires authority unless the statutes expressly grant it that power. Smith East Property Owners & Residents Assn. v. City Plan Commission, 156 Conn. 587, 590, 244 A.2d 394; Finn v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 540, 546, 244 A.2d 391; State ex rel. Huntington v. McNulty, 151 Conn. 447, 449, 199 A.2d 5. When authority to commence a proceeding is conferred by statute and the manner of proceeding is prescribed, the prescribed procedure is mandatory and must be strictly complied with when a matter of substance is involved. Broadriver, Inc. v. Stamford, 158 Conn. 522, 529, 265 A.2d 75; Beach v. Trumbull, 133 Conn. 282, 289, 50 A.2d 765; Scoville v. Columbia, 860 Conn. 568, 570, 86 A. 85. The allegations of the plaintiff's complaint in which it sought injunctive relief show a purpose to have the court determine whether, in doing what they did, the defendants had jurisdiction to act at all, and under these circumstances equity was empowered to act. Smith v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 142 Conn. 88, 93, 111 A.2d 552. Injunctive relief properly lies against threatened legal action when the rights of a party are clear and full legal relief is not available to him. Brainard v. West Hartford, 140 Conn. 631, 635, 103 A.2d 135; Clover v. Urban, 108 Conn. 13, 18, 142 A. 389. The plaintiff alleges, in substance, that if the defendants in this case are permitted to proceed with the contemplated hearing, irreparable injury will be done to the plaintiff through unfavorable publicity, public opprobrium, and other matters detrimental to its municipal standing and authority. Results of the sort described could not be obviated by resort to an appeal from such action as the commission might take following the threatened hearing.

The defendants claim that the court erred in deciding that they had no authority under § 53-36 to hold a public hearing 'on a complaint filed by an individual alleging a violation of Section 53-34.' The question which the record in this case presents is not the defendant's right to hold a hearing upon a complaint filed by a complainant. The question before use is the defendants' right to hold a hearing on this complaint against this plaintiff. We do not reach the question of whether the defendants had authority under § 53-36 to hold a public hearing on a complaint filed by an individual alleging a violation of § 53-34 upon the record in this case because of the deficiency in the complaint upon which the defendant commission proposed to hold a hearing and the subsequent action of the commission. Even if it be assumed that the commission could, under § 53-36, hold a hearing on a complaint for a violation of § 53-34 filed by an individual, a point which we do not decide, it is obvious that the complaint must be a sufficient one and that the statutory steps required to be taken by the commission on receipt of the complaint must be followed.

The complaint filed by Miller against the Waterbury police department is deficient, in the first place, because it contains no allegation whatever which could form a reasonable basis for charging that the Waterbury police department had violated § 53-34 by subjecting him to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured or protected by the state or ...