Clark v. APAC Mid-South, Inc.

• Decision Date: 06 December 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:09–cv–02497–HGD.
• Parties: Jeffery A. CLARK, III, Plaintiff v. APAC MID–SOUTH, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

912 F.Supp.2d 1273

Jeffery A. CLARK, III, Plaintiff

v.APAC MID–SOUTH, INC., Defendant.

Case No. 1:09–cv–02497–HGD.

United States District Court,

N.D. Alabama,

Eastern Division.

Dec. 6, 2012.

Rocco Calamusa, Jr., Russell W. Adams, Wiggins Childs Quinn & Pantazis, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.

Shannon L. Miller, Thomas A. Davis, Rhonda S. Nabors, Jackson Lewis LLC, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HARWELL G. DAVIS, III, United States Magistrate Judge.

On December 11, 2009, plaintiff Jeffery A. Clark, III, (“Clark”) an African–American, initiated this civil action with a two-count complaint filed in the Northern District of Alabama against defendant APAC Mid–South, Inc., (“APAC”) alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”) and Title VII of the Act of Congress, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991) (“Title VII”). Clark demands a trial by jury, monetary damages, and injunctive relief.

This case is before the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to the parties' consent. See28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Rule 73(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;LR 73.2; and the General Orders of Reference dated July 25, 1996, May 8, 1998, as amended July 27, 2000, specifically at ¶ 3. APAC has filed a motion for summary judgment, briefs, and evidentiary submissions. (Docs. 18, 19 & 20).¹ Clark tendered a response and evidentiary submissions. (Docs. 27 & 28). APAC filed a reply brief and additional evidentiary submissions. (Doc. 30). The parties have supplemented their evidentiary submissions at the direction of this court. (Docs. 36 & 37).

I. APPLICABLE LAW

A. Summary Judgment—General Standard

Summary judgment is proper when no genuine issue as to any material fact is present, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). APAC carries the initial burden of “informing the court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those materials that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Rice–Lamar v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 232 F.3d 836, 840 (11th Cir.2000) (citing Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). “Only when that burden has been met does the burden shift to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991). The non-moving party then is required “to go beyond the pleadings” and present competent evidence in the form of affidavits, depositions, admissions and the like designating “specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” supporting the non-movant's case is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The reviewing court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “[F]acts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of facts for the purpose of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. If the record does not blatantly contradict the non-movant's versions of events, the court must determine “whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.” See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505;see also EPL, Inc. v. USA Federal Credit Union, 173 F.3d 1356, 1362 (11th Cir.1999).

B. Title VII and Section 1981 Claims—General Analytical Framework

Clark relies upon Title VII and Section 1981 to support his race-based employment discrimination claims. Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against any individual with respect to the terms of employment on the basis of race. Title VII also contains a separate anti-retaliation provision that forbids an employer from intentionally discriminating against an employee for engaging in activity protected by Title VII. Section 1981 prohibits race-based discrimination and retaliation in the making and enforcement of contracts. CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 445–46, 128 S.Ct. 1951, 170 L.Ed.2d 864 (2008). Since both laws have the same proof requirements, unless otherwise noted, all claims shall be addressed under the Title VII moniker. See Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281,1307 (11th Cir.2009) (quoting Standard v. A.B.E.L. Services, 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir.1998) (“stating that Title VII and § 1981 ‘have the same requirements of proof ...’ ”)).

A plaintiff may establish a claim of discrimination or retaliation by direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence. For claims based only upon circumstantial evidence, as is the case in the present action, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted the three-step burdenshifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–08, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir.2004); Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc). This analytical framework applies to Clark's Title VII and Section 1981 claims.²

Under the framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving a prima facie case. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. Once a prima facie case is established, the burden then shifts to the employer to state a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. Id. at 802–03, 93 S.Ct. 1817. An employer's burden to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for its action is a burden of production, not of persuasion. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). This burden involves no credibility determination, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), and therefore it is an “exceedingly light” burden. Perryman v. Johnson Prod. Co., 698 F.2d 1138, 1141 (11th Cir.1983). The employer must simply articulate “a clear and reasonably specific” non-discriminatory basis for its actions to discharge its burden of production. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254–55, 101 S.Ct. 1089. After the employer discharges its burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the reason offered by the employer was a pretext for discrimination or retaliation. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817. At the pretext stage, the court's concern is not whether the employment decisions are prudent or fair but whether unlawful discriminatory or retaliatory animus motivates the challenged employment decision. Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, 196 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir.1999).

In other words, once a defendant articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action, the initial inference of discrimination “drops” from the case. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510–11, 113 S.Ct. 2742. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered reason was pretext for intentional discrimination and that the defendant intentionally discriminated against him. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089;Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024. Plaintiff's evidence must reveal “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 (11th Cir.2004).

The plaintiff may not simply quarrel with the wisdom of the reason proffered “but must meet it head on and rebut it.” Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. Federal courts “do not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity's business decisions. No matter how medieval a firm's practices, no matter how high handed its decisional process, no matter how mistaken the firm's managers,” the courts do not interfere. Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir.1991) (quoting Mechnig v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 864 F.2d 1359, 1365 (7th Cir.1988) (citations omitted)). A plaintiff may show pretext and survive summary judgment by “presenting evidence sufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the truth or falsity of the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.” Evans v. McClain of Georgia, Inc., 131 F.3d 957, 965 (11th Cir.1997) (citations omitted); Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir.1999).

II. STATUTES OF LIMITATION, ABANDONED AND UNPLED CLAIMS

A. Statutes of Limitation

1. Any adverse decisions arising in 2005 are untimely under Section 1981 and Title VII

Out of an abundance of caution, APAC argues that to the extent Clark may be

attempting to make any [Section 1981] claims related to alleged adverse employment actions occurring in 2005, such claims are due to be dismissed as untimely because plaintiff filed the lawsuit in the instant case on December 11, 2009, more than four years from the date of any of the alleged 2005 actions. See e.g., Summerlin v. M & H Valve Co., [2005 WL 6132650, at] *10–12 (N.D.Ala. Jan. 31, 2005) (citing Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382 [124 S.Ct. 1836, 158 L.Ed.2d 645] (2004) and explaining that statute of limitations for Section 1981 claims is either two or four years depending on nature of claim). Any of plaintiff's [Title VII] claims related to his first EEOC Charge that was filed in November of 2005 and...