Clark v. Centene Co. of Tex., L.P.
| Citation | 44 F.Supp.3d 674 |
| Decision Date | 02 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. A–12–CA–174–SS. |
| Parties | Kathy CLARK, Amy Endsley, Susan Grimmett, Margueriette Schmoll, and Kevin Ulrich, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. CENTENE COMPANY OF TEXAS, L.P., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Alexander M. Baggio, Rachhana T. Srey, Nichols Kaster & Anderson, PLLP, Minneapolis, MN, David G. Langenfeld, Thomas Bradley Bleich, Dunham & Jones, Attorneys at Law, P.C., Austin, TX, for Plaintiffs.
BE IT REMEMBERED on this day the Court reviewed the file in the above-styled cause, and specifically Defendant Centene Company of Texas, L.P.'s Motion for Summary Judgment [# 110], Plaintiffs Kathy Clark, Amy Endsley, Susan Grimmett, Margueriette Schmoll, and Kevin Ulrich's Response [# 122], and Centene's Reply [# 125]; Centene's Motion to Decertify [# 111], Plaintiffs' Response [# 119], and Centene's Reply [# 124]; and Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [# 113], Centene's Response [# 120], and Plaintiffs' Reply [# 126]. Having reviewed the documents, the governing law, and the file as a whole, the Court now enters the following opinion and orders.
This is an FLSA collective action brought by a number of utilization review nurses against their employer, Centene Company of Texas, to recover unpaid overtime wages. Utilization review consists of reviewing medical authorization requests submitted by healthcare providers to verify “medical necessity” and the “appropriate level of care” for insurance coverage and payment purposes. Plaintiffs are nurses who primarily perform utilization review, though their job titles vary. Nurses reviewing out-patient service requests are referred to as pre-certification, pre-authorization, or prior authorization (PA) nurses. Nurses reviewing in-patient service requests are referred to as concurrent review (CR) nurses. Nurses of both types are also more broadly referred to as Case Managers (CMs).
Plaintiffs are all nurses, but have varying degrees of education and hold different licenses and certifications. Among the different classifications are licensed practical nurses (LPNs), licensed vocational nurses (LVNs), and registered nurses (RNs).1 In Texas, an LVN must complete an educational program approximately one-year in length and pass the NCLEX–PN licensing examination. See 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 214.9(a)(1) (); id. § 217.4(a). An RN must complete an educational program between two and four years in length and pass the NCLEX–RN licensing examination. See id. § 215.9(a) (); id. § 217.4(a). Nurses of all types may also obtain four-year degrees (e.g., a Bachelor's of Science in Nursing), advanced degrees, and advanced certifications, and at least some CMs employed by Centene hold such qualifications. The baseline requirements to qualify for any CM job at Centene are: (1) licensure as an LPN, LVN, or RN, and (2) two or three years of clinical nursing experience.
This Court previously conditionally certified a class of utilization review nurses. The total number of plaintiffs, including the original five named plaintiffs, currently stands at thirty. Both sides have now filed summary judgment motions on a handful of issues, though both motions focus heavily on Centene's alleged FLSA exemption defenses. Centene has also moved to decertify the class on the basis the twenty-five opt-in plaintiffs are not similarly situated to the named plaintiffs.
Summary judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Washburn v. Harvey, 504 F.3d 505, 508 (5th Cir.2007). A dispute regarding a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view all inferences drawn from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; Washburn, 504 F.3d at 508. Further, a court “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence” in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) ; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254–55, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Once the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Mere conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence, and thus are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir.2007). Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence. Id. The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his claim. Adams v. Travelers Indent. Co. of Conn., 465 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir.2006). Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to “sift through the record in search of evidence” to support the nonmovant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing laws will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Disputed fact issues that are “irrelevant and unnecessary” will not be considered by a court in ruling on a summary judgment motion. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Several classes of employees are statutorily exempt from the FLSA's overtime requirements.
See 29 U.S.C. § 213 (listing exemption categories). “An employer claiming an exemption bears the burden of proving that the exemption claimed is valid.” Heidtman v. Cnty. of El Paso, 171 F.3d 1038, 1042 (5th Cir.1999). “Exemptions under the FLSA are construed narrowly against the employer, and the employer bears the burden to establish a claimed exemption.” Songer v. Dillon Res., Inc., 618 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir.2010). As the Fifth Circuit has explained, “the ultimate decision whether the employee is exempt from the FLSA's overtime compensation provisions is a question[ ] of law.” Lott v. Howard Wilson Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 203 F.3d 326, 331 (5th Cir.2000) ; see also Dalheim v. KDFW–TV, 918 F.2d 1220, 1226 (5th Cir.1990) ().
Centene claims Plaintiffs are exempt under at least one of three exemptions: (1) the learned professional exemption; (2) the administrative exemption; or (3) the combination exemption. The Court addresses each in turn.
The FLSA exempts from its overtime requirements “any employee employed in a bona fide ... professional capacity.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). Department of Labor regulations further define which employees qualify for this “learned professional” exemption. The regulations explain:
Plaintiffs first argue their work does not require “advanced knowledge ... customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized instruction.” See id. § 541.301(a)(3). The regulations contain a lengthy explanation of that phrase:
The phrase “customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized instruction” restricts the exemption to professions where specialized academic training is a standard prerequisite for entrance into the profession. The best prima facie evidence that an employee meets this requirement is the possession of the appropriate academic degree. However, the word “customarily” means that the exemption is also available to employees in such professions who have substantially the same knowledge level and perform substantially the same work as the degreed employees, but who attained the advanced knowledge through a combination of work experience and intellectual instruction. Thus, for example, the learned professional exemption is available to the occasional lawyer who has not gone to law school, or the occasional chemist who is not the possessor of a degree in chemistry. However, the learned professional exemption is not available for occupations...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Clark ex rel. Situated v. Centene Co. of Tex., L.P.
...44 F.Supp.3d 674Kathy CLARK, Amy Endsley, Susan Grimmett, Margueriette Schmoll, and Kevin Ulrich, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs,v.CENTENE COMPANY OF TEXAS, L.P., Defendant.Case No. A–12–CA–174–SS.United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Austin Divisi......