City of Waycross v. Pierce Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs

• Decision Date: 07 November 2016
• Docket Number: S16A1019
• Citation: 300 Ga. 109,793 S.E.2d 389
• Parties: CITY OF WAYCROSS v. PIERCE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

300 Ga. 109

793 S.E.2d 389

CITY OF WAYCROSS

v.PIERCE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS et al.

S16A1019

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: November 7, 2016

Richard Ernest Currie, City Attorney, Re Currie Law LLC, 1035 Riverdale Drive, Waycross, Georgia 31503, for Appellant.

Willis H. Blacknall, III, Willis H. Blacknall, III P.C., PO Box 177, Waycross, Georgia 31502–0177, Walter Gus Elliott, II, William Gus Elliott, II, Elliott, Blackburn & Gooding, PC, 3016 North Patterson Street, Valdosta, Georgia 31602, Bryant H. Bower, Jr., Bryant H. Bower, Jr. Law Office, P.O. Box 2028, Waycross, Georgia 31502, for Appellee.

THOMPSON, Chief Justice.

The City of Waycross (the "City"), which is situated primarily in Ware County, annexed property in Pierce County (the "County") in the 1980's. The City constructed a component of its wastewater treatment facility in the annexed area, and entered into service delivery strategy agreements with the County in 1999. The agreements provided that the City would provide water and sewer services in the annexed area; they did not contain an expiration date. The City provided the agreed upon services and collected fees from the users of the services.¹ The fees covered the costs of providing water and sewer services in the annexed area. Residents of the City did not subsidize the costs of the services.

In 2015, the legislature passed House Bill 523, which was signed by the Governor and became effective July 1, 2015. Ga. L. 2015, p. 3513. The bill amended the City's charter so that no portion of the City would "include any territory within the boundaries of Pierce County." Id.

The City brought suit to enjoin enforcement of House Bill 523 and have it declared unconstitutional. The trial court denied interlocutory relief, partly because it determined the City is still authorized to provide water and sewer services to the formerly annexed area.²

In July 2015, the City notified businesses and homeowners located in the de-annexed area that new, higher user fees would be charged. The County filed a counterclaim alleging that the new fees were arbitrarily higher than fees charged Ware County residents, and therefore violated the Service Delivery Strategy Act, OCGA § 36–70–20 et seq. The County sought an interlocutory injunction to prohibit the City from implementing the new user fees.

In August 2015, the City passed a resolution to halt the delivery of water and sewer services in the formerly annexed area. At that point, the County filed an amended counterclaim requesting the City be enjoined from discontinuing its water and sewer services. Thereafter, the trial court granted motions to intervene filed by Kelly Thrift and Coastal Forklift Hydraulics, Inc., water and sewer customers of the City.³ Then, following a hearing, the trial court granted the County's request for an interlocutory injunction. This appeal followed.

1. We find no abuse of the trial court's broad discretion in granting the interlocutory injunction.

An interlocutory injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and the power to grant it must be "prudently and cautiously exercised." Parker v. West View Cemetery Assn., 195 Ga. 237, 242–243, 24 S.E.2d 29 (1943). However, to be effective, the decision to grant an interlocutory injunction must often be made under time constraints that do not allow for the careful deliberation and reflection that accompany a full trial on the merits. See id. Thus, the trial court must make a judgment call regarding the equities presented, and the court is vested with broad discretion in making that decision. See OCGA § 9–5–8 ("The granting and continuing of injunctions shall always rest in the sound discretion of the judge...."). The grant or denial of an interlocutory injunction will not be reversed on appeal unless the trial court made an error of law that contributed to the decision, there was no evidence on an element essential to relief, or the court manifestly abused its discretion. See Chambers[v. Peach County], 268 Ga. [672, 673, 492 S.E.2d 191 (1997) ]; Christopher J. McFadden et al., Georgia Appellate Practice with Forms, § 6–16, pp. 205–206 (2008).

Bishop v. Patton, 288 Ga. 600, 604, 706 S.E.2d 634 (2011).

An interlocutory injunction should not be granted unless the moving party shows that: (1) there is a substantial threat that the moving party will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (2) the threatened injury to the moving party outweighs the threatened harm that the injunction may do to the party being enjoined; (3) there is a substantial likelihood that the moving party will prevail on the merits of her claims at trial; and (4) granting the interlocutory injunction will not disserve the public interest. The first factor—substantial threat of irreparable injury if an interlocutory injunction is not entered—is the most important one, given that the main purpose of an interlocutory injunction is to preserve the status quo temporarily to allow the parties and the court time to try the case in an orderly manner.

(Citations omitted.) Id.

The trial court balanced the equities and determined that an interlocutory injunction should issue to preserve the status quo in this case. Because the test for the issuance of an interlocutory injunction is a balancing test, it was not incumbent upon the County to prove all four factors to obtain the interlocutory injunction. See SRB Investment Svcs., LLLP v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 289 Ga. 1, 5, n. 7, 709 S.E.2d 267 (2011). Nevertheless, the County presented compelling evidence as to each of the four factors.

As to the first factor, irreparable injury, the most important one, Bishop v. Patton, supra, the County demonstrated that it and intervenors would suffer irreparable harm if the City discontinued water and sewer services in the affected area. After all, in the absence of water and sewer services, it would be incumbent upon the County to provide these services to residents of the de-annexed area as soon as possible. This would entail great expense on the part of the County. Moreover, the intervenors would be unable to remain at their current locations without water and sewer services.

The County met the second factor by showing that the potential for harm to the County and intervenors outweighs any possible harm to the City. That is because, as the trial court found, the cost of providing water and sewer services is wholly financed by the fees collected from users of the services. Thus, the City will not endure any harm as a result of the interlocutory injunction. On the other hand, as already noted, the County will incur great costs in the absence of interlocutory injunctive relief.

The City argues the County failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits because, pursuant to its water and sewer contract with the County, it is prohibited from providing water and sewer services to customers outside the City limits. Continuing the argument, the City asserts that once the legislature de-annexed the City's territory within the County, it could no longer provide water and sewer services legally to customers in the de-annexed area. The flaw in the City's argument is three-fold. First, it is predicated on the erroneous supposition that a substantial likelihood of success is the same as a showing of ultimate success. See Garden Hills Civic Assn. v. MARTA, 273 Ga. 280, 281, 539 S.E.2d 811 (2000). Second, it loses sight of the fact that the four factor test for issuing an interlocutory injunction is a balancing test and that it is not incumbent upon the movant to prove each factor. See SRB Investment Svcs., LLLP v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 289 Ga. 1, 5, n.7, 709 S.E.2d 267. See also Bernocchi v. Forcucci, 279 Ga. 460, 461, 614 S.E.2d 775 (2005) ("In determining whether to issue an interlocutory injunction, the trial court must balance the conveniences of the parties pending final adjudication. An interlocutory...