Claffey v. Huntley
| Decision Date | 17 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1-19-1938 |
| Citation | 2021 IL App (1st) 191938,198 N.E.3d 1074,459 Ill.Dec. 697 |
| Parties | Kevin CLAFFEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Virginia HUNTLEY and Mark Huntley, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Patrick J. Giese and Patrick M. Grim, of Tomasik Kotin Kasserman, of Chicago, for appellant.
Alexandra K. Hunstein, of Law Offices of Meachum, Boyle, Trafman, Marek & Parker, of Chicago, for appellees.
¶ 1 Plaintiff, Kevin Claffey, appeals a jury's verdict in favor of the owners of a dog that Claffey accused of biting him without provocation. Claffey, a letter carrier, after inserting his hand through the mail slot of defendants’ front door, was bit on the hand. Claffey appeals the circuit court's orders denying his motion for directed verdict, motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and motion for new trial, arguing there was no evidence for the jury to find the bite was provoked. As we find the evidence did not preclude a finding of provocation as a matter of law and the verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we affirm.
¶ 3 Kevin Claffey brought this action with a jury demand seeking damages against Virginia and Mark Huntley after their dog, Chelsea, a 45-pound Labrador mix, bit Claffey on his right hand. Claffey, a United States Postal Service letter carrier, testified the bite occurred when he was delivering mail to the Huntleys’ home in Glencoe, Illinois, on October 1, 2015. Just as he had done on many occasions over the 16 years that he was assigned to this route, Claffey parked his mail truck in front of the Huntleys’ house and walked to the front door. He knew the Huntleys had two dogs and heard one barking from the back part of the driveway. The front door had a mail slot with two flaps, one on the outside and one on the inside of the door. The inner flap had a strong spring-loaded hinge that kept the flap shut unless pushed open. As Claffey wanted to prevent the inner flap from damaging pieces of mail, he placed his right hand through the slot to hold the inner flap open while he inserted the mail with his left hand. When he did so, Chelsea leapt up and bit his right hand. Claffey found himself in a "tug of war" for two or three seconds until he was able to pull his hand back from Chelsea's mouth. The top of Claffey's hand was ripped, and he was in excruciating pain. He then ran back to his truck and drove to the post office in Glencoe.
¶ 4 Claffey later sought medical attention. He received one stitch, was prescribed pain medication, and underwent physical therapy. For the first few months, Claffey experienced acute pain that he likened to being poked with a fire poker if he used his right hand to do anything, even basic tasks such as tying his shoes. Eventually, Claffey required surgery to repair a nerve in his finger.
¶ 5 At trial, Claffey testified the Huntleys’ dogs would sometimes get excited when he delivered mail to their house. When he knew the dogs were present, Claffey would bundle the mail and leave it between the front and screen doors. He also testified that he could insert mail through the slot without placing his hand inside the house to hold the inner flap open and had done so before. But at other times, Claffey would place his hand through and hold the flap open.
¶ 6 Katherine Sweeney, an animal control officer for the Village of Glencoe, testified she was dispatched to the Glencoe post office on October 1, 2015. There, she encountered paramedics attending to Claffey. Claffey reported that the Huntleys’ dog bit his hand when he placed it in the mail slot. Sweeney's written report noted that Claffey told her that he heard the dog barking before he placed his hand in the mail slot. After taking Claffey's report, Sweeney contacted Virginia. Virginia stated the dogs were in the house, she heard her dog barking, and then she heard the mail slot open. She did not learn Claffey had been bitten until Sweeney contacted her.
¶ 7 Virginia testified she was home at the time but was in the basement painting a room, so she did not see what happened. A veterinary technician, Jennifer Johnston, testified that Virginia brought Chelsea to the Green Bay Veterinary Hospital later that day and reported that Chelsea had bitten the mailman that morning.
¶ 8 After the close of evidence, Claffey moved for a directed verdict on liability, arguing that there was no evidence of provocation. The circuit court denied the motion, reasoning that "a reasonable jury could conceivably infer from the evidence in this case that the act of sticking his entire hand or a portion of his hand through the mail slot could be considered provocation of these dogs." Accordingly, the matter was submitted to the jury.
¶ 9 The court instructed the jury that Claffey had the burden on proving four propositions: that he sustained an injury caused by the Huntleys’ dog; that he was conducting himself peaceably at the time; that he did not provoke the dog; and that he was in a place where he had a legal right to be. The court further instructed the jury:
"The term ‘provoked’ means any action or activity, whether intentional or unintentional, which could reasonably be expected to cause a normal animal in similar circumstances to react in a manner similar to that shown by the evidence." See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 110.04 (approved Dec. 8, 2011).
¶ 10 The jury returned a verdict finding in favor of the Huntleys and against Claffey. Claffey then filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (judgment n.o.v. ) and a motion for new trial. Both motions argued that there was no evidence of provocation. The circuit court denied both motions, and this appeal followed.
¶ 11 On appeal, Claffey argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict and motion for judgment n.o.v., as there was no evidence of provocation and he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on liability. He, therefore, requests that we reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial on damages only. Alternatively, Claffey argues the circuit court erred in denying his motion for new trial because the lack of provocation renders the jury's verdict against the manifest weight of the evidence, and thus, he requests we vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial on both liability and damages.
¶ 13 Motions for directed verdicts and motions for judgments n.o.v. , although made at different times, raise the same questions and are governed by the same rules of law. Maple v. Gustafson , 151 Ill. 2d 445, 453 n.1, 177 Ill.Dec. 438, 603 N.E.2d 508 (1992). A directed verdict or a judgment n.o.v. is properly entered in those limited cases where all the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand. Id. at 453, 177 Ill.Dec. 438, 603 N.E.2d 508. Motions for directed verdicts and motions for judgment n.o.v. present questions of law, and therefore, our review is de novo. Lawlor v. North American Corp. of Illinois , 2012 IL 112530, ¶ 37, 368 Ill.Dec. 1, 983 N.E.2d 414. De novo review means we consider these motions anew and conduct the same inquiry the trial court would. Ryan v. Yarbrough , 355 Ill. App. 3d 342, 346, 291 Ill.Dec. 249, 823 N.E.2d 259 (2005) ; Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP , 408 Ill. App. 3d 564, 578, 350 Ill.Dec. 63, 948 N.E.2d 132 (2011). The standard for a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. is high and not appropriate if " ‘reasonable minds might differ as to inferences or conclusions to be drawn from the facts presented.’ " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lawlor , 2012 IL 112530, ¶ 37, 368 Ill.Dec. 1, 983 N.E.2d 414 ). In ruling on these motions, a court does not weigh evidence nor consider credibility of witnesses; rather, the court only considers the evidence and any inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Serrano v. Rotman , 406 Ill. App. 3d 900, 908-09, 348 Ill.Dec. 269, 943 N.E.2d 1179 (2011). Judgment should not be entered on either motion when "there is any evidence, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, demonstrating a substantial factual dispute, or where the assessment of credibility of the witnesses or the determination regarding conflicting evidence is decisive to the outcome." Maple , 151 Ill. 2d at 454, 177 Ill.Dec. 438, 603 N.E.2d 508.
¶ 14 A motion for new trial is different. Steed v. Rezin Orthopedics & Sports Medicine , 2021 IL 125150, ¶ 44, 450 Ill.Dec. 663, 182 N.E.3d 109. On a motion for new trial, the court will set aside the jury's verdict and order a new trial if the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. A verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence " ‘where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the findings of the jury are unreasonable, arbitrary[,] and not based upon any of the evidence.’ " Id. (quoting Maple , 151 Ill. 2d at 454, 177 Ill.Dec. 438, 603 N.E.2d 508 ). A reviewing court will not reverse the trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial " ‘unless it is affirmatively shown that the trial court clearly abused its discretion.’ " Id. (quoting Lazenby v. Mark's Construction, Inc. , 236 Ill. 2d 83, 101, 337 Ill.Dec. 884, 923 N.E.2d 735 (2010) ). An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court's decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Seymour v. Collins , 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 41, 396 Ill.Dec. 135, 39 N.E.3d 961. We are also mindful that "[i]t is well established that, in an appeal from a jury verdict, a reviewing court may not simply reweigh the evidence and substitute its...
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