City of Wewoka v. Rodman
Decision Date | 16 April 1935 |
Docket Number | 25761. |
Citation | 46 P.2d 334,172 Okla. 630 |
Parties | CITY OF WEWOKA v. RODMAN. |
Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied June 18, 1935.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Where a freeholder city charter authorizes the police commissioner to discharge firemen, the charter and not the statutes of the state controls, although the charter provision in giving the power says that the commissioner shall do as he sees fit "restrained only by the laws of the state."
2. The increased discipline and efficiency of a city fire department, when the chief of the department selects his own men, is a good and sufficient cause under Statutes 1931, § 6085, for the removal of a fireman appointed by a former chief.
Appeal from Superior Court, Seminole County; C. Guy Cutlip, Judge.
Action by Carl Rodman against the City of Wewoka. Judgment for plaintiff, and the defendant appeals.
Reversed with directions.
R. J Roberts, of Wewoka, for plaintiff in error.
A. M Fowler, of Wewoka, for defendant in error.
Carl Rodman was assistant chief of the fire department of Wewoka. Being removed from office, he continued to present salary claims to the city and these being rejected brought action against the city, on the theory that his removal was illegal. Judgment went in his favor and the city brings error.
The major question is whether the state statutes relating to the removal of firemen apply to the city of Wewoka, which is a freeholder charter city. Rodman claims that he was removed without cause in violation of the statutes of the state. The principle of demarcation governing the power of the Legislature over cities having a freeholder charter is definite and clear. The city has full legislative power over matters that are purely municipal; the Legislature is supreme as to matters of general concern. The distinction between governmental and nongovernmental powers found in many old cases was drawn in the attempt, prior to the freeholder charters, to give a measure of self-government to municipalities. The distinction has never been regarded of importance in the case of a freeholder charter city; there the question has shifted to whether the power is purely municipal, or whether there is a wider public interest. Where the power is purely municipal, the state has no control, even though the power be governmental in character. The law is clear that the control of a freeholder charter city over the personnel of its fire department is solely a matter of municipal concern, and hence not subject to legislative control. State v. Callahan, 96 Okl. 276, 221 P. 718; Hinz v. Hubbard, 95 Okl. 164, 216 P. 440; Klench v. Board of Pension Fund Commissioners, 79 Cal.App. 171 249 P. 46; City of Lexington v. Thompson, 113 Ky 540, 68 S.W. 477, 57 L. R. A. 775, 101 Am. St. Rep. 361; Davidson v. Hine, 151 Mich. 294, 115 N.W. 246, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 575, 123 Am. St. Rep. 267, 14 Ann. Cas. 352.
This would be the end of the matter were it not for the language contained in the Wewoka charter. Like so many of the charters in the state, it uses language indicating that the statutes of the state have a bearing. If a city desires to incorporate by reference in its charter all the existing statutes of the state, we suppose it may do so; perhaps it may even adopt a charter with a movable content by adopting all statutes present or prospective, though the validity of such an idle gesture would be more doubtful. Sufficient for the present case is the fact that Wewoka did neither. In so far as the present case is concerned, the charter merely provided: "Said Commissioner of police shall also have full and exclusive charge of all the equipment of said city of Wewoka to be used to prevent and extinguish fire; also the right to fix the qualifications for and to employ and discharge such men as members of the fire department of the City of Wewoka as he shall see fit, restrained only by the laws of the State of Oklahoma, this charter and the ordinances and resolutions of said city."
The question is one of interpretation, What does this provision of the charter mean, particularly the part we have italicized? But we do not think we can safely isolate the one provision of the charter. In determining the meaning of the one provision, we gain enlightenment from the formulas of words used in other parts of the charter. Running over it, we find numerous powers followed by the expression that they shall be "restrained" by the laws of the state. Ordinances are not to be "inconsistent" with the Constitution and laws of the state. In various parts, certain concrete powers as to purely municipal affairs, granted as "restrained" by the laws of the state, are in direct opposition to the statutes. Both cannot stand. Thus in the section above quoted the concrete right granted the commissioner "to fix the qualifications for and to employ and discharge such men as members of the fire department as he shall see fit," is in direct opposition to the statutes. Thus by Statutes 1931, § 6082, fire chiefs are to be appointed by the mayor "by and with the consent of the city council." By section 6083 the chief must have "at least three years' actual experience as a paid fireman." By section 6084, firemen are to be appointed by the mayor "by and with the consent of the city council." By section 6085, "the chief and members of all paid fire departments appointed hereunder shall hold their respective positions unless removed for a good and sufficient cause."
The opposition between the provisions of the charter and the statutes is clear. And in determining which is the law for Wewoka, we are required to determine as best we may the intention of the people of Wewoka when they adopted the charter. Walton v. Donnelly, 83 Okl. 233, 201 P. 367. It would be an exceedingly strange thing for a city engaged in the attempt to acquire the right to determine its purely municipal affairs, to intend that the state law should apply to such affairs. It would be entirely rational for such a city, in the excess of caution to insert phrases like those found in the Wewoka charter, merely to negative any notion that the city was claiming powers beyond the self-rule authorized by the Constitution. It is probable that the framers of the charter, in view of Const. art. 18, § 3(a), requiring charters to be "consistent with and subject to the Constitution and laws of this State," merely intended to adopt a charter strictly in accord with the constitutional authorization.
We believe that the charter should be construed in accordance with the well-settled construction of the authorizing provision of the...
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State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson
...Court's interpretation of identical language in the Oklahoma Constitution's home rule charter provision. Id. In City of Wewoka v. Rodman , 172 Okla. 630, 46 P.2d 334, 336 (1935), the court rejected an assertion that " ‘consistent with and subject to the Constitution and laws of the state’ r......
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Axberg v. City of Lincoln
... ... matter of municipal concern, and hence not subject to ... legislative control. See cases cited in City of Wewoka v ... Rodman, 172 Okl. 630, 46 P.2d 334. The court in the State v ... City of Lincoln case [137 Neb. 97, 288 N.W. 503], also said, ... "for ... ...
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City of Tucson v. State
...of the state” refers to laws addressing matters of “statewide interest” rather than “local concern.” Id. (citing City of Wewoka v. Rodman, 172 Okla. 630, 46 P.2d 334, 335 (1935)). Reviewing prior decisions, the Court in Strode explained: [T]his court has uniformly held that a city charter, ......
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Hall v. O'Keefe
...be for "good and sufficient cause" the discretion of the appointing authority was not substantially diminished. See City of Wewoka v. Rodman, 172 Okl. 630, 46 P.2d 334 (1935) (interest of a new fire chief in selecting his own men held good and sufficient cause for the removal of a fireman a......