C.K. v. State
Docket Number | 23A-JM-2671 |
Decision Date | 24 April 2024 |
Parties | C.K., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court The Honorable Stephen Koester Judge Trial Court Cause No. 48C02-2309-JM-173
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Anderson, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Monika Prekopa Talbot
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
[¶1] Appellant-Respondent, C.K., appeals the trial court's Order, finding her in contempt of court.
[¶2] We affirm.
[¶3] C.K. presents this court with one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it held C.K. in contempt of court.
[¶4] C.K. is the mother of one child, R.K. In March 2023, C.K. announced on Facebook that she was pregnant with another child and posted a picture of her "belly." (Transcript p. 14). That same month, when R.K. was approximately six months old, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) got involved with the family. Family Case Manager Kimberly Rodemeyer (FCM Rodemeyer) noticed that C.K. "did have a belly," appeared pregnant, and that she mentioned her pregnancy complications to service providers. (Tr. p. 16). C.K. informed a visit supervisor that she had given birth on August 31, 2023, and showed FCM Rodemeyer a photo of a newborn.
[¶5] On September 13, 2023, FCM Taylor Humphries (FCM Humphries) received a report alleging that C.K. had recently given birth to a two-month premature baby and that her residence was dirty. A photo of a baby accompanied the report. Following up on the report, FCM Humphries went to C.K.'s residence several times where she spoke with C.K. Despite refusing to divulge the whereabouts of the baby, who C.K. now reported was born on August 26, 2023, C.K. mentioned that the baby had a heart murmur, a "stage two heart issue," a hole in the heart, asthma, and diabetes. (Tr. p. 8). After getting the name of the putative father, FCM Humphries located the alleged father, who informed her that he did "not have any proof that there [was] actually a child" and that he was "not sure that the child [was] actually his if there [was] one." (Tr. pp. 7-8). Although C.K. told FCM Humphries that the child was in the NICU, none of the area hospitals had a child by the name or birthdate provided by C.K. After making significant efforts, FCM Humphries could not locate a birth certificate for the baby. A site visit at C.K.'s residence revealed that C.K. did not have any formula or diapers in her home. At one point, C.K. informed FCM Humphries that the baby had passed away on September 18, 2023, and that she was going to have the child cremated. However, C.K. did not provide a death certificate and FCM Humphries was unable to obtain such record. FCM Humphries was unable to ascertain whether C.K. had given birth to a child, and if so, whether the child was alive.
[¶6] On September 22, 2023, DCS filed a verified motion pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-33-8-7 to compel C.K. to make the child available for an interview and otherwise cooperate with DCS. During the trial court's hearing on September 26, 2023, C.K. appeared pro se and informed the court that the baby was at Riley Children's Hospital (Riley) but had passed away on September 18, 2023. At the close of the hearing, the trial court granted DCS's motion, ordered DCS to contact Riley, prepare a report, and share it with law enforcement.
[¶7] After the hearing, DCS contacted Riley and was again informed that there was no child there with the name and date of birth provided by C.K. Riley also confirmed that there had not been any child fatalities during the relevant period. Law enforcement had no information about C.K.'s baby. Although C.K. had signed a release of information for DCS, she had left the doctor's and hospital names blank. When questioned about the blank spaces, C.K. said that she had seen several doctors at the Women's Hospital. She refused to give DCS any other information. When confronted with a possible suspension of her visitation rights with R.K., C.K. admitted that "there wasn't a kid" but again refused to clarify. (Tr. p. 29). DCS was still unable to confirm the existence of any baby.
[¶8] On September 29, 2023, DCS filed a second verified motion to compel, with various attachments, again requesting C.K. to make the child available for an interview, sign a release of information, and cooperate with DCS. The attachments featured several of C.K.'s Facebook posts which announced her pregnancy with photos and included a gender reveal, complaints about Braxton-Hicks contractions, and mentions of the birth of a baby. The attachments further included text messages and pictures of a newborn. DCS also filed a verified information for a rule to show cause, claiming that C.K. had violated the trial court's order instructing her to disclose her child's whereabouts. On October 2, 2023, the trial court conducted another hearing at which C.K. appeared pro se. During the proceedings, she testified that "there's no baby[,]" and she admitted to having previously said that there was a baby because she was scared. When the trial court inquired about all the Facebook posts about her pregnancy and the baby, she insisted that she had not been on Facebook "in a while" and that others had been posting about her. (Tr. p. 32). She admitted that she had told people that she was pregnant because at one point she was indeed pregnant. At the close of the evidence, the trial court found C.K. in contempt of court for "providing false information to ourt and the Department under oath." (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 73). C.K. was taken into custody.
(Tr. p. 59).
[¶10] C.K. now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
[¶11] C.K. contends that the trial court abused its discretion by finding her in contempt of court. As a threshold matter, we first address the State's argument that C.K.'s appeal is moot, as C.K. has already served her entire contempt sanction. While we agree with the State that "the controversy at issue" has been "settled," so "the court can give" C.K. "no effective relief," we do recognize a public interest exception in the cause before us. T.W. v. St. Vincent Hosp. and Health Care Ctr., Inc., 121 N.E.3d 1039, 1042 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019). Contrary to C.K.'s argument, the trial court did not find her in contempt because she failed to produce a newborn for an interview with DCS, the court found C.K. in contempt because she provided false information to the court and DCS while she was under oath. A witness who lies in court is an issue that can and will occur again, and which must be discouraged to retain trust in the judicial system. As such the situation before us is of public importance and we will address the trial court's contempt finding on its merits. See E.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. &Health Care Ctr Inc., ...
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