Civetti v. Turner
| Decision Date | 03 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2019-036,2019-036 |
| Citation | 2020 VT 23 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | Paul Civetti v. Selby L. Turner, Jr. and Town of Isle La Motte |
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions by email at: JUD.Reporter@vermont.gov or by mail at: Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801, of any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
On Appeal from Superior Court, Grand Isle Unit, Civil Division
Pietro J. Lynn, Sean M. Toohey, and Kienan D. Christianson of Lynn, Lynn, Blackman & Manitsky, P.C., Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Brian P. Monaghan and James F. Conway, III of Monaghan Safar Ducham PLLC, Burlington, for Defendants-Appellees.
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Skoglund, Robinson, Eaton and Carroll, JJ.
¶ 1. The central issue in this case is whether a town may be held indirectly liable for damages pursuant to 24 V.S.A. § 901 or § 901a for alleged negligence by the Town Road Commissioner. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's negligence action against the Town of Isle La Motte and the Town Road Commissioner on the grounds that (1) because the Road Commissioner is an "appointed or elected municipal officer," plaintiff was required by § 901(a) to bring his action against the Town, rather than the Road Commissioner, and (2) the Town is, in turn, immune from suit based on municipal immunity. We conclude that if the Road Commissioner was negligent in performing a ministerial function, the Town assumes the Road Commissioner's place in defending the action and therefore may not assert municipal immunity from the claim pursuant to § 901(a) or § 901a, and that dismissal of this claim on the basis of qualified immunity would be premature. We accordingly reverse and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 2. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that: the Town has formally adopted road standards for its town roads; the Road Commissioner is responsible for assuring that the Town's roads meet those standards; Main Street did not comply with those standards, including standards relating to the "width and shoulder"; the Road Commissioner knew or should have known that Main Street does not comply; and plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident because of the non-compliant road.1 Defendants separately moved to dismiss under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) and (c). Following oral argument, the court granted defendants' motions.
¶ 3. In dismissing the claim against the Road Commissioner, the trial court explained that under 24 V.S.A. § 901(a), an action against "any appointed or elected municipal officer" must be brought against "the town in which the officer serves." Because the Road Commissioner was an appointed or elected municipal officer, he was not properly named as a defendant. The court further concluded that municipal immunity barred plaintiff's claim against the Town—including the claim against the Road Commissioner directed at the Town pursuant to § 901(a). It reasoned that the Town was entitled to municipal immunity because the allegedly negligent acts—involving the design of roads—were governmental acts. It further concluded that the Town was entitled to "discretionary-function" immunity with respect to its discretionary decision regarding whether and how to comply with its road standards. The court thus dismissed plaintiff's claim against the Town. Plaintiff appealed.
¶ 4. On appeal, plaintiff argues that we should abolish the governmental/proprietary distinction in municipal tort immunity law so that the Town can be held directly liable in this case;that the Town's municipal immunity does not insulate it from indirect liability arising from a claim against the Road Commissioner pursuant to § 901(a) and/or § 901a; and that the trial court's determination that discretionary-function immunity applies here is premature.
¶ 5. We review the court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint without deference. Bock v. Gold, 2008 VT 81, ¶ 4, 184 Vt. 575, 959 A.2d 990 (mem.). "[W]e take all facts alleged in the complaint as true." Id. "Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper only when it is beyond doubt that there exist no facts or circumstances consistent with the complaint that would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Id. For the reasons set forth below, we decline to abolish the governmental/proprietary-function distinction, and thus conclude that the Town is immune from direct suit in this case. However, pursuant to 24 V.S.A. § 901a and § 901(a), the Town essentially steps into the Road Commissioner's shoes for the purposes of defending the suit and paying a judgment; we conclude that it is not entitled to invoke its municipal immunity in that context. Finally, we agree with plaintiff that on the basis of the bare pleadings, we cannot conclude that qualified immunity for discretionary acts applies as a matter of law.
¶ 6. Pursuant to well-established common law, a municipality is generally immune from suit based on the negligent performance of "governmental" functions. Lorman v. City of Rutland, 2018 VT 64, ¶ 9, 207 Vt. 598, 193 A.3d 1174. Designing and building roads is a core governmental function. We recognize that the governmental/proprietary distinction has come under fire, but decline plaintiff's invitation to abandon the distinction at this juncture. Accordingly, we conclude that the Town is immune from direct suit arising from the design and construction of a town road.
¶ 7. Vermont continues to apply the longstanding common-law doctrine of municipal immunity. See Hillerby v. Town of Colchester, 167 Vt. 270, 272, 706 A.2d 446, 447 (1997) (); see also D.Dobbs, et al., The Law of Torts § 343 (2d ed.) ().
¶ 8. Pursuant to Vermont's common law of municipal immunity, "[a]bsent insurance coverage, those functions which are governmental are protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, while, in contrast, the governmental unit will be liable for injuries caused or sustained in furtherance of its proprietary function." Lorman, 2018 VT 64, ¶ 9 (quotation omitted). See Town of Stockbridge v. State Hwy. Bd., 125 Vt. 366, 369, 216 A.2d 44, 46 (1965) (). "The rationale for this is that municipalities perform governmental responsibilities for the general public as instrumentalities of the state; they conduct proprietary activities only for the benefit of the municipality and its residents." Lorman, 2018 VT 64, ¶ 9 (quotation omitted); see also Mark v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 40 Haw. 338, 341 (1953) ().
¶ 9. "Building and maintaining streets . . . are generally governmental functions, and no liability for injuries suffered as a result of such activities may attach." Graham v. Town of Duxbury, 173 Vt. 498, 499, 787 A.2d 1229, 1232 (2001) (mem.) (citing cases); accord McMurphy v. State, 171 Vt. 9, 14 n.2, 757 A.2d 1043, 1047 n.2 (2000) . Accordingly, based on a common-law analysis, the Town is immune from direct suit.
¶ 10. We recognize that the governmental/proprietary-function distinction is imperfect. Vermont is one of few states that continue to apply the distinction. Lorman, 2018 VT 64, ¶ 9. And we have recognized that "[t]he application of this doctrine has produced anomalous results inparticular cases." Marshall v. Town of Brattleboro, 121 Vt. 417, 423, 160 A.2d 762, 766 (1960); see also Mark, 40 Haw. at 341-42 ().
¶ 11. Nevertheless, we reject plaintiff's request that we abolish the governmental/proprietary distinction in municipal tort immunity law. We recently reaffirmed that the distinction applies. See Lorman, 2018 VT 64, ¶¶ 10, 20 (continuing to apply governmental/proprietary distinction despite its flaws but reiterating that "it would be beneficial for the Legislature to act in this area"). While we will not uncritically perpetuate common-law precedent for its own sake, we continue to believe that the Legislature is best suited to balance the competing considerations at play in reevaluating municipal immunity. See O'Connor v. City of Rutland, 172 Vt. 570, 570-71, 772 A.2d 551, 552-53 (2001) (mem.) (similarly rejecting argument that Court should abolish governmental/proprietary distinction, reiterating earlier holding that Legislature's "fact-finding and problem-solving process is better suited for the task in this area of the law") (quoting Hillerby, 167 Vt. at 276, 706 A.2d at 449); Marshall, 121 Vt. at 424, 160 A.2d at 767 ().2
¶ 12. The central question in this appeal is whether, pursuant to either 24 V.S.A. § 901 or § 901a, the Legislature has waived municipal immunity for the negligent actions of municipal officers or employees while performing governmental...
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