Clapp v. Mason
| Decision Date | 01 October 1876 |
| Citation | 2 L.Ed. 212,94 U.S. 589 |
| Parties | CLAPP v. MASON |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Smith for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. George Putnam, Jr., contra.
The plaintiffs below brought their action against the collector of internal revenue to recover back a tax paid to him to avoid distraint. The facts are these:——
William P. Mason, the plaintiff's testator, died Dec. 4, 1867. By his will, the real estate upon which the tax in question was levied was devised to his widow for her life, or until she should cease to occupy the same as a place of residence, and upon her death, or ceasing so to occupy the same, to the plaintiff.
The widow occupied the said real estate as her residence until her death, June 17, 1872.
The tax in question was assessed on the 15th of May, 1873, by the assessor of said district, and on the 31st of May, 1873, the plaintiff paid the defendant the said tax under protest, to avoid distraint or other forcible process to collect the same.
The Circuit Court held that the tax was illegally imposed, and gave judgment that the party paying it should recover back the amount with interest. The collector appeals.
The relationship, if any, between the deceased and the devisees does not appear. The identity of names is suggestive upon the point, but no facts in relation to it are contained in the record.
It is conceded that under the United States statute of 1864 the tax would have been a proper one. The statute of July 14, 1870, repealed the taxes imposed by the act of 1864 on legacies and successions after the first day of August, 1870. 16 Stat. 261, sect. 17.
The Repealing Act contained the following proviso:——
'And all acts and parts of acts relating to the taxes herein repealed, and [that] all the provisions of said acts shall continue in full force for levying and collecting all taxes properly assessed or liable to be assessed, or accruing under the provisions of former acts, or drawbacks, the right to which has already accrued, or which may hereafter accrue, under said acts, and for maintaining and continuing liens, fines, penalties, and forfeitures incurred under and by virtue thereof; and this act shall not be construed to affect any act done, right accrued, or penalty incurred under former acts, but every such act is hereby saved.'
The collector insists that the tax upon the succession in question had accrued before the repeal of the act of 1864; to wit, that it accrued upon the death of the testator in 1867. The devisees contend that the tax did not accrue until they came into the possession of the land, and that before this occurred the statute authorizing the tax was repealed. The question is, when did the right to this tax accrue,—at the death of the testator, or at the death of the widow, when the plaintiff became entitled to the possession of the land?
By the statute of 1864, as a part of a system of taxation made necessary by the existence of a civil war, a tax was imposed upon the 'succession to real estate.' 13 Stat. 287. The term 'real estate' was defined to include all lands, tenements, and hereditaments, corporeal and incorporeal; and a 'succession' was declared to denote 'the devolution of title to any real estate.' Sect. 126.
By sect. 127 it is provided that any disposition by will, or deed, or descent, by reason whereof any person shall become beneficially entitled in possession or expectancy to any real estate or any interest therein upon the death of any person, shall be deemed to confer a succession. The argument made upon this section by the plaintiff in error, that the will of Mason conveyed an estate to William P. Mason and Charles H. Parker, and that, although they were not entitled to immediate possession, they had a vested estate, and that the succession to such an estate was made taxable, we readily admit. We agree further, that vested estates not only, but estates which are not vested,—those in expectancy merely,—are within the statute. Wimple v. Forda, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 288. The admission, however, does not aid us in deciding the point before us, as the question of time still arises,—when is this vested estate taxable?
Sect. 133 enacts that the duties there provided for shall be as follows, viz.: Where the successor is a lineal descendant or a lineal...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Coolidge v. Long 1930
...of such tenancies, and were obviously neither arbitrary nor capricious, and so not violative of the Fifth Amendment. Clapp v. Mason, 94 U. S. 589, 24 L. Ed. 212, and Mason v. Sargent, 104 U. S. 689, 26 L. Ed. 894, arose under the Succession Tax Act of June 30, 1864, § 124 et seq., 13 Stat. ......
-
Fernandez v. Wiener
...acquired and vested upon which the tax is laid. Such was deemed to be the taxable event under our earlier death taxes. Clapp v. Mason, 94 U.S. 589, 24 L.Ed. 212; Vanderbilt v. Eidman, 196 U.S. 480, 25 S.Ct. 331, 49 L.Ed. 563. And see Moffitt v. Kelly, With these general principles in mind w......
-
In re Estate of Rising
... ... entitled" to the property and "the income ... thereof" so as to make them liable to a succession tax ... under G. S. 1923 (1 Mason, 1927) § 2292(1,3, and 4) ... Taxation ... -- inheritance tax -- gifts inter vivos ... 2. Such ... gifts ... when the remainderman became "entitled to the possession ... or enjoyment of the estate." Clapp v. Mason, 94 ... U.S. 589, 592, 24 L.Ed. 212 ... ... Perfect title consists in "the union of actual ... possession, the ... ...
-
Rising's Estate v. State ex rel. Benson, 28745.
...was held to take effect only when the remainderman became ‘entitled to the possession or enjoyment of the estate.’ Clapp v. Mason, 94 U. S. 589, 592, 24 L. Ed. 212. Perfect title consists in ‘the union of actual possession, the right of possession and the right of property.’ 4 Kent's Com. (......