Clark v. Clawson, Case No. 3:20-cv-00230
| Decision Date | 05 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:20-cv-00230 |
| Parties | COREY CLARK, Plaintiff, v. REMINGTON CLAWSON et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
This civil rights action arises out of pro se Plaintiff Corey Clark's arrest and detention in the Wilson County Jail in Lebanon, Tennessee. (Doc. No. 3-1.) Defendants Wilson County Sheriff's Deputy Remington Clawson; Wilson County, Tennessee; and the City of Lebanon, Tennessee, have filed a motion to dismiss Clark's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 4.) Defendants argue that Clark's complaint is untimely and fails to state any claims for which relief can be granted. (Doc. No. 5.) Clark has responded in opposition to the motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 21), and Defendants have filed a reply (Doc. No. 23). Clark has also filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint under Rule 15(a)(2) and a proposed amended complaint. (Doc. Nos. 20, 20-1.) Defendants oppose Clark's motion to amend, arguing that the proposed amendments are futile because Clark's claims are still untimely and would not survive a motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 22.) For the reasons that follow, the Magistrate Judge will recommend that Defendants' motion to dismiss be granted and that Clark's motion to amend be denied.
Clark initiated this action on February 13, 2020, by filing a complaint in the Chancery Court of Wilson County, Tennessee. (Doc. No. 3-1.) Clark's complaint alleges that, in the early morning hours of Sunday, February 10, 2019, he was driving near his home in Mount Juliet, Tennessee, when Defendant Clawson pulled him over. (Id.) Clark gave Clawson his driver's license and registration, as requested, and asked "to know [Clawson's] probable cause for" stopping him. (Id. at PageID# 20.) Clawson "stat[ed] that he had pulled [Clark] over for a 'Light Law Violation'." (Id.) Clark states that "both [f]ront [h]eadlights on his automobile were completely operational and in working condition and, just days before, [he] had purchased bulbs for the automobile[']s rear brake lights . . . [and] replace[d] the older rear bulbs with the newly purchased bulbs on the same date of purchase." (Id.) Clark "provided [Clawson] with the receipt from the local Auto Zone reflecting this recent purchase[,]" and Clawson "looked at the receipt and[ ] handed it back to [Clark] stating, 'ok just hang tight for me and I'll be right back'." (Id.)
Clawson returned and "asked [Clark] if he wanted to get out of the automobile to check the rear light that [Clawson] alleged was the probable cause for him to [p]ull [Clark] over . . . ." (Id.) Clark said he would get out and check the lights, then exited his vehicle and took a step towards the rear of the car where he saw both taillights working. (Doc. No. 3-1.) "Almost simultaneously, Deputy Clawson grabbed [Clark's] left wrist" and began patting down Clark's pockets. (Id. at PageID# 21.) Clark objected that Clawson did not have his consent to search him, but Clawson said "he 'was just making sure for his safety that [Clark] did not have any dangerous weapons on his person and directed [Clark] to remain still with his legs apart and to outstretch both arms'."(Id.) Clark continued to object that Clawson did not have his consent to search him. Clawson then handcuffed Clark's wrists behind his back and told him he was under arrest. (Doc. No. 3-1.) Clawson said that, "after running [his] name through a national database on [Clawson's] computer, it appeared that [Clark] had a warrant for his arrest out of Yuma, Arizona for alleged intimidation." (Id. at PageID# 21.) Clawson "stated that he 'thought the warrant looked odd . . .'" and "stated multiple times that 'he had never seen such a warrant before and it was very generic in form and substance'." (Id.) Clark told Clawson that he had paperwork with him from an Arizona court, signed by the local Arizona sheriff's office, stating that the warrant Clawson found was void. (Doc. No. 3-1.) But "Clawson did not want to look at [the] paperwork" and told Clark that, no matter what it said, "'[h]e was still obligated to take [Clark] to jail because [Clark's] name showed up in his computer'." (Id. at PageID# 23.) At Clark's request, Clawson called a supervisor who "directed [him] . . . to bring [Clark] in to the Wilson County Jail anyway, in spite of the [p]aperwork [Clark] continued to offer [Clawson] . . . ." (Id.)
Clawson transported Clark to the Wilson County Jail in Lebanon. (Doc. No. 3-1.) Clark "was charged with one count of being a Fugitive from Justice under T.C.A. [§] 40-9-103." (Id. at PageID# 26.) He was booked into the jail, had his possessions taken from him, was strip searched, and was confined in a dirty cell with blood and feces on the walls, ceiling, and door. (Doc. No. 3-1.) Clark states that he "was in jail from 2:00 A.M. Sunday [m]orning . . . [t]hrough all day and night Monday and was not allowed to see a [j]udge until sometime early Tuesday [a]fternoon." (Id. at PageID# 27.) On Tuesday, February 12, 2019, following a hearing in Wilson County Court, the charge against Clark was dropped and he was released from jail. (Doc. No. 3-1.)
Clark's complaint alleges violations of federal and Tennessee laws arising from his arrest and detention. (Id.) Specifically, Clark states that his complaint is filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 8-8-302 and 8-19-301. (Id.) He seeks $100,000.00 in damages. (Id.)
Defendants removed the action to this Court on March 16, 2020. (Doc. No. 1.) Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss Clark's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) and a supporting memorandum of law. (Doc. Nos. 4, 5.) Defendants argue that all of Clark's claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations and that his complaint is untimely because Clark filed it after the limitations period had passed. (Doc. No. 5.) They further argue that Clark lacks any cause of action under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-19-301 and that he has failed to state any federal claims against Wilson County and the City of Lebanon. (Id.) Clark argues that his complaint was timely filed, that its allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, and, if the allegations are insufficient, that he should be granted leave to amend under Rule 15(a). (Doc. No. 21.) Defendants reply that Clark filed his complaint at least one day late, that he has not adequately pleaded the majority of his claims, and that any amendments would be futile because Clark's claims remain time-barred. (Doc. No. 23.)
On the same day he filed his response in opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss, Clark filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint under Rule 15(a)(2) and a proposed amended complaint. (Doc. Nos. 20, 20-1.) The proposed amended complaint adds three defendants and several legal claims arising out of the same alleged events, including claims asserted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986. (Doc. No. 20-1.) Defendants argue that Clark's motion to amend should be denied as futile because, among other reasons, neither § 241 nor § 242 provides a private cause of action and the remaining proposed claims in theamended complaint are subject to one-year limitations periods that Defendants argue Clark did not meet. (Doc. No. 22.) Clark did not file an optional reply in support of his motion to amend.
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must "construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Courtright v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d 513, 518 (6th Cir. 2016). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, "[t]he factual allegations in the complaint need to be sufficient to give notice to the defendant as to what claims are alleged, and the plaintiff must plead 'sufficient factual matter' to render the legal claim plausible, i.e., more than merely possible." Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009)).
"The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). A plaintiff must plead more than "'labels and conclusions[,]'" "'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[,]'" or "'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. () (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.
Because Clark proceeds pro se, the Court construes his filings "'liberally'" and holds his complaint "'to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]'" Erickson v.Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). There are limits to liberal construction, however, and "courts are not required to conjure up unpleaded allegations or guess at the nature of an argument." Brown v. Cracker Barrel Rest., 22 F. App'x 577, 578 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that district courts should "freely" grant a motion for leave to amend a pleading "when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2...
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