Clanton v. State
| Decision Date | 15 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A02–1203–CR–198.,49A02–1203–CR–198. |
| Citation | 977 N.E.2d 1018 |
| Parties | Derek CLANTON, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Patricia Caress McMath, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Brian L. Reitz, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Derek Clanton was found in possession of cocaine after he was stopped and searched by an off-duty police officer who was working part-time as a security officer for an apartment complex in a high crime area of Indianapolis. The cocaine was in a small plastic bag stuffed into a pen cap, and it was discovered after the officer removed the pen cap from Clanton's pocket during a patdown of Clanton for weapons.
Claiming the cocaine was found during an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the United States and Indiana Constitutions, Clanton filed a motion to suppress. The trial court denied the motion, and following a bench trial, Clanton was subsequently convicted of Possession of Cocaine, a class D felony.1
We conclude that the trial court erred when it admitted the cocaine into evidence because the arresting officer was not entitled to further search the contents of the pen cap after determining that the pen cap was not a weapon. Because we find this issue to be dispositive, we do not specifically address whether the initial stop and patdown were proper under the circumstances presented here. In reaching this decision, however, we also conclude that the Fourth Amendment does not categorically fail to apply to off-duty police officers working as security officers on private property.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
On April 29, 2011, Officer Michael Price and Officer McFadden 2 of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) were off duty and working part-time as security officers for an apartment complex in Marion County. The apartment complex, which Officer Price later testified is “not well lit” and in “a very well known high crime area [with a] lot of guns, a lot of weapons in that area at all times[,]” employed the officers in part to enforce its strict no-loitering policy on its property.3 Tr. p. 5. Although the officers were off duty and purportedly working solely for the apartment complex, they wore their full IMPD uniforms and carried their IMPD-issued sidearm revolvers and tasers. The officers were also equipped with their department radios, which enabled them to “contact anyone in the city by radio.” Id. at 12.
At approximately 11:15 p.m., Officer Price and Officer McFadden were patrolling the apartment complex on foot when they observed three black men, one of whom was Clanton, standing outside a resident's doorway for roughly five to fifteen seconds. Believing the men to be loitering, the officers immediately approached them. The men turned their backs as the officers approached. One of the officers asked what the men were doing, and Officer Price later testified that he could not recall whether he or Officer McFadden also verbally identified themselves as police officers at that time. One of the men fled on foot, and Officer McFadden gave chase.
The other two men, including Clanton, remained and followed all of Officer Price's directions. Neither made any furtive movements or threatened Officer Price in any way. Nonetheless, Officer Price “immediately” withdrew his taser and instructed both men to place their hands on the wall. Tr. p. 10. He then proceeded to perform a patdown search of each man for weapons.
When Officer Price patted down Clanton, he felt a sharp object in Clanton's right front pocket. Officer Price could not determine the identity of the object while it was in Clanton's pocket, so he removed the object. Officer Price then saw that the object was a pen cap. Inside the pen cap was a clear plastic baggie, which Officer Price removed, and inside the baggie was a white powder that Officer Price believed to be narcotics. Officer Price then arrested Clanton.
Clanton was charged with possession of cocaine as a class D felony, and Clanton filed a motion to suppress the cocaine from being admitted as evidence at his trial. On December 1, 2011, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing during which Officer Price testified about the events leading up to Clanton's arrest. About his initial reason for performing the patdown searches, Officer Price testified:
[W]hen you have two officers there, you kind of feel like you have a little bit more control. Once [Officer McFadden] was gone and one of the suspects fled, I immediately become more aware that the situation is going from, you know, good to worst and now I'm left alone with two individuals. So, what I did was immediately ... pull my taser out to try to show that, you know, I'm going to keep them under control and have them put their hands on the wall. And I went to pat-down [sic] one individual as the other one, you know, had his hands on the wall and I did that for both of them.
The following colloquy took place later in the hearing regarding Officer Price's removal of the pen cap from Clanton's pocket and the subsequent discovery of the cocaine:
[Officer Price:] Well, once I pulled it out I realized what ... the sharp object was but upon further investigation and looking at it, I seen [sic] a clear plastic baggie that, you known, obviously wasn't stuffed down in there, it was hanging out of the pen cap. And amongst looking at that, after—I realize there's a white powdery substance in that and that's when, through my training and experience, [I] realized that's a compound.
[State:] So once you pulled the pen cap out of the pocket was it immediately apparent that there were narcotics in [it?]
[Officer Price:] Yes, yes, like I say, because it was hanging out of the pen cap.
On cross-examination, the following exchange took place:
[Defense counsel:] And when you pulled it out you realized it was the top to a pen?
[Officer Price:] Yes.
[Defense counsel:] And it wasn't until you inspected it that you found that there was contraband inside?
[Officer Price:] Well, I mean, it's immediately apparent that there's [sic] baggies inside it which is automatically, you know, we see that multiple times.
[Defense counsel:] When you pulled it out you didn't know what was inside the pen cap?
[Officer Price:] No I wouldn't have been able to tell you what was inside it no.
Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
The trial court denied Clanton's motion to suppress. At the bench trial held on March 1, 2012, Clanton renewed his motion to suppress and objected to the admission of the cocaine into evidence. At trial, Officer Price testified, Id. at 47–48 (emphasis added). He further stated, “I noticed the clear baggie that was stuffed into the pen cap with a lot of excess bag hanging out which I've seen in the past ... used to carry narcotics.” Id. at 51.
The trial court overruled Clanton's objection to the admissibility of the evidence and found him guilty as charged of possession of cocaine as a class D felony. Clanton now appeals.
A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Shinault v. State, 668 N.E.2d 274, 276 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). We will reverse a trial court's ruling on admissibility of evidence only when an abuse of discretion has occurred. Scott v. State, 855 N.E.2d 1068, 1071 (Ind.Ct.App.2006). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id.
As noted above, Clanton argues that the cocaine should not have been admitted into evidence at his trial because the officer's seizure of it violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Indeed, both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution guarantee this right. 4 Notwithstanding the nearly identical text of these guarantees, the very same police behavior could be reasonable under the federal constitution and unreasonable under the state constitution, or vice versa, because each has a distinct reasonableness analysis. See Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind.2005) ().
Nevertheless, evidence obtained by police action in violation of either constitution is inadmissible. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (); Grier v. State, 868 N.E.2d 443, 445 (Ind.2007) (). 5 We review de novo the ultimate question of whether the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was violated. Howard v. State, 862 N.E.2d 1208, 1210 (Ind.Ct.App.2007).
A. The Federal Constitution Claims
Clanton contends that the initial stop was not justified because the officers could not reasonably suspect him of loitering or otherwise being engaged in criminal activity merely because he was standing outside a doorway for five to fifteen seconds with two other black males. Appellant's Br. p. 7–8. He also contends that there was no basis for Officer Price to suspect that he was armed and dangerous to justify the patdown for weapons when he fully complied with Officer Price's instructions and made no furtive or...
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