Clark v. Chappell
| Decision Date | 17 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 14-cv-04649-YGR (PR) |
| Parties | DOUGLAS DANIEL CLARK, Plaintiff, v. KEVIN CHAPPELL and CAROLE HYMAN, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Plaintiff Douglas Daniel Clark, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison ("SQSP"), filed this pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that prison officials at SQSP have refused to provide him with a diet that accommodates his religious beliefs in violation of his constitutional rights. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he identifies himself as a Messianic Jew. Dkt. 1 at 3.1 On February 29, 2012, Plaintiff submitted a religious diet request wherein he identified himself as a "Messianic Jew" and requested participation in the Jewish Kosher Diet Program ("JKDP") to accommodate his religious dietary laws. Id. The Jewish chaplain, Defendant Carole Hyman, denied his request, stating that Plaintiff would have to "convert" to her sect of Judaism to avail of the JKDP. Id. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief as well as declaratory and monetary damages.
On April 15, 2015, the Court found that the aforementioned allegation of Defendant Hyman's denial of Plaintiff's request to participate in the JKDP infringed upon his right to exercise his religious practices and beliefs and appeared to state a cognizable 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Dkt. 10 at 1-2. Thereafter, the Court found the Plaintiff had also stated a cognizable claim against Defendant Former SQSP Warden Kevin Chappell in his supervisory capacity based on this Defendant's failure to act to correct the constitutional violation despite being made aware ofDefendant Hyman's denial of Plaintiff's request to participate in JKDP. Dkt. 36 at 3-4.
Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss,2 in which they assert that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar Plaintiff's claims against them because Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity for his claims to be heard and determined in his state habeas proceedings in the Marin County Superior Court. Dkt. 24 at 8-14. Further, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims of injunctive relief under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA") are now moot because Plaintiff has been admitted to participate in the JKDP as of April 16, 2015. Id. at 13-14, Dkt. 24-2 at 9. Defendants argue that the complaint further fails to state a claim under RLUIPA because RLUIPA does not authorize a damages claim against Defendants, and any claim against Defendants in their official capacity is barred under the Eleventh Amendment. Dkt. 24 at 14-15. Finally, Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 15-16. In support of their motion to dismiss, Defendants have filed an unopposed request for judicial notice ("RJN") of the decision from Plaintiff's state superior court habeas proceedings and SQSP's "Approved Kosher List." Dkts. 24-1 at 1-2, 24-2.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants' request for judicial notice and GRANTS their motion to dismiss.
On a motion to dismiss, a court may properly look beyond the complaint to matters of public record, and doing so does not convert a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment. Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986) overruled on other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991); see also MGIC Indemn. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986). Here, Plaintiff has not objected to Defendants' RJN, and the Court finds the documents to be matters of public record properly subject to judicial notice.
The Court may take judicial notice of the Marin County Superior Court's "Order DenyingPetition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus" in In Re Douglas Daniel Clark, Case No. SC183347A (), because "a court may take judicial notice of its own records in other cases, as well as the records of an inferior court in other cases." United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980). The Court also takes judicial notice of SQSP's "Approved Kosher List," which includes Plaintiff's name (attached as Exhibit B to the RJN, Dkt. 24-2 at 8-9), because a court may take judicial notice of the official acts and public records of state agencies not subject to reasonable dispute because they can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Abdullah v. U.S. Sec. Associates, Inc., 731 F.3d 952, 959 n.10 (9th Cir. 2013).
Accordingly, Defendants' unopposed RJN is GRANTED. Dkt. 24-1.
First, Defendants argue that because Plaintiff has been admitted to the JKDP as of April 16, 2015, his claim for injunctive relief must be dismissed as moot. Dkt. 25 at 4. This Court agrees.
A claim is considered moot if it has lost its character as a present, live controversy, and if no effective relief can be granted: Where the question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by developments subsequent to filing of the complaint, no justiciable controversy is presented. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). Where injunctive relief is involved, questions of mootness are determined in light of the present circumstances. Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 528 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, because Plaintiff is presently participating in the JKDP, his claim for injunctive relief is DISMISSED as moot.
Plaintiff may proceed with his claim for declaratory and monetary damages, and the Court will now resolve the pending motion to dismiss as to the remaining claim for such damages, as discussed below.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a defendant to move to dismiss on theground that there is a "failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." A motion to dismiss should be granted if plaintiff fails to proffer "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (abrogating Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). The court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint," Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and must construe pro se pleadings liberally, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). The court need not accept as true allegations that are legal conclusions, unwarranted deductions of fact or unreasonable inferences. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988, amended, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). As mentioned above, in considering a motion to dismiss, the Court may take judicial notice of matters of public record outside the pleadings. See Mack, 798 F.2d at 1282; MGIC Indemn. Corp., 803 F.2d at 504.
On December 19, 2012, Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Marin County Superior Court, seeking to have the state court overrule Defendant Hyman's February 29, 2012 decision denying him admission into the JKDP. In Re Douglas Daniel Clark, Case No. SC183347A; Dkt. 24-2 at 2. Plaintiff had also described himself as a "Messianic Jew," and requested that the state superior court command the SQSP Warden to allow him to participate in the JKDP and to give him compensation for the days he was not allowed to participate in that program. Id. at 2. The state superior court construed the aforementioned filing as a state habeas petition. Id. at 4.
The state superior court issued an order to show cause regarding the petition, and solicited factual contentions from the parties, including a traverse setting forth Petitioner's contention that the CDCR's denial of his participation in the JKDP "has substantially burdened the exercise of his religion." Id.
Respondent in that state habeas action filed a return to the order to show cause showing that on February 2, 2012, Petitioner wrote a letter to Defendant Hyman asking to attend Jewish services acknowledging Petitioner's "baptism as an 'L.D.S. Mormon' and conced[ing] he is 'somewhat agnostic but [has] very deep religious roots . . . [with] a special affinity to the Jewishfaith." Id. at 4-5. The return also "shows that petitioner attended traditional Jewish services once after the [February 2, 2012] letter was written and then attended protestant services over the eight month period thereafter." Id. at 5. The state superior court noted that "[e]ssentially, respondent contend[ed] that petitioner's professed allegiance to a kosher diet [was] nothing more than an attempt to eat better." Id.
Although Plaintiff was given additional time, he did not respond to respondent's return. Id. Instead, the state superior court noted that Plaintiff filed a "'notice of appeal' of what he describe[d] as this court's 'hijacking' of his writ." Id. On December 2, 2013, the court denied the petition, and stated as follows:
On February 4, 2014, Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal.3 See Clark v. The Superior Court of Marin County, Case No. A140898. On February 19, 2014, the state appellate court denied the petition stating:
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