Clark v. Busey
Decision Date | 06 November 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 90-16421,90-16421 |
Citation | 959 F.2d 808 |
Parties | Ronald J. CLARK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James B. BUSEY, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Lawrence B. Smith, Tucson, Ariz., for plaintiff-appellant.
Harry S. Gold, Office of the Chief Counsel, F.A.A., Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellee.
Before BOOCHEVER and NORRIS, Circuit Judges, and GILLIAM, District Judge. **
Ronald Clark appeals the district court's denial of his motion for costs and attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Clark's request for an EAJA award followed the dismissal without prejudice of his lawsuit against the FAA upon the FAA's voluntary agreement to give Clark the relief he sought. We affirm the denial of an EAJA award because the district court lacked jurisdiction over Clark's suit.
Clark brought suit in district court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the FAA. He sought to force the FAA to publish verbatim in the Federal Register the summary Clark and others had submitted in their petition for rulemaking and to provide an extended 180-day comment period. Clark objected to the original published notice of the petition because it contained an abbreviated summary drafted by the FAA which he considered "wholly inadequate, if not deliberately misleading." After Clark noticed the depositions of the FAA's chief counsel and two retired FAA lawyers, the FAA agreed on the record to publish verbatim Clark's summary and allowed a 180-day comment period.
The FAA then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the district court lacked jurisdiction. Without addressing the motion or the jurisdictional issue, the district judge dismissed the case without prejudice. The court denied Clark's subsequent motion for attorney's fees and costs under the EAJA, determining that the FAA had been "substantially justified" in its actions.
The EAJA provides for the award of costs and attorney's fees in certain cases:
... [A] Judgment for costs ... may be awarded to a prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States or any agency or any official of the United States.... in any court having jurisdiction over such action....
....
... [A] court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses ... incurred by that party in any civil action ..., brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.
Clark filed his suit in federal district court, yet jurisdiction lay exclusively in the court of appeals. Section 1006 of the Federal Aviation Act is the statute conferring jurisdiction for judicial review of FAA actions. The statute provides that "[a]ny order, affirmative or negative, issued by the [Administrator] ... shall be subject to review by the courts of appeals." 49 U.S.C. app. § 1486 (1988). Under section 1006, the court of appeals' jurisdiction is exclusive with regard to review of final FAA actions. See Air Line Pilots Association, International v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 750 F.2d 81, 84 (D.C.Cir.1984) ("ALPA"); Nevada Airlines v. Bond, 622 F.2d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir.1980). An agency's denial of a petition for rulemaking constitutes final, reviewable agency action, "except where there is evidence of a 'clear and convincing legislative intent to negate review.' " WWHT, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 656 F.2d 807, 809 (D.C.Cir.1981); see also, e.g., GMC v. National Hwy. Traffic Safety Admin., 898 F.2d 165, 169 (D.C.Cir.1990); Nader v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 859 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1988). We perceive in section 1006 of the Federal Aviation Act no legislative intent to negate review of the FAA's final disposition of rulemaking petitions. Thus, any final action the FAA takes regarding Clark's rulemaking petition is subject to the court of appeals' exclusive review.
In addition, the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), empowers the federal courts in certain circumstances to issue interlocutory relief for nonfinal agency action or agency inaction. E.g., Public Utility Commissioner of Oregon v. Bonneville Power Admin., 767 F.2d 622, 630 (9th Cir.1985); California Energy Comm'n v. Johnson, 767 F.2d 631, 634 (9th Cir.1985). The federal courts' authority under the All Writs Act, however, is to be used "in aid of their prospective jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). When the prospective jurisdiction over an issue rests exclusively in the court of appeals, the district court necessarily has no power to grant interlocutory relief on that issue under the All Writs Act. ALPA, 750 F.2d at 84.
The scope of judicial review of final agency action includes the power to review the intermediate and procedural agency actions leading up to the final challenged result. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (). Thus, on review of the final disposition of a rulemaking petition, intermediate agency actions in processing the petition are also subject to review. Because the court of appeals' jurisdiction to review the FAA's final disposition of Clark's petition is exclusive, its jurisdiction to review at that time any procedural irregularities, such as publishing a "misleading" summary in the Federal Register, is also exclusive. Bonneville Power, 767 F.2d at 627 ( ). Because only the court of appeals had prospective jurisdiction over Clark's claim, the court of appeals' jurisdiction under the All Writs Act was exclusive.
We acknowledge that, had the district court not dismissed the suit when the FAA agreed to verbatim publication of his summary, Clark might have sought transfer of his suit to the court of appeals. Jurisdictional defects that arise when a suit is filed in the wrong federal court may be cured by transfer under the federal transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Section 1631 provides:
Whenever a civil action is filed in a [federal] court ... or an appeal, including a petition for review of administrative action, is noticed for or filed with such a court and that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to any other such court in which the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed, and the action or appeal shall proceed as if it had been filed in or noticed for the court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was actually filed in or noticed for the court from which it is transferred.
28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1988) (emphasis added). The transfer statute does not help Clark, however. Section 1631 does not itself establish jurisdiction, but rather corrects lack of jurisdiction only in cases that are actually transferred or are at least transferable. See Howitt v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 897 F.2d 583, 584 (1st Cir.) (declining to treat case as transferred when Federal Circuit found transfer not in interests of justice), cert....
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