Le Clair v. First Div. St. P. & P. R. Co.

• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Ripley
• Citation: Le Clair v. First Div. St. P. & P. R. Co., 20 Minn. 1 (Minn. 1852)
• Decision Date: 01 January 1852
• Parties: PETER S. LE CLAIR v. FIRST DIV. ST. P. & P. R. CO.

Page 1

20 Minn. 1

PETER S. LE CLAIR

v. FIRST DIV. ST. P. & P. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court, Ramsey county, denying a new trial.

The action was to recover for injuries sustained by plaintiff, in the employment of defendant, while he was endeavoring, in the course of his duty, to couple together a tender and

car, in doing which he was crushed between them, owing, as he claims, to the coupling arrangement being defective.

The cause was tried with a jury, and a verdict returned for plaintiff.

Bigelow, Flandrau & Clark, for appellant, contended—

Davis & O'Brien, for respondent, cited:

RIPLEY, C. J.

The instructions of the court to the jury were sufficiently favorable to the defendant. The court stated, "that to the general rule, that one servant cannot recover damages from his employers for injuries occasioned by the negligence of his fellow-servants, there are two exceptions: the first is where the employer is at fault in not employing safe and competent servants; the second is where the employer is at fault in employing defective machinery." The defendant excepted to this statement, and in support thereof contends that the charge was too broad, because though the defendant may have employed defective machinery and been at fault in so doing, still, if the plaintiff knew it and did not object, he could not recover.

The proposition is correct in itself, though plaintiff's contributory negligence in any given case may prevent his recovery. It is sufficient to say, assuming that defendant states the law correctly, that not only should it have asked for more specific instruction if it had apprehended that the jury might be misled by the generality of instruction applied to the facts, but the court in the course of its charge expressly instructed the jury that "if this coupling arrangement was defective, and plaintiff knew of it and did not notify the proper person, he could not recover." The other grounds of defendant's exceptions fall under the head that the verdict is not justified by the evidence.

The defendant also excepted to the statement by the court in its said charge that "it was for the jury to say whether that was a safe and proper coupling arrangement." It insists that this was error because "there was no evidence to the contrary." If not, the court also erred in refusing to give the instructions requested by defendant, viz.: "that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a verdict for plaintiff." The point may, therefore, be considered, in connection with the remaining ground upon which defendant moved for a new trial in the district court, and insists in this court, that such new trial should have been granted, (the point that the damages were excessive not being urged here,) viz., that the verdict is not justified by the evidence.

The plaintiff was injured in endeavoring to couple together an engine and car. The defendant's theory of the case is that the coupling arrangements were perfect, if properly managed, but that "the smoke, steam, and snow were flying in blinding clouds, and they were all in a hurry to make up the train, get their dinners, and go home. The plaintiff, inspired by the confidence which long experience in such matters turns into recklessness, stepped in between the tender and the car, as he had probably done thousands of times before, and not calculating on the effect of the steam, smoke, and snow that filled the space and blinded him, he failed to give the link the right direction and met with one of those unfortunate accidents which are incident to the hazards of his profession."

It may have been so, certainly, but the plaintiff testifies that "when he stepped in there (in between the tender and car) there were no obstructions to my sight, nor when I attempted to effect the coupling." He also testified: "I pressed the link down as far as I could; it struck above the hole on the car bumper; I could not have coupled it with that link because the car was too low; I did not know of the difficulty when I stepped in; I supposed I could make the coupling when I went in there; I could see well enough to couple; I had acquired a competent knowledge of the proper way to couple cars; * * * I was prudent and careful when coupling; I saw just how that thing struck and which way it went; it went away from me; it slipped to one side; * * * the link struck above the side." Here, certainly, is competent evidence, if the jury believe it, reasonably tending to prove that the failure of the link to enter the hole resulted not from any failure of plaintiff to give it the right direction, nor from his improper adjustment of perfect machinery, but because the car was too low, and of the credit to be given to it, they are the exclusive judges.

In accordance with the settled rule of this court, we must take it to have been the fact, that such was the cause of the failure to couple, unless such a conclusion would be most manifestly and palpably against the weight of the evidence. McMahon v. Davidson, 12 Minn. 308, (Gil. 232.) The fact that bears hardest against it is that the other end of the car had been coupled to this engine with the same link the same morning and drawn with it all day; and there being evidence tending to show that the height of the car was the same at both ends, if the defendant had proved that such coupling was effected in the ordinary manner, i. e., in the manner in which plaintiff was attempting to do the work, the inference as to the cause of his failure would have been strong indeed. But while the defendant's assistant superintendent testifies that there was "no difficulty in coupling it" in the morning, he neither did it, nor saw it done, and those who did are not produced.

The plaintiff's evidence is to the effect that to couple at his end it would have been necessary to lift the draft iron of the car, which one man could not do. When this is shown to the jury, the presumption, until those who did it are produced, is (supposing both ends of the car to be of the same height) not that the plaintiff is not to be believed as to the cause of his failure to couple, but that the coupling at the other end was done in the only way in which he says it could be done. At all events, the jury were certainly at liberty to draw that inference, from the failure of the defendant to show how it was done.

The same remark applies to the evidence of the assistant superintendent, — that there was no difficulty in coupling on after the accident, — and to that of the engineer, "that the coupling was done in five minutes; not over ten. There was no trouble in coupling 17 onto the car. I only came back with the engine once and the coupling was made." They did not make the coupling, nor see it made, and those who did are not called to say how it was done, nor with what kind of link, while a delay of five or ten minutes in making it, points to something out of the ordinary mode of effecting it.

The testimony of the officers of the road, that there was no difficulty in coupling this engine to any car on the road "with the ordinary appliances," "with the crooked links in use on the road," is entitled to weight, but when weighed against positive testimony that with one of the "ordinary appliances" and "crooked links" it could not be done with respect to this car without the assistance of another man in lifting the draft iron of the latter, a decision against such a conclusion is certainly not most manifestly and palpably against the weight of the evidence.

On the whole, so far as this point is concerned, the verdict of the jury must be taken to have settled it, that the cause of plaintiff's failure to make the connection was that the car was too low. The defendant, then, had provided on this occasion an engine and car, which could not, with this link at least, be coupled together in the ordinary way. This circumstance, of itself, was evidence tending to show that it was not a safe and proper arrangement for the purpose. There is no ground, therefore, for the defendant's exception aforesaid to the judge's charge, that whether it was thus safe and proper, or not, was for the jury. They have decided this question also in the negative, and on the principle above stated we cannot say that their verdict...