Clark v. Boynton

• Decision Date: 01 July 1966
• Docket Number: No. 23157.,23157.
• Citation: 362 F.2d 992
• Parties: James G. CLARK, Jr., Sheriff of Dallas County, Alabama, Appellant, v. Amelia P. BOYNTON et al., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

362 F.2d 992 (1966)

James G. CLARK, Jr., Sheriff of Dallas County, Alabama, Appellant, v. Amelia P. BOYNTON et al., Appellees.

No. 23157.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

July 1, 1966.

T. G. Gayle, Philip Henry Pitts, J. E. Wilkinson, Jr., W. McLean Pitts, Selma, Ala., for appellant.

Peter A. Hall, Birmingham, Ala., Norman C. Amaker, Jack Greenberg, Charles H. Jones, Jr., Charles Stephen Ralston, New York City, for appellees.

Vernol R. Jansen, Jr., U. S. Atty., Mobile, Ala., amicus curiae.

Before BROWN and COLEMAN, Circuit Judges, and DAWKINS, District Judge.

JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge.

This is another fall out from the Selma, Alabama racial-voter registration crisis of the spring of 1965. The aspect here is the present appeal by Sheriff Clark from an order of the United States District Court holding him in contempt of previous orders issued by Judge Thomas. In the memorandum order of contempt the Court found that Sheriff Clark is "in contempt of this Court's order" and then, of decisive importance here, declared that "he is ordered to pay a fine in the amount of One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00)."

So preoccupied have the parties been with the contentions pro and con that the fine exceeding, as it does, $300 automatically triggered the jury trial provisions of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1995¹ which came into being in the 1957 Civil Rights Act,² the real deficiency of this record has been overlooked. Indeed, the preargument study of the case led this Court to request the United States Attorney and the Department of Justice to file a brief and appear as amicus because of this apparent deficiency. The simple fact is that no one, simply no one, is able to determine whether this was begun, tried, or ended as a case for criminal contempt, civil contempt, or both, or whether some place down the trail, begun as one it was transmuted into the other. This is, of course, one thing about which there may not be any doubt if a contempt order is to stand. Cliett v. Hammonds, 5 Cir., 1962, 305 F.2d 565.

The result is that the decree must be vacated and the cause remanded for further consistent proceedings. This disposition permits us to severely capsulate the setting of the case and the serious legal issues presented which, for the most part, have never yet been faced.

The injunctive orders of January 23 and 30, 1965, were entered in a private-non-governmental, suit³ brought as a class action for three classes, (a) Negroes being harassed in their attempt to register to vote, (b) Negroes seeking to vouch for applicants for registration as then required by Alabama law, and (c) citizens being harassed, coerced, etc. "in their attempt to exercise their rights of freedom of speech and assembly designed to persuade voting registrars in Dallas County, Alabama to comply with the Constitution and laws of the United States guaranteeing the right to vote to all citizens."

The orders, purposely phrased by Judge Thomas in nonlegalistic lay terms so all, he said, could understand what was required, spelled out certain procedures to be followed to give control and stability because of the large number of persons assembling near or in the courthouse. These included the formation and composition of the lines of those seeking to register, the assembly and conduct of those assisting or encouraging applicants in their efforts. It is a fair summary to say that the orders undertook to assure the right of peaceful assembly without violence from those in the assembly or the public officers with an affirmative obligation on public officers to afford legal protection to those assembled. But it was careful to make very clear that the conduct of the public officers would have to be genuine and in good faith.⁴

But, as the plaintiffs saw it, things did not change and, on January 28, 1965, they moved for additional relief and for an order to show cause for contempt.⁵ On January 30, 1965, the District Court amended its order of January 23, 1965, to clarify the question of how many persons could remain in line for registration. But the plaintiffs, unsatisfied with the turn of events, on February 12, 1965, filed a supplemental motion for additional relief and order to show cause. This set forth in detail the events of February 10, 1965, which formed the basis of the contempt judgment later entered. In brief, this charged that on February 10, a group of Negro children and teenagers peacefully assembled before the Dallas County Courthouse carrying signs urging full and equal voting rights for Negroes. But Sheriff Clark exercising his authority as Sheriff with a group of 15 to 20 of his Deputies surrounded the teenagers and led them through the streets of Selma and forced the demonstrators to take a march of several miles out in the country at a fast pace, walking and running.

Subsequently, on March 25, 1965, Judge Thomas entered the order requiring that Sheriff Clark on April 26, 1965, "show cause why he should not be held in contempt of this court and punished therefore by fine and imprisonment or both."⁶

The Court thereafter, on April 26, 1965, held an extensive evidentiary hearing without ever expressly ruling on Sheriff Clark's demand for a jury trial.⁷ Later, September 2, 1965, Judge Thomas announced his decision. In effect he exonerated Sheriff Clark and his Deputies of disobedience as to the several events prior to February 10. Although the finding was not categorical, he declared, as to the alleged occurrences of January 25-27 (see note 5, supra), that "on most occasions when confronted by the plaintiffs, Sheriff Clark and his deputies acted with propriety and restraint." But, he concluded, "the notable exception to this occurred on February 10, 1965." Of this incident the Court held:

"The demonstrators were not disorderly. About 2:30 p. m., Sheriff Clark and his deputies ordered the group to disperse. The group refused, so they were taken on a `forced march.\' The group was forced to either run or walk at a brisk pace for over four miles. Sheriff Clark and his deputies rode in cars, taking turns walking and conducting the march with posse men. Sheriff Clark himself was in a car at all times while the march was occurring. Several members of the group marching were struck with a cattle prod on the march."

This action, the Court continued, placed Sheriff Clark "in direct contempt of the following portion of" the order of January 23, 1965, and here was set out the portion appearing in note 4, supra. This was followed, in turn, by the express finding of contempt and the order to pay the fine set forth earlier.⁸

Subsequently, the Court overruled motions by Sheriff Clark for new trial. This specifically included his renewed demand for a jury trial.

On brief and in argument, counsel and the amicus struggled mightily to discern from whatever bench marks were available the undisclosed characterization of this proceeding as a criminal or civil contempt in the mind of Judge Thomas. The signs point in many directions. We need not seek them out nor discuss them because, analyzed in terms of whether it is criminal or civil, on no hypothesis does the present record warrant an affirmance. At the same time, this record, revealing in practically uncontradicted terms spectacular action by Sheriff Clark which can hardly be squared with the injunctive order, is a long way from warranting a reversal and rendition for him. Only a brief consideration of the alternatives is necessary to bear this out.

If we proceed on the assumption that what was intended was a criminal contempt, the procedure just does not begin to meet the requirements of the law. There was, first, no apparent consideration of F.R.Crim.P. 42(b).

To begin with, there was no plain statement in the order or other papers showing that the proceeding was one in criminal contempt. The Rule, in requiring that "a criminal contempt * * * shall be prosecuted on notice," provides that (1) "the notice * * * shall state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such" and (2) "the notice shall be given a orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the defendant or, b on application of the United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order of arrest." There is nothing in the record to indicate that a notice meeting these requirements (1) was given by Judge Thomas in open court (2a). Nor did the order to show cause (see note 6, supra, and accompanying text) comply with these requirements (1). Neither was it entered on application of the United States Attorney or of an attorney appointed by the Court for that purpose (2b). The record reflects no designation by the Court of the plaintiffs' attorney to prosecute a criminal contempt.⁹

And in the extensive memorandum opinion order finding Sheriff Clark guilty there is nothing to indicate that these findings were made beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a mere preponderance of the evidence. See Cliett v. Hammonds, supra, 305 F.2d 570.

But even more important, until the question of the § 1995 jury trial provision came up in the motion for new trial after the order of contempt, the record shows absolutely no consideration of the serious question of jury trial for criminal contempt. Quite apart from the application of the § 1995 jury trial de novo provision — a matter on which we express no opinion — the District Court was from the beginning inescapably faced with the problem arising under §§ 402¹⁰ and 3691,¹¹ the effect of which is to grant a jury trial for criminal contempt in non-government actions where the actions alleged to have transgressed the order constitute a violation of Federal or State law. On this point we agree with the candid statement by the Government as amicus that if this were a criminal contempt proceeding, the conduct asserted to be contemptuous was, at least arguably, a violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §...