Clark v. Bridges

Decision Date30 September 2016
Docket NumberCivil Action No.: 6:14-4313-BHH
Citation211 F.Supp.3d 731
Parties Christine CLARK, Plaintiff, v. Brian K. BRIDGES, Justin Moody, Robert R. Wilkie, Ryan Abernathy, Brandon Scott, Sheriff Ricky Chastain, Sheriff Ray Watson, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

Howard Walton Anderson, III, Howard W. Anderson III Law Office, Pendleton, SC, for Plaintiff.

Carly H. Davis, Russell W. Harter, Jr., Chapman Harter and Harter, Greenville, SC, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Bruce Howe Hendricks, United States District Judge

On August 27, 2014, Plaintiff Christine Clark ("Plaintiff" or "Clark") filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in the Court of Common Pleas for Laurens County, South Carolina, alleging that Defendants Brian K. Bridges ("Bridges"), Justin Moody ("Moody"), Robert R. Wilkie ("Wilkie"), Ryan Abernathy ("Abernathy"), Brandon Scott ("Scott"), and Kenneth Ray Smith ("Smith")1 (collectively "Individual Defendants") violated her Fourth, Eight, and Fourteenth Amendment rights during a search of her home, seizure of property, and her associated arrest. (ECF No. 1-1.) Plaintiff also brought related claims for federal conspiracy, state civil conspiracy, and declaratory judgment. (Id. ) On November 5, 2014, Defendants removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446. (ECF No. 1.) In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) D.S.C., this matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Jacquelyn D. Austin, for consideration of pretrial matters. On May 11, 2015, with leave of the Court, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint adding Defendants Sheriff Ricky Chastain ("Chastain") and Sheriff Ray Watson ("Watson") (collectively "Sheriff Defendants") and a South Carolina Tort Claims Act claim against Chastain and Watson. (ECF No. 24.) The Magistrate Judge prepared a thorough Report and Recommendation ("Report") which recommends that Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment be granted and part and denied in part, and that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part. (ECF No. 55.) Plaintiff and Defendants filed timely objections to the Report. (ECF Nos. 61; 63.) Additionally, the parties filed replies to one another's objections. (ECF Nos. 67; 68.) For the reasons set forth herein, the Court adopts the Report.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Report sets forth in detail the relevant facts and standards of law, and the Court incorporates them herein, summarizing below only in relevant part. Plaintiff's operative pleading is her Amended Complaint, filed on May 11, 2015. (ECF No. 24.) In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges various violations of her rights under the U.S. Constitution as well as state law claims. (Id. ) Specifically, Plaintiff brings suit against Individual Defendants under § 1983 for violation of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures as well as unlawful arrest.2 (Id. ¶¶ 14-32.) In general, Plaintiff's version of events is that she was at home dressed in her panties and about to take a shower when Individual Defendants: (1) arrived at her home to investigate the potential theft of a lawnmower; (2) burst through the back door, grabbed her and threw her on the ground, causing her to suffer multiple bruises; (3) photographed her in her panties, over her objection and to her humiliation and emotional distress; (4) verbally berated her, calling her foul names, (5) arrested her without a warrant for baseless charges; (6) grabbed her in an offensive manner and dragged her outside to be transported to the detention center; (7) searched her home without her consent and damaged her property in the process; (8) seized numerous items, including $200 and a cell phone, without a warrant; and (9) later obtained an invalid warrant, which did not and could not justify further searches inside her home. (Id. ¶¶ 14-28.) Plaintiff also brings a federal conspiracy claim, alleging that Individual Defendants conspired to violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a state civil conspiracy claim, alleging that Individual Defendants conspired to deprive her of her federal and state rights, causing her special damages in the form of physical and emotional injuries. (Id. ¶¶ 33-38.) Further, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment stating that All Defendants violated her rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Sections Ten and Fifteen of Article I of the South Carolina Constitution. (Id. ¶¶ 39-42.) Lastly, Plaintiff brings a South Carolina Tort Claims Act claim against Sheriff Defendants, alleging that: (1)Individual Defendants acted within the course and scope of their employment when they engaged in the alleged conduct described above; (2) that the Sheriffs are liable for the Individual Defendants actions and inactions; and, (3) that the Sheriffs were grossly negligent in their duties and responsibilities to have and/or implement appropriate policies regarding training, supervision, and monitoring of employees to prevent the misconduct that allegedly occurred here (Id. ¶¶ 43-47.)

On September 18, 2015, Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 32.) Defendants responded (ECF No. 41) and Plaintiff replied (ECF No. 46) in turn. On November 16, 2015, Defendants filed their own motion for summary judgment, asserting that they are entitled to judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. (ECF No. 45.) Plaintiff responded (ECF No. 48) and Defendants replied (ECF No. 52) in turn. After consideration of all the relevant briefing, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report recommending that Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part, and that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part. (ECF No. 55.) The Court has reviewed the objections (ECF Nos. 61; 63) to the Report and finds them to be without merit. Therefore, the Court will enter judgment accordingly.3

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the district court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with the district court. Mathews v. Weber , 423 U.S. 261, 270–71, 96 S.Ct. 549, 46 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which specific objection is made, and the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party makes only "general and conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson , 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir.1982). In the absence of a timely filed, specific objection, the Magistrate Judge's conclusions are reviewed only for clear error. See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. , 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir.2005).

DISCUSSION

In the Report, the Magistrate Judge helpfully summarizes the various issues presented in the parties' respective motions for summary judgment. (ECF No. 55 at 10.) Plaintiff's motion alleges she is entitled to summary judgment on the following specific issues: (1) unconstitutional warrantless arrest; (2) unconstitutional pre-warrant search of the curtilage of her home; (3) unconstitutional post-warrant search of her home; (4) unconstitutional seizure of guns; and, (5) unlawful destruction of photographs taken during the course of the arrest. (See ECF No. 32-1 at 8-14.) Defendants allege that they are entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. (See ECF No. 45-1 at 6-27.)

Defendants Abernathy and Scott

The Magistrate Judge begins her analysis by rejecting Defendants arguments that Abernathy and Scott are entitled to summary judgment because they were employed by the Abbeville County Sheriff's Office, they had no jurisdiction in Laurens County,4 and they were not physically involved in Plaintiff's arrest and/or seizure. (ECF No. 55 at 10-11; see ECF No. 45-1 at 23.) Defendants argue that Abernathy and Scott were present merely to identify the stolen property and observe the search and/or seizure of the stolen property. (ECF No. 45-1 at 23.) However, as the Magistrate Judge notes, Defendants fail to cite any legal authority to support the position. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Abernathy and Scott's participation in the search and seizure is sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable juror could conclude that they were personally involved, even if indirectly. (ECF No. 55 at 11 (citing Dockery v. Tucker , No. 97–CV–3584, 2006 WL 5893295, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006) (holding an FBI agent was not entitled to summary judgment for lack of personal involvement in a search because his participation in a task force and descriptions at trial of the acts at the scene were sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable juror could conclude the agent was personally involved, even if indirectly, in the search)).) Defendants make no specific objections to the Magistrate Judge's reasoning, and the Court finds that said reasoning evinces no clear error. See Diamond , 416 F.3d at 315 (holding de novo review unnecessary in the absence of a timely filed, specific objection). Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants' motion for summary judgment to the extent it is based on Abernathy and Scott's putative lack of personal involvement.

Warrantless Arrest of Plaintiff

The Magistrate Judge correctly explains a relevant distinction in the legal standard that applies to Plaintiff's arrest depending on where it took place. (ECF No. 55 at 11-12.) In general, "a warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to...

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