Clark v. Cnty. of Green Lake, Corr. Healthcare Cos.

• Decision Date: 12 September 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 14-C-1402
• Parties: ESTATE OF RYAN L. CLARK, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF GREEN LAKE, CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE COMPANIES INC., HEALTH PROFESSIONALS LTD., TINA KUEHN, BRUCE WALKER, STEVEN SCHONSCHECK, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

ESTATE OF RYAN L. CLARK, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF GREEN LAKE, CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE COMPANIES INC.,

HEALTH PROFESSIONALS LTD., TINA KUEHN, BRUCE WALKER,

STEVEN SCHONSCHECK, Defendants.

Case No. 14-C-1402

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

September 12, 2016

ORDER DENYING BRUCE WALKER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 42), GRANTING STEVEN SCHONSCHECK'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 42), DENYING TINA KUEHN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 70), GRANTING CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE COMPANIES INC. AND HEALTH PROFESSIONALS LTD.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 70), AND SETTING STATUS CONFERENCE

The Estate of Ryan Clark filed this lawsuit after Ryan Clark committed suicide while incarcerated in the Green Lake County Jail ("Jail"). Defendants Green Lake County, Bruce Walker, Liz Pflum, and Stephen Schonscheck ("Green Lake defendants") filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Then, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint for the purpose of adding a Monell claim against County of Green Lake and removing Pflum as a defendant.¹ (Doc. 48.) The court granted the motion to amend but denied the Green Lake defendants' motion to dismiss after concluding that disposition of the motion required consideration of the depositions and declarations on file. Months later, the corporate health care providers, CorrectionalHealthcare Companies, Inc. ("CHC"), and Health Professionals Ltd. ("HPL"), and their employee, Tina Kuehn, filed their motion for summary judgment. Consequently, the court must now decide whether Walker and Schonscheck have met their burden of establishing as a matter of law that they were not deliberately indifferent to Clark's medical needs and that Clark had no clearly established right to different treatment. Additionally, the court must decide whether the defense of qualified immunity extends to Kuehn, a nurse who was employed by a corporate health provider, and whether the plaintiff may proceed on a respondeat superior claim or a Monell claim against CHC and HPL. For the reasons set forth below, the motions will be granted as to Schonscheck, CHC, and HPL, but genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment for Walker and Kuehn.

Motions for summary judgment should be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). "Material" means that the factual dispute must be outcome-determinative under law. Contreras v. City of Chicago, 119 F.3d 1286, 1291 (7th Cir.1997). A "genuine" issue must have specific and sufficient evidence that, were a jury to believe it, would support a verdict in the non-moving party's favor. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). The moving party has the burden of showing there are no facts to support the non-moving party's claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. In determining whether to grant a motion for summary judgment, the court should consider the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. When the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational jury to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue and no reason to go to trial.Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). Further, once qualified immunity is raised by a defendant, it becomes the plaintiff's burden to defeat it. See Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 639 (7th Cir. 2008).

FINDINGS OF FACT

For purposes of summary judgment, the court has reviewed all proposed findings to make sure they are in compliance with the Federal and Local Rules and are supported by citations to the record. Also, it has disregarded proposed findings that were not set forth in short numbered paragraphs, or that were otherwise not supported by an affidavit or declaration made with personal knowledge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4); Civil L.R. 56(b)(1)(C)(i)-(iii). Moreover, the court notes that defendants' Daubert objections were not supported by a motion or argument and, therefore, should not be considered at this time.

This court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because the plaintiff, the Estate of Ryan Clark, has alleged a violation of Clark's constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1.) The Eastern District of Wisconsin is the proper venue for this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) as the events omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in Green Lake County, Wisconsin. (Doc. 1.) The Estate of Ryan L. Clark, represents the decedent, Ryan L. Clark ("Clark"). The Waushara County Circuit Court appointed Vickie Clark as administrator of Clark's estate. Waushara County Circuit Court Case No. 2012-PR-60.

Defendant Green Lake County is a municipal corporation organized under the laws of the State of Wisconsin. In May of 2012, Bruce Walker worked at the Green Lake CountyJail ("the Jail") as a corrections officer, Stephen Schonscheck was a part-time corrections officer, and Liz Pflum was a corrections sergeant. (Doc. 46, Simatic Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. A.)

Green Lake County contracted with HPL to provide healthcare for inmates at the Jail. The term of the contract at issue was July 1, 2011, through December 31, 2012. (Doc. 8, ¶ 10.) However, CHC did not contract to provide mental health services at the Green Lake County Jail:

1.11 MENTAL HEALTH - NOT COVERED. HPL shall not be responsible for the provision or cost of any mental health services. The COUNTY shall be responsible for the provision or cost of mental health services for the JAIL POPULATION.

(Elmer Aff. ¶ 5, 4.) HPL was taken over by CHC (Lueptow Dep. 40.), and, for purposes of this suit, it is undisputed that HPL and CHC had common corporate ownership, officers and directors. (Doc. 102, ¶ 4.)

Between December 2011, and October 1, 2012, CHC employed Kuehn as a registered nurse at the Green Lake County Correctional Facility in Green Lake, Wisconsin. (Doc. 8, ¶ 12; Kuehn Dep. Exs. 1 and 3.) Kuehn has been a licensed registered nurse since 2010.² Kuehn's position entailed providing a full range of nursing services to inmates including assessing, nursing diagnosis, planning, implementing, and evaluating the medical condition of inmate patients. (Olson Decl. ¶ 5, Kuehn Dep. Ex. 2.) Kuehn testified in her deposition that "officers would let [me] know if there was anything they found to be—as far as like a red flag as mental history. As far as current suicidal ideation or wanting to harm themselves, they would—he or she would let [me] know that they found that on their assessment." (Kuehn Dep. 43.)

On August 15, 2007, Clark was sentenced to eighteen months in state prison followed by three years on extended supervision for his fifth offense of operating under the influence contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1). (Doc. 46, Simatic Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. D.) Clark finished his term of confinement on February 24, 2009, and was released to extended supervision. (Id.) Thereafter, Clark was admitted to the Jail approximately eight times during the next two years as a result of alleged infractions of the rules of his extended supervision. (Id.) Each time he was placed on a "hold" by his extended supervision officer as a result of an alleged infraction of the rules of extended supervision that included being under the influence of alcohol. (Doc. 1, ¶ 405.) On June 4, 2009, Clark was perceived by the Jail staff to be suicidal and was placed on Special Watch Observation. (Ward Decl. ¶ 5.) Walker was one of the correctional officers who observed and interacted with Clark while Clark was on Special Watch Observation in 2009. (Doc. 1, ¶ 408.)

In early August of 2011, Clark was perceived to be suicidal during his confinement at the Winnebago County Jail (where he attempted to cut his wrists on the edge of the sink or toilet in his cell) resulting in his being placed on Special Watch there. He was transferred to Green Lake County Jail later that month, and the account of his suicidal conduct was included in his transfer documents. (Doc. 59, Ward Decl. ¶ 6.) Further, during his several admissions to the Jail between February 2009, and August of 2011, Clark was frequently given medications for depression. (Doc. 59, Ward Decl. ¶ 7.) For example, in May and June of 2009, he was prescribed Fluoxetine for his treatment of depression. (Doc. 59, Ward Decl. ¶ 8.) He told the Intake Officer that when he does not take the medication he gets anxiety attacks. (Doc. 59, Ward Decl. ¶ 9.) During his stay at the Jail in August of2010 and in Mach of 2011, Clark was prescribed Sertraline, an antidepressant. (Doc. 59, Ward Decl. ¶¶ 10, 11.)

After Clark's extended supervision was revoked in September of 2011, he returned to prison. (Doc. 46, Simatic Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. D.) On November 29, 2011, Clark was released and began a period of extended supervision. (Doc. 46, Simatic Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. E.) However, on January 12, 2012, he was admitted to the Jail and was required to serve a 60-day sanction for violating provisions of his extended supervision. (Doc. 46, Simatic Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. F.) At that time, Pflum assessed Clark as a maximum suicide risk. (Doc 1, ¶ 418.) On January 27, 2012, Kuehn administered a Health Assessment and determined that Clark was suffering from depression and alcoholism. (Doc. 59, Ward Decl. ¶ 14.) While incarcerated from January to March 23, 2012, Clark was prescribed Trazadone and had seven sessions with the mental health worker as noted in his jail records. (Doc. 59, Ward Decl. ¶¶ 15, 16.)

On May 23, 2012, Clark was again admitted to the Jail for violating the terms of his extended supervision. (Doc. 57, ¶ 16.) A preliminary breath test revealed that he had a blood alcohol level of 0.27, more than three times the legal...