Claremont Police v. City of Claremont

• Decision Date: 14 August 2006
• Docket Number: No. S120546.,S120546.
• Citation: 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 69,39 Cal.4th 623,139 P.3d 532
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: CLAREMONT POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF CLAREMONT et al., Defendants and Respondents.

47 Cal.Rptr.3d 69

39 Cal.4th 623

139 P.3d 532

CLAREMONT POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF CLAREMONT et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. S120546.

Supreme Court of California.

August 14, 2006.

Lackie & Dammeier, Dieter C. Dammeier and Michael A. Morguess, Upland, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Rains, Lucia & Wilkinson and Alison Berry Wilkinson, Pleasant Hill, for Peace Officers Research Association of California's Legal Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, Richard M. Kreisler, Los Angeles, Mark H. Meyerhoff; Best Best & Krieger, Jeffrey V. Dunn, Sonia R. Carvalho, Irvine and Sandra M. Schwarzmann for Defendants and Respondents.

Alan L. Schlosser, Mark Schlosberg, San Francisco; and Peter Eliasberg, Los Angeles, for American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

Jeffrey Kightlinger, Henry Barbosa, Henry Torres, Jr.; Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo, James F. Baca, Warren S. Kinsler, Nate Kowalski and Joshua E. Morrison, Cerritos, for Metropolitan Water District of Southern California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

Meyers, Nave, Riback, Silver & Wilson, Andrea J. Saltzman and Arthur A. Hartinger, Oakland, for League of California Cities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

CHIN, J.

[139 P.3d 628]

In this case, we consider a provision of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) (Gov.Code,¹ § 3500 et seq.), which governs labor-management relations at the local government level. Section 3505 mutually obligates a public employer and an employee organization to meet and confer in good faith about a matter within the "scope of representation" concerning, among other things, "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" (§ 3504). A fundamental managerial or policy decision, however, is outside the scope of representation (§ 3504), and is excepted from section 3505's meet-and-confer requirement.

For reasons that follow, we conclude that there is a distinction between an employer's fundamental managerial or policy decision and the implementation of that decision. To determine whether an employer's action implementing a fundamental decision is subject to the meet-and-confer requirement (§ 3505), we employ the test found in our decision in Building Material & Construction Teamsters' Union v. Farrell (1986) 41 Cal.3d 651, 660, 224 Cal.Rptr. 688, 715 P.2d 648 (Building Material).

Applying that test to the case at hand, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Claremont Police Officers Association (Association) is an employee organization representing public employees of defendant City of Claremont (City), including police officers and recruits, police agents, communication officers, record clerks, jailors and parking enforcement officers. In May 2000, the City's police department (Department) implemented a tracking program to determine if police officers were engaging in racial profiling. The Association, as the "[r]ecognized employee organization,"² did not request to meet and confer with the City beforehand. Under the program, if an officer stopped a vehicle or person without issuing a citation or making an arrest, the officer was required to radio the Department with information about the stop, including the person's race. The program lasted one year.

After the City's police commission concluded that the data collected in the pilot tracking program was insufficient to determine whether officers engaged in racial profiling, the commission appointed a subcommittee and advisory

[139 P.3d 629]

panel to prepare a further study. In February 2002, the police commission adopted the subcommittee's recommendation that the Department implement a "Vehicle Stop Data Collection Study" (Study), which is at issue in this case. This Study required officers on all vehicle stops to complete a preprinted scantron form called a "Vehicle Stop Data Form" (Form). The Form included questions regarding the "driver's perceived race/ethnicity," and the "officers' prior knowledge of driver's race/ethnicity." On average, the Form takes two minutes to complete, and an officer may complete between four and six Forms for each 12-hour shift. Each Form is traceable to the individual officer making the stop. The Study was to last 15 months, commencing July 1, 2002.

In April 2002, the Association requested that the City meet and confer regarding the Study because it asserted "the implementation of policy and procedures in regards to this area falls under California Government Code section 3504." On April 11, 2002, the City gave written notice disagreeing that the Study fell within the scope of representation under section 3504. On June 27, 2002, the Department informed officers it would implement the Study effective July 1, 2002. On July 11, 2002, the Association filed a petition for writ of mandate to compel the City and the Department not to implement the Study until they meet and confer in good faith under the MMBA.

On August 22, 2002, the superior court denied the petition. In its detailed statement of findings and conclusions, the court concluded, among other things, that the Study did not substantially affect the terms and conditions of the Association members' employment, and that "given the de minimis impact upon workload, and the predominantly policy directed objectives of the Study, . . . the Study falls primarily within management prerogatives under § 3504, and is not a matter within the scope of representation requiring compliance with the meet and confer provisions of the MMBA."

The Court of Appeal reversed. While it concluded the City's decision to take measures to combat the practice of racial profiling and the public perception that it occurs is "a fundamental policy decision that directly affects the police department's mission to protect and to serve the public," the Court of Appeal held that "the decision precisely how to implement that fundamental policy, however, involves several variables affecting law enforcement officers and is not itself a fundamental policy decision."³ The Court of Appeal explained that "the vehicle stop policy significantly affects officers' working conditions, particularly their job security and freedom from disciplinary

[139 P.3d 630]

action, their prospects for promotion, and the officers' relations with the public. Racial profiling is illegal. [Fn. omitted.] An officer could be accused of racial profiling and subjected to disciplinary action, denial of promotion, or other adverse action based in part on the information collected under the new policy. For this reason, the manner that the information is collected and the accuracy of the data and data analysis are matters of great concern to the association's members."

We granted review.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Background of the MMBA

The MMBA applies to local government employees in California. (Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608, 614, fn. 4, 116 Cal.Rptr. 507, 526 P.2d 971 (Fire Fighters Union).)⁴ "The MMBA has two stated purposes: (1) to promote full communication between public employers and employees, and (2) to improve personnel management and employer-employee relations. (§ 3500.) To effect these goals the act gives local government employees the right to organize collectively and to be represented by employee organizations (§ 3502), and obligates employers to bargain with employee representatives about matters that fall within the `scope of representation.' (§§ 3504.5, 3505.)" (Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 657, 224 Cal.Rptr. 688, 715 P.2d 648.) The duty to meet and confer in good faith is limited to matters within the "scope of representation": the public employer and recognized employee organization have a "mutual obligation personally to meet and confer promptly upon request by either party ... and to endeavor to reach agreement on matters within the scope of representation prior to the adoption by the public agency of its final budget for the ensuing year." (§ 3505.) Even if the parties meet and confer, they are not required to reach an agreement because the employer has "the ultimate power to refuse to agree on any particular issue. [Citation.]" (Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 665, 224 Cal.Rptr. 688, 715 P.2d 648.) However, good faith under section 3505 "requires a genuine desire to reach agreement." (Placentia Fire Fighters v. City of Placentia (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 9, 25, 129 Cal.Rptr. 126.)

[139 P.3d 631]

1. "Scope of representation"

Section 3504 defines "scope of representation" to include "all matters relating to employment conditions and employer-employee relations, including, but not limited to, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, except, however, that the scope of representation shall not include consideration of the merits, necessity, or organization of any service or activity provided by law or executive order." (Italics added.) The definition of "scope of representation" and its exception are "arguably vague" and "overlapping." (Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 658, 224 Cal.Rptr. 688, 715 P.2d 648; Fire Fighters Union, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 615, 116 Cal.Rptr. 507, 526 P.2d 971.) "`[W]ages, hours and working conditions,' which, broadly read could encompass practically any conceivable bargaining proposal; and `merits, necessity or organization of any service' which, expansively interpreted, could swallow the whole provision for collective negotiation and relegate determination of all labor issues to the city's discretion." (Fire Fighters Union, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 615, 116 Cal.Rptr. 507, 526 P.2d 971.)

Courts have interpreted "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment," which...