Clark v. Allen

• Decision Date: 26 October 1964
• Parties: Joseph S. CLARK, Appellant, v. Robert E. ALLEN, M.D., a/k/a Robert V. Allen, M.D., and Henry W. Lark.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

204 A.2d 42

415 Pa. 484

Joseph S. CLARK, Appellant, v. Robert E. ALLEN, M.D., a/k/a Robert V. Allen, M.D., and Henry W. Lark.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 26, 1964.

Franklin L. Kury, Sunbury, for appellant.

Sanford S. Marateck, Shamokin, for appellee Robert E. Allen M.D.

Preston L. Davis, and Preston B. Davis, Milton, for appellee Henry W Lark.

Before BELL, C. J., and JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

BELL, Chief Justice.

Joseph S Clark brought an action of libel against Robert E. Allen M.D. a/k/a Robert V. Allen, M.D. and Henry W. Lark, for the alleged libelous statements contained in a letter written and circulated by them opposing his candidacy for re-election to the United States Senate. Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to plaintiff's amended complaint were sustained by the lower Court and from the Order dismissing the complaint, plaintiff took this appeal.

The alleged libel is contained in the following language of said letter, which appellant averred was circulated maliciously by appellees: 'We are shocked at Joe Clark's record on Senate absenteeism and his A.D.A. approved voting record with its communist tendencies.'

Preliminary objections (or pleadings) in the nature of a demurrer admit as true all facts which are well and clearly pleaded, but not the pleader's conclusions or averments of law. Stahl v. First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Company, 411 Pa. 121, 191 A.2d 386; Universal Film Exchanges, Inc. v. Board of Finance and Revenue, 409 Pa. 180, 185 A.2d 542; Philadelphia Minit-Man Car Wash Corp. v. Building and Construction Trades Council of Phila. and Vicinity, 411 Pa. 585, 192 A.2d 378.

The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides:

'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment or religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press: * * *.'

Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, P.S., provides:

' § 7. The printing press shall be free to every person who may undertake to examine the proceedings of the Legislature or any branch of government, and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof. The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizens may freely speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. * * *'

Libel was thus defined in Bogash v. Elkins, 405 Pa. 437, 439, 440, 176 A.2d 677, 678:

'* * * A libel is a malicious publication, expressed either in printing or writing, or by signs and pictures, which tends to blacken a person's reputation and expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or injure him in his business, trade or profession. Sarkees v. Warner-West Corp., 349 Pa. 365, 37 A.2d 544; Collins v. Dispatch Publishing Co., 152 Pa. 187, 25 A. 546; Schnabel v. Meredith, 378 Pa. 609, 107 A.2d 860; Mengel v. Reading Eagle Co., 241 Pa. 367, 88 A. 660.

'The question of whether the language used in the allegedly defamatory article can fairly and reasonably be construed to have the libelous meaning ascribed to it by plaintiff is in the first instance a matter of law for the Court. Mengel v. Reading Eagle Co., 241 Pa. 367, 88 A. 660, supra; McDonald v. Lee, 246 Pa. 253, 92 A. 135, L.R.A. 1916B, 915; Sarkees v. Warner-West Corp., 349 Pa. 365, 37 A.2d 544, supra; Naulty v. Bulletin Co., 206 Pa. 128, 55 A. 862.

"It was the duty of the court to determine whether or not the words used were libelous per se. If they were not, then, in the absence [of averment] of special damage, binding instructions were proper.' McDonald v. Lee, 246 Pa. at page 255, 92 A. at page 136, supra.'

See also to the same effect: Volomino v. Messenger Publishing Co., 410 Pa. 611, 189 A.2d 873; Cosgrove Studio and Camera Shop, Inc., v. Pane, 408 Pa. 314, 182 A.2d 751.

In Volomino v. Messenger Publishing Co., 410 Pa. pages 613-614, 189 A.2d page 875, supra, the Court said: 'In a defamatory case, it is the function of the court, in the first instance, to determine whether or not the communication complained of is capable of a defamatory meaning: Restatement, Torts, § 614(1); Bogash v. Elkins, 405 Pa. 437, 176 A.2d 677 (1962); Cosgrove Studio & Camera Shop v. Pane, supra.'

Notwithstanding the fact that the law of libel has been well settled for a long period of time, the Supreme Court of the United States has recently greatly broadened the concept and meaning of freedom (of the press and freedom) of speech and has greatly narrowed the meaning of libel when applied to a public official or a candidate for public office. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, infra.

It is deplorable but true that during a political campaign, candidates and their supporters often indulge in gross exaggeration, invectives, distorted statements, charges of being unfit for the office sought, gross incompetence, disregard of the public interest or the welfare of our Country, prophecies of war or doom if the opponent is elected, mudslinging, half truths and outright lies which are so defamatory that they not only deeply wound the feelings of the person attacked, but undoubtedly damage his political aspirations and often (for a time) his reputation. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has apparently taken the position that the free expression of thoughts and opinions, charges, accusations, criminations and recriminations regarding men in public life and political matters are so valuable and so essential to the preservation or improvement of our Government that they must be permitted and constitutionally protected unless they are made with actual malice.

Such charges, which are frequently made against candidates for President or Governor or Senator or for local office--irrespective of whether the office sought is elective or appointive--are apparently privileged under the theory (a) that the people are entitled to know and discuss the life, the character and qualifications, the finances, and the innermost thoughts, motives, connections and associations of public, officials and candidates for public office, as well as the likely or inevitable result of the official's candidate's actions, connections, statements or votes, and (b) that the importance to the State and to Society of such information, charges and discussions and the adventages likely to be derived therefrom are so great, that they overbalance the harm which is often inflicted upon the persons maligned.

In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, ^[1] the Court reversed the lower Court and set aside a large verdict obtained in a libel suit. The alleged libel appeared in a public advertisement in the New York Times; it contained defamatory and false statements regarding a public official, but no recovery was allowed in spite of the fact that a reading of its newspaper files would have disclosed to the Times and falsity of a number of statements in the advertisement. The syllabus briefly but accurately summarizes the changed law with respect to libel of a public official:

'A state cannot under the First and Fourteenth Amendments award damages to a public official for defamatory falsehood ^[2] relating to his official conduct unless he proves 'actual malice'--that the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false.

'* * *

'(c) Factual error, content defamatory of official reputation, or both, are insufficient to warrant curbing free expression unless actual malice is alleged and proved.

'* * *

'(e) The evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support the judgment for respondent, since it failed to support a finding that the statements were made with actual malice * * *.'

The Court said (pages 269-270, 272, 273, 279-280, 283, 288, 84 S.Ct. pages 720-721, 722, 726-729):

'The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions. The constitutional safeguard, we have said, 'was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1308, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498. 'The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.' Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369, 51 S.Ct. 532, 536, 75 L.Ed. 1117. '[I]t is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions,' Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270, 62 S.Ct. 190, 197, 86 L.Ed. 192, and this opportunity is to be afforded for 'vigorous advocacy' no less than 'abstract discussion.'

'* * * Mr. Justice Brandeis, in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-376, 47 S.Ct. 641, 648, 71 L.Ed. 1095, gave the principle its classic formulation:

"Those who won our independence believed * * * that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. * * *'

'Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.

'* * * Judge Edgerton spoke for a unanimous court which affirmed the...