City of Winona v. Minnesota Railway Construction Company

• Decision Date: 10 January 1882
• Citation: City of Winona v. Minnesota Railway Construction Company, 11 N.W. 228, 29 Minn. 68 (Minn. 1882)
• Parties: City of Winona v. Minnesota Railway Construction Company
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

11 N.W. 228

29 Minn. 68

City of Winona v. Minnesota Railway Construction Company

Supreme Court of Minnesota

January 10, 1882

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the district court for Steele county, where the action was tried by Stearns, J., (acting for the judge of the 5th district,) without a jury.

Bigelow Flandrau & Squires, for appellant.

Thos Wilson, for respondent.

OPINION

Dickinson, J.^[*]

This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and presents for review (1) the action of the court below in allowing an amendment of the complaint; and (2) the correctness of the amount of the judgment.The action was originally commenced in August, 1874, against the Minnesota Railway Construction Company and Horace Thompson, and has been three times before this court upon appeal.The decisions upon such appeals are reported in 24 Minn. 199;25 Minn. 328; and in 27 Minn. 415.

The general nature of the original issues appears in the report of the case in 24 Minn. 199, as well as the contract, the interpretation and performance of which were drawn in question.

It should be further stated that the complaint, as it stood at the time of the first trial, set forth several particulars in respect to which it was alleged that the contract had not been performed; but did not aver specifically that no truss railroad bridge had been constructed across the Mississippi river at Winona, connecting the St. Paul & Chicago railway or the Winona & St. Peter railroad with the La Crosse Trempealeau & Prescott railroad, which was, by the terms of such contract, made a condition precedent to the right to have the bonds delivered.Nor were any facts pleaded in the original complaint upon which a reformation of the contract was sought.

After the decision in this court, upon appeal after the first trial, in which the decision of the district court, ordering judgment against the defendants, and the order denying a new trial, were reversed, the plaintiff moved in the court below for leave to amend the complaint by alleging facts upon which a reformation of the contract was sought, so that it should express the agreement which, upon the former trial and upon such appeal, had been claimed by the plaintiff to be the correct interpretation of the contract.Plaintiff also sought leave to amend the complaint by alleging that neither this defendant nor any company or person had, prior to the commencement of the action, constructed or caused to be constructed across the Mississippi river, at Winona, a truss railroad bridge connecting the St. Paul & Chicago railway, or the Winona & St. Peter railroad, with the La Crosse, Trempealeau & Prescott railroad.

This motion was made upon the record already made in the case, and upon affidavits which tended to show that, until the decision in the supreme court of the United States in the case of City of Winona v. Cowdrey, in December 1876, (93 U.S. 612, 23 L.Ed. 987,)the plaintiff's attorney believed the true interpretation of the contract required a connection across the river, between the St. Paul & Chicago railway and the La Crosse, Trempealeau & Prescott railroad, to be made directly and immediately by a bridge or ferry, as a condition precedent to the delivery of the bonds; and that until the decision of this court, upon appeal after the former trial in this action, he believed it competent for the plaintiff to show the circumstances surrounding the parties when the contract was entered into, in order to aid in the interpretation of it.In fact, upon the former trial, such evidence had been presented on the part of the plaintiff, and received by the court under objection.See24 Minn. 199.The affidavits further tended to show that at the time the contract was entered into both parties understood that under it, and by its provisions, the defendant should become entitled to the bonds only upon the condition of the construction of the St. Paul & Chicago railway to such a point in Winona, on the west bank of the river, as would enable connection to be made immediately by bridge or ferry with the La Crosse, Trempealeau & Prescott railroad at its terminus on the opposite side of the river, and only upon such connection being made; and that, by mistake, the real agreement of the parties was not embraced in the written contract.

On the other hand, counter-affidavits were presented upon such motion, controverting, in some respects, those presented on the part of the plaintiff, and going to show that the contract did express the real agreement of the parties.They also showed that the action of Cowdrey against the city, referred to in plaintiff's affidavits, had been commenced in 1873 in the United States circuit court, to recover upon interest coupons of the bonds constituting the subject-matter of this action; that the plaintiff's attorney in this action was its attorney in the action commenced by Cowdrey; that that case was tried in January, 1874, resulting in a disagreement of the jury, and was again tried in June, 1874; that at both of such trials the court had, in its charges to the juries, interpreted the written contract substantially as it was construed by this court on the appeal, after the former trial of this cause; that although the issues were substantially the same in the Cowdrey Case as in this, yet no evidence was offered upon the trial of the Cowdrey Case to show the negotiations in making the contract, or the understanding of the parties as to its meaning, nor any question made that the contract did not express the real agreement of the parties.

Upon this application for amendment it was not shown that plaintiff had not always known the manner in which the bridge connecting the La Crosse, Trempealeau & Prescott and the Winona & St. Peter railroads had been constructed; that is, that that portion of the structure crossing the sand-bar or island in the river was pile bridging and not truss bridging.

Upon the hearing of this motion, the court before which the former trial had been had, refused the amendment upon which a reformation of the contract was sought; not, as it appears, as a matter of discretion, but for the reason that the contract could not be amended so as to charge defendant Thompson (the depositary of the bonds, and who was not a party to the contract) with a liability not incurred under the original contract.The court allowed amendment in respect to the non-building of a railroad truss bridge.The plaintiff then again moved before the same court for leave to make the amendment which had been refused, upon condition of dismissing the action as to Thompson; and upon hearing upon this latter motion the court made an order allowing both the amendments sought, upon condition of dismissing the action as to Thompson.The action was then formally dismissed as to Thompson.From this order allowing the amendmentsdefendant appealed to this court.The appeal was dismissed, for the reason that such order was not appealable.25 Minn. 328.

Upon the amended pleadings the cause was again tried before Stearns, J., without a jury, in March, 1879.Upon such trial the plaintiff offered evidence to prove the allegations upon which a reformation of the contract was sought, but no relief upon that part of the case was granted to plaintiff.The court, however, found as a fact, in substance, that no truss bridge had been constructed, as required by the contract, and that the bridge of the Winona & St. Peter railroad, by means of which the connection between the St. Paul & Chicago and the La Crosse, Trempealeau & Prescott railroads was actually made, was not a truss bridge, the structure being pile bridging for 1,000 feet of its length, where it crossed an island or sand-bar in the river.It was hence decided that this defendant was not entitled to the bonds in question, and a recovery was accordingly awarded the plaintiff.From the judgment entered upon such findings this appeal was taken.

As to that part of the order allowing an amendment by alleging facts upon which a reformation of the contract was sought, no serious question arises here.That issue, brought into the case by the amendment, was practically eliminated again at the trial.The result was not unfavorable to the defendant, and no such prejudice was suffered as should call for a review of the action of the court below in allowing that amendment.Nor is it here claimed by defendant that this matter is important except incidentally, and as it may bear upon the action of the court in allowing the amendment upon the other branch of the case.

We proceed to consider more particularly the question whether the court, in allowing that amendment, exceeded its authority.Upon the court is expressly conferred authority to allow amendments to pleadings "before or after judgment in furtherance of justice, and on such terms as may be proper, * * * by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the the name of a party, a mistake in any other respect, or by inserting other allegations material to the case."Gen. St. 1878, c. 66, § 124.To this end the trial court must necessarily exercise its discretion, in view of the circumstance of each particular case, and no fixed rule can be laid down by which the propriety of allowing such amendments shall be determined.So long as the court in such matters acts within the limits of its discretion, its action will not be reviewed and its propriety or expediency considered.It is only when it is claimed that the limits of discretion have been exceeded that an appellate court will look...